Venezuela

15 July 2026
Risk Level: Current Crisis

Ongoing systematic state-led repression in Venezuela may amount to crimes against humanity.

BACKGROUND:

On 3 January 2026 United States (US) armed forces conducted an unprecedented and unlawful military operation in Venezuela, resulting in the forced transfer of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, to US territory. In the subsequent days, Delcy Rodríguez – who served as vice president under Maduro – was sworn in as acting president. While Maduro’s forcible removal generated cautious hope and created a critical opportunity for meaningful long-term change, the political, security and institutional structures that enabled widespread abuses remain largely intact. This continuity was evident in the immediate aftermath of his removal, when domestic authorities issued emergency decrees, deployed colectivos in public spaces and temporarily detained journalists, demonstrating that the state’s repressive apparatus remains capable of carrying out systematic political persecution.

For more than a decade, Maduro presided over an entrenched authoritarian system. Following years of endemic corruption and the gradual erosion of the rule of law, mass protests erupted in 2014 in response to insecurity, hyperinflation and a lack of essential services. These protests were met with a brutal crackdown by state agents. Since then, the Venezuelan government, including civilian and military intelligence and security forces, has perpetrated systematic arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, sexual and gender-based violence and short-term enforced disappearances targeting a wide range of actual and perceived opponents. Pro-government paramilitaries, known as colectivos, have also been regularly mobilized to reinforce coercive control at the community level. Various security forces have been implicated in tens of thousands of extrajudicial killings carried out under the pretext of combating crime.

Authorities have steadily dismantled safeguards against authoritarianism, including by shrinking and attacking civic space through restrictive laws, criminalizing opposition activities and targeting civil society organizations (CSOs) and independent media.

Patterns of politically motivated repression intensified in the lead-up and aftermath of the presidential elections held on 28 July 2024. Following the opposition’s landslide victory and the government’s refusal to relinquish power, authorities escalated persecution of actual or alleged opponents, including ordinary citizens, opposition members, journalists and human rights defenders. Venezuelan rights organization Foro Penal recorded the detention of almost 2,000 individuals between election and inauguration day alone.

Since the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) established the Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela (FFM) in 2019, it has repeatedly found that violations and abuses committed since at least 2014 formed part of a “widespread and systematic attack” against the civilian population and are “part of a plan orchestrated at the highest levels of the government to repress dissent through crimes against humanity.” The International Criminal Court’s Chief Prosecutor opened an investigation into possible crimes against humanity in November 2021.

Venezuela’s wider security landscape has further compounded risks to civilians. Armed groups and criminal actors operate with relative impunity in multiple regions, at times in collusion with state agents. This fragmentation has deepened vulnerability, including among Indigenous Peoples, particularly in border regions and resource-rich areas.

Since 2014 populations have endured a prolonged humanitarian emergency and the full collapse of socio-economic systems, leaving most Venezuelans in need of assistance amid severely underfunded humanitarian relief efforts. Throughout this period an estimated 8 million Venezuelans have left the country in what is considered the largest migration crisis in recent Latin American history.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

On 24 June two powerful earthquakes struck Venezuela less than a minute apart, causing catastrophic destruction across the Capital District and several central and coastal states. The official death toll, as of 13 July, has surpassed 4,400 and is believed to be significantly higher, with thousands still unaccounted for. Venezuelan authorities have faced intense criticism for a response widely regarded as grossly inadequate. Family members, national humanitarian organizations, international actors and civil society volunteers have carried out the bulk of the relief effort. Provea also warned of the deployment of security bodies with no legal competence in disaster response – including the military counterintelligence directorate and the intelligence service – which could obstruct relief efforts and result in human rights abuses.

Amid broader concerns regarding the direction of the transition process, the release of political prisoners quickly emerged as one of the most pressing issues. While authorities announced on several occasions that significant numbers of the more than 1,000 political prisoners in state custody would be released, Foro Penal has documented far more limited releases in practice, with many of those freed remaining subject to precautionary measures, ongoing criminal investigations and restrictions on public communication.

Separately, the National Assembly adopted a controversial Amnesty Law for political detainees on 19 February. The law generated significant concern regarding its limited scope and ability to provide comprehensive redress, as well as lack of transparency over its implementation. Moreover, it remains unclear to what extent the releases announced by the authorities have been carried out pursuant to the Amnesty Law, as opposed to other legal or administrative mechanisms. Uncertainty increased further when President Rodríguez announced in late April that the process “will be coming to an end,” raising questions regarding the fate of an estimated 380-550 remaining political prisoners.

ANALYSIS:

The government’s inadequate response to the earthquakes has revealed how years of corruption and institutional decay have eroded the state’s capacity to fulfil even its most basic functions. The reliance on security forces implicated in crimes against humanity to lead the response has raised further concerns that state conduct may place affected communities at even greater risk.

The actions undertaken by the US constitute a serious breach of the UN Charter. Uncertainty over internal power dynamics within Venezuela’s ruling elite has increased the risk of renewed repression to consolidate authority. Although authorities have sought to project an image of transition, measures adopted thus far have largely focused on economic concessions and normalization with the US rather than addressing the institutional drivers of atrocity crimes. There has been no meaningful commitment to reform the judiciary, electoral system or security sector, nor to dismantle the legal and institutional frameworks that have enabled political persecution and the systematic restriction of civic space. The replacement of some senior officials, including the country’s attorney general or defense minister, with other long-standing regime figures illustrates the limited nature of these changes and risks perpetuating the same structures responsible for atrocity crimes under Maduro.

At the same time, the acting authorities’ growing need for international legitimacy has created a narrow but important opportunity to press for change. While both the prisoner release process and the Amnesty Law have been marred by significant shortcomings, they nevertheless represent developments that would have been unlikely prior to Maduro’s removal and demonstrate the authorities’ responsiveness to external pressure. These dynamics underscore the need for cross-regional governments to place human rights, atrocity prevention, accountability and rule of law concerns at the center of their engagement strategies. Absent such benchmarks, governments risk disregarding Venezuelans’ demands for democratic change, exacerbating protection gaps, entrenching acute poverty and potentially contributing to further displacement and migration.

RISK ASSESSMENT:

      • Ambiguity over the exercise of state authority, producing volatile power dynamics.
      • Continued influence of senior government officials involved in the planning and commission of crimes against humanity.
      • Lack of independent and impartial judiciary and other state institutions, enabling impunity for atrocity crimes.
      • Adoption of measures to criminalize CSOs and attacks against democratic institutions.
      • Absence of accountable state authority, presence of non-state armed actors and high levels of crime, corruption and illicit economic exploitation.

NECESSARY ACTION:

Venezuelan authorities must immediately end systematic repression and fully release all individuals arbitrarily detained. The government should commit to genuine and comprehensive reform, pursue impartial investigations into all serious violations and abuses, immediately grant all OHCHR staff full and permanent access to the country, including all detention facilities, and fully cooperate with the FFM. In the aftermath of the earthquakes, the authorities must immediately grant humanitarian actors and independent media full and unrestricted access and guarantee transparency on ongoing recovery efforts, the identification of the dead and the tracing of the missing.

US engagement must move beyond a narrow emphasis on resource access and instead toward a genuine commitment to human rights. This must be pursued through multilateral frameworks and reflected in concrete measures to address the severe living conditions and socio-economic hardship facing Venezuelans and a sustainable path towards democratic reform.

Closing diverse protection gaps and advancing a long-term path toward democratic change will require principled, coordinated and long-term engagement, including by regional member states, Canada and the European Union. This should include concrete calls for electoral reform. Governments engaging with Venezuelan authorities, including through their diplomatic missions in Caracas, must ensure that engagement is firmly oriented toward restoring fundamental liberties and the rule of law. Recommendations issued by the FFM should be used as the basis for political and diplomatic efforts.

UN member states should renew the mandate of the FFM for a period of two years at the upcoming 63rd session of the HRC in September.


For more on the Global Centre’s advocacy work on the situation in Venezuela, see our Venezuela country advocacy page.

GET INVOLVED

Sign up for our newsletter and stay up to date on R2P news and alerts

CONTACT US

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies
The Graduate Center, CUNY
365 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5203
New York, NY 10016-4309, USA

Phone: +1 212-817-1929 | info@globalr2p.org