Sudan

15 July 2026
Risk Level: Current Crisis

Populations in Sudan are enduring war crimes and crimes against humanity due to an armed confrontation between the Sudanese military, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied armed groups. Non-Arab communities in Darfur are enduring crimes perpetrated by the RSF that may amount to acts of genocide.

BACKGROUND:

Since violent clashes broke out on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), both parties have been fighting to preserve and expand their control in Sudan. Allied armed groups have further complicated the conflict. The fighting has included indiscriminate and deliberate attacks against civilians and civilian objects, frequent shelling, bombardments and heavy artillery strikes, often in densely populated areas. Parties to the conflict have also engaged in widespread sexual violence, including rape, sexual assault, exploitation and sexual slavery. The UN Human Rights Council (HRC)-mandated Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) concluded that the SAF and RSF and allied armed groups are responsible for large-scale violations of human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), many amounting to war crimes and/or crimes against humanity.

The RSF have utilized the conflict to accelerate a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing and large-scale attacks targeting non-Arab communities in Darfur and elsewhere. In February 2026 the FFM concluded that the RSF committed crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide against non-Arab communities in and around El Fasher, North Darfur, during its siege and subsequent takeover of the city in October 2025. During and after the fall of El Fasher, victims have endured widespread rape, arbitrary detention and extrajudicial executions, with many acts documented on video and celebrated by perpetrators. Satellite imagery suggests door-to-door executions, mass graves and the burning of objects that may be consistent with bodies. Unconfirmed reports from December 2025 estimate that at least 60,000 people may have been killed since the RSF’s takeover. An additional 150,000 residents remain unaccounted for.

In November 2025 the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the African Union (AU) Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities warned of the real and growing risk of genocide in Sudan, citing crimes that display strong indicators of intentionally inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction, in whole or in part, of targeted communities.

The conflict has severely restricted humanitarian access through attacks, blockades and looting, triggering the world’s largest hunger crisis. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, over 13 million people have been displaced since April 2023 and an estimated 33.7 million people require assistance. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Famine Review Committee has confirmed famine in parts of North Darfur and Kordofan states and has expressed grave concern about a shift toward normalization of famine or near-famine conditions in parts of Sudan. Starvation has been used as a method of warfare, potentially amounting to the war crime of starvation and/or the crime against humanity of extermination.

The conflict stems from Sudan’s turbulent political transition following the overthrow of former President Omar al-Bashir in 2019. Leadership was initially transferred to a joint civilian-military transitional Sovereign Council but the military – led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and supported by Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo – seized power on 25 October 2021. The current conflict erupted from mounting tensions between General Burhan, commander of the SAF, and General Hemedti, commander of the RSF, regarding the RSF’s integration into Sudan’s regular forces as part of a political agreement aiming to establish a new transitional civilian authority.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

The strategic city of El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, has come under increasing attack. Since May repeated drone strikes have damaged critical civilian infrastructure, including electricity generation facilities, fuel storage sites, gas stations and the main market. As the RSF seeks to expand its control into North Kordofan, concerns are mounting that El Obeid could face a prolonged siege or major offensive, placing hundreds of thousands of civilians at heightened risk. In early July the HRC convened an urgent debate to discuss the situation in and around El Obeid and requested the FFM to conduct an urgent inquiry.

Drone warfare has become a defining feature of the conflict, significantly expanding the reach and intensity of violence against civilians, including in and around densely populated areas. Both the SAF and the RSF have increasingly relied on drones for surveillance and targeted strikes. Drone attacks on hospitals, markets, neighborhoods and critical infrastructure have heightened the risk of indiscriminate harm and contributed to widespread displacement. On 15 June the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that his Office documented more than 1,000 civilians killed by drone strikes during the first five months of 2026.

In February, in response to the FFM’s findings, the Netherlands, Ireland, Norway, Germany and the UK established a coalition of like-minded states and regional institutions committed to preventing further atrocities in Sudan and supporting pathways to justice. Since its establishment, the Coalition on Atrocity Prevention and Justice in Sudan has engaged with humanitarian and human rights organizations, issued joint statements on atrocity crimes and expanded its membership.

ANALYSIS:

Generals Burhan and Hemedti have consistently disregarded or obstructed attempts at ceasefires and peace deals and undermined Sudan’s political transition to preserve and expand their power and privileges. Both continue to recruit forces along ethnic lines and strengthen relationships with regional powers, whose backing fuels the conflict.

While a ceasefire between the SAF and RSF is vital, it will not end the RSF’s ongoing identity-based violence. For decades, the Arab-dominated government imposed its control on ethnic minorities and exploited ethnic divisions, with armed Arab militias like the Janjaweed (the RSF’s forerunner), fueling deadly competition for resources and pastoral land. Civilians in Darfur, particularly non-Arab communities, are at risk of ethnic cleansing and genocide given the country’s genocidal history, entrenched impunity for past crimes and ongoing ethnically charged violence.

Civilians are at grave risk in El Obeid, where the emerging pattern of encirclement, siege warfare and sustained strikes on civilian infrastructure mirrors RSF tactics previously documented in El Fasher. There, similar methods were used to isolate the city, degrade essential services and intensify pressure on civilians through bombardment and encirclement.

Impunity has allowed those responsible for atrocity crimes and grave human rights violations to remain in leadership positions. During his dictatorship, former President Bashir, government officials and militia leaders were allegedly responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes and acts of genocide, for which they were indicted by the International Criminal Court following a 2005 UN Security Council (UNSC) referral. As a commander of the Janjaweed, General Hemedti was also implicated in atrocities committed during the conflict in Darfur and beyond.

RISK ASSESSMENT:

      • Escalating humanitarian and human rights catastrophes driven by armed conflict, including widespread violence and increasing use of drones in densely populated areas.
      • Deliberate targeting of civilians based on their ethnicity, which may amount to ethnic cleansing and genocide.
      • Past or present serious discriminatory practices, policies or legislation against marginalized communities and persons belonging to minority groups, some of which may amount to crimes against humanity and acts of genocide.
      • Complete absence of meaningful reconciliation, accountability or transitional justice mechanisms, leaving victims and survivors without redress.
      • Sustained external interference through the provision of arms, funding, logistics, training or other forms of support by states, private companies and other entities.

NECESSARY ACTION:

Generals Burhan and Hemedti must agree to a permanent cessation of hostilities and all forces under their command must adhere to International Human Rights Law and IHL. The international community, including the UNSC, AU and UN member states, must use diplomatic channels, far-reaching sanctions and public condemnation to compel all parties to immediately cease attacks on civilians. The UNSC must urgently consider strengthened measures to protect civilians and prevent further escalation, including expanding sanctions against those responsible for atrocities. External actors fueling the conflict must be held accountable, including the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, Russia and Iran. States Parties to the Genocide Convention have a legal obligation to prevent and punish acts of genocide in Sudan.

Alongside ceasefire negotiations, the international community must rigorously assess the risk of further atrocities by identifying communities at imminent risk and coordinating timely, context-specific responses. Given Sudan’s fragmented conflict, all prevention and protection strategies must be tailored to local needs. The Coalition on Atrocity Prevention and Justice in Sudan must ensure that preventing atrocities becomes a central priority in international engagement on Sudan.

The UN and member states must develop a comprehensive plan to address the humanitarian and protection needs of civilians, particularly women, children, internally displaced persons and minorities. International donors must utilize more innovative and flexible ways for aid delivery across Sudan, including support for civilian-run Emergency Response Rooms, neighborhood communities and the disbursement of cash grants to empower local communities.

A comprehensive and inclusive political dialogue involving all relevant stakeholders, including civil society and marginalized groups, must be facilitated to address the root causes of the conflict and lay the groundwork for lasting peace.


For more on the Global Centre’s advocacy work on the situation in Sudan, see our Sudan country advocacy page.

GET INVOLVED

Sign up for our newsletter and stay up to date on R2P news and alerts

CONTACT US

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies
The Graduate Center, CUNY
365 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5203
New York, NY 10016-4309, USA

Phone: +1 212-817-1929 | info@globalr2p.org