Populations in Sudan are enduring war crimes and crimes against humanity due to an armed confrontation between the Sudanese military, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied armed groups. Non-Arab communities in Darfur are enduring crimes perpetrated by the RSF that may amount to acts of genocide.
Since the outbreak of fighting on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), both parties have committed widespread violations of human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), unleashing a war in which civilians have been deliberately targeted and subjected to widespread atrocities. Allied armed groups have further complicated the conflict. The fighting has included indiscriminate and deliberate attacks against civilians and civilian objects, frequent shelling, bombardments and heavy artillery strikes, often in densely populated areas. Parties to the conflict have also engaged in widespread sexual violence, including rape, sexual assault, exploitation and sexual slavery, as well as arbitrary detention, torture, forced displacement and attacks on infrastructure essential for civilian survival. The UN Human Rights Council-mandated Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) concluded that the SAF and RSF and allied armed groups are responsible for war crimes and/or crimes against humanity.
The RSF have utilized the conflict to accelerate a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing and large-scale attacks targeting non-Arab communities in Darfur and elsewhere. These have included mass atrocities in El Geneina in 2023 and El Fasher in 2025, involving mass killings, rape, torture and forced displacement. In November 2025 the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the African Union (AU) Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities warned of a real and growing risk of genocide in Sudan, citing crimes displaying strong indicators of intentionally inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction, in whole or in part, of targeted communities. Following the RSF’s capture of El Fasher in October 2025, the FFM documented more than 6,000 killings during the first three days of the final offensive alone, while noting that the actual death toll was likely significantly higher. In February 2026 the FFM concluded that the RSF had committed crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide against non-Arab communities in and around El Fasher.
The conflict has severely restricted humanitarian access through attacks, blockades and looting, triggering the world’s largest hunger crisis. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, nearly 13 million people have been displaced since April 2023 and an estimated 33.7 million require assistance. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification has identified a risk of famine in fourteen areas across North Darfur, South Darfur and South Kordofan under a reasonable worst-case scenario characterized by intensified conflict and further restrictions on humanitarian access and the movement of goods and people between February 2026 and January 2027. Starvation has also been used as a method of warfare, potentially constituting the war crime of starvation and/or the crime against humanity of extermination.
The current conflict stems from Sudan’s turbulent political transition following the overthrow of former President Omar al-Bashir in 2019. A power-sharing agreement established a civilian-military transitional government in August 2019, however, the military seized power in October 2021, dissolving the transitional government and consolidating military control. Tensions subsequently escalated between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, commander of the SAF, and General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, commander of the RSF, over the distribution of political and military power during the transition, including the terms and timeline for integrating the RSF into Sudan’s regular armed forces.
Drone warfare has become a defining feature of the conflict, significantly expanding the reach and intensity of attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. In September the FFM reported that foreign weapons, military technology, fighters and logistical networks are strengthening the military capabilities of the SAF and RSF and enabling increasingly sophisticated drone operations. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights documented at least 306 deaths and hundreds of injuries resulting from drone strikes by both parties during the first three weeks of October alone. The attacks have intensified severe humanitarian pressures in the city, where siege-like conditions have disrupted access to food, water, electricity and other essential services. The FFM found reasonable grounds to believe that repeated RSF drone strikes on El Obeid between July and August constituted serious violations of IHL and may amount to war crimes.
During early November, fighting intensified around El Obeid, North Kordofan, as SAF and allied forces advanced along the city’s western and southern approaches, while RSF counterattacks reversed some of their gains. The clashes reflect the continued contest over key supply routes around the city.
The Coalition for Atrocity Prevention and Justice in Sudan has continued its attempts to strengthen civilian protection and advance accountability. On 19–20 August Coalition members convened in London to discuss civilian protection measures and met with the FFM to coordinate support for the renewal of its mandate.
Sudan’s conflict has increasingly entrenched a de facto partition, with rival authorities consolidating control over different parts of the country and developing competing governance structures. Rather than advancing a transition to civilian rule, these developments risk further fragmenting the state and entrenching the power of armed actors. Repeated failures to secure a ceasefire and political settlement have failed to end the war, while external support continues to strengthen the parties’ military capabilities.
Civilians across the Kordofans and Blue Nile face escalating risks as fighting spreads, armed actors contest territorial control and attacks increasingly affect civilian areas and critical infrastructure. The use of drone warfare, attacks on civilian infrastructure and disruptions to supply routes and humanitarian access are compounding existing vulnerabilities, increasing the risks of civilian casualties, displacement and deprivation of essential services. As front lines shift and armed actors compete for strategic territory, civilians face heightened exposure to indiscriminate attacks. A ceasefire is essential to protect civilians, but it alone will not address the entrenched drivers of conflict and atrocities. For decades, the Arab-dominated government imposed its control on ethnic minorities and exploited ethnic divisions, with armed Arab militias like the Janjaweed (the RSF’s forerunner), fueling deadly competition for resources and pastoral land. Civilians in Darfur, particularly non-Arab communities, are at risk of ethnic cleansing and genocide given the country’s genocidal history, entrenched impunity and ongoing ethnically charged violence.
Impunity has enabled individuals implicated in atrocity crimes to retain positions of power. Former President Bashir, government officials and militia leaders were allegedly responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes and acts of genocide, for which they were indicted by the International Criminal Court following a 2005 UN Security Council (UNSC) referral. As a commander of the Janjaweed, General Hemedti was also implicated in atrocities committed during the conflict in Darfur and beyond.
Generals Burhan and Hemedti must agree to a permanent cessation of hostilities and all forces under their command must adhere to International Human Rights Law and IHL. The international community, including the UNSC, AU and UN member states, must use diplomatic channels, far-reaching sanctions and public condemnation to compel all parties to immediately cease attacks on civilians. The UNSC must urgently consider strengthened measures to protect civilians and prevent further escalation, including expanding sanctions against those responsible for atrocities. External actors fueling the conflict must be held accountable, including the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, Russia and Iran. States Parties to the Genocide Convention have a legal obligation to prevent and punish acts of genocide in Sudan.
Alongside ceasefire negotiations, the international community must rigorously assess the risk of further atrocities by identifying communities at imminent risk and coordinating timely, context-specific responses. Given Sudan’s fragmented conflict, all prevention and protection strategies must be tailored to local needs. The Coalition on Atrocity Prevention and Justice in Sudan must ensure that preventing atrocities becomes a central priority in international engagement on Sudan.
The UN and member states must develop a comprehensive plan to address the humanitarian and protection needs of civilians, particularly women, children, internally displaced persons and minorities. International donors must utilize more innovative and flexible ways for aid delivery across Sudan, including support for civilian-run Emergency Response Rooms, neighborhood communities and the disbursement of cash grants to empower local communities.
A comprehensive and inclusive political dialogue involving all relevant stakeholders, including civil society and marginalized groups, must be facilitated to address the root causes of the conflict and lay the groundwork for lasting peace.
For more on the Global Centre’s advocacy work on the situation in Sudan, see our Sudan country advocacy page.
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