Persistent localized and inter-communal violence, amid a fragile and increasingly strained peace process, continues to pose a serious and escalating threat to civilians in South Sudan.
South Sudan is at serious risk of returning to widespread armed conflict amid escalating political tensions, persistent localized violence and the continued failure to fully implement the 2018 peace agreement, which was intended to end the country’s 2013–2015 civil war and chart a path toward stability.
Fighting between forces aligned with President Salva Kiir – the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) – and armed opposition groups renewed in February 2025 after opposition groups overran an army base in Nasir. The attack triggered retaliatory actions by the SSPDF and a campaign of arrests targeting leaders aligned with First Vice President Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO), culminating in Machar’s placement under house arrest. These developments effectively rendered the power-sharing framework inoperative by March 2025 and signaled the collapse of the political settlement.
Hostilities and tensions intensified sharply in late December 2025, fueling a broader cycle of violence involving government and opposition-aligned armed groups. Attacks targeting Machar and recurrent clashes between forces aligned with him – including the loosely organized White Army, composed primarily of Nuer youth – and the SSPDF deepened these divisions. Ongoing hate speech and inflammatory rhetoric, including from senior military officials, and localized conflict, featuring intermittent fighting and ethnically motivated violence, continue to expose civilians to conflict-related violence, sexual and gender-based violence, killings and other grave human rights violations and abuses.
Since gaining independence in 2011, South Sudan has experienced persistent conflict and atrocities, with successive phases of violence threatening civilians across the country. The civil war between December 2013 and August 2015 caused an estimated 400,000 deaths. Both the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), under President Kiir, and the SPLA-IO, led by Machar, perpetrated widespread atrocities, including extrajudicial killings, torture, child abductions and sexual violence.
Parties to the conflict signed multiple agreements between 2015 and 2018, culminating in the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The R-ARCSS established the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) and a power-sharing arrangement between Kiir and Machar, while outlining a roadmap for institutional reform and eventual national elections. Repeated implementation delays, compounded by President Kiir’s unilateral amendments and major political reshuffles, have deepened mistrust and prolonged political uncertainty. The transitional period has been extended multiple times, with the latest extension postponing the country’s first elections to December 2026.
Cross-border movements by armed groups operating in Sudan and South Sudan have further heightened insecurity, including in the disputed Abyei border region.
Over 10 million people – more than two thirds of the population – need humanitarian assistance. An estimated 2.5 million people remain internally displaced and 2.29 million have fled to neighboring countries. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of refugees and returnees have been forced to flee the conflict in neighboring Sudan into South Sudan, straining already limited resources and compounding existing food insecurity.
In recent months, political contestation and intense military operations, including aerial bombardments and indiscriminate attacks, have significantly increased in the Greater Upper Nile, Jonglei and Western and Eastern Equatoria regions. These escalations have caused substantial civilian casualties, the destruction of critical infrastructure, including health facilities, schools and public buildings, widespread displacement and the forced separation of families. The situation is particularly acute in Jonglei State, where fighting intensified in April and May. In Akobo County, sustained clashes have caused large-scale displacement and civilian casualties as control of the area shifted repeatedly. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported increasing incidents of child abduction, conflict-related sexual violence and recruitment into armed groups in Akobo and surrounding counties.
In February the African Union (AU) High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5), consisting of five African Heads of State, called for an immediate end to hostilities, measures to create an environment for credible elections and a renewed focus on inclusive political engagement to sustain the peace process. On 1 July South Sudan’s parliament approved controversial amendments to the R-ARCSS, removing requirements for a population census and a permanent constitution before elections.
The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has been significantly affected by the UN’s liquidity crisis and system-wide contingency measures, including troop repatriations and the closure of several bases, hindering its ability to carry out core protection, political and human rights functions. In April 2026, led by the United States, the UN Security Council (UNSC) narrowed UNMISS’s mandate to restrict capacity-building and development activities, specifically reducing the mission’s direct support for elections. The renewal also includes cuts to both civilian personnel and uniformed peacekeepers. This shifts UNMISS away from a broader role focused on supporting state institutions toward a more limited protection posture, reducing its engagement in long-term institution-building, governance support and electoral preparedness. These changes risk weakening early warning and prevention capacities and could increase the risk of atrocity crimes.
The current instability in South Sudan stems from long-standing political, ethnic and local tensions, compounded by prolonged delays and ongoing friction within the TGoNU. Senior political and military leaders continue to exploit long-standing ethnic divisions to serve their own agendas, while the repeated failure to uphold peace agreements, ongoing political competition and the mobilization of armed groups reflect a lack of genuine commitment to a political solution. Tensions over access to resources and political appointments have sparked violent clashes and serious human rights violations. Both Kiir and Machar, alongside their supporters and allied forces, have prioritized the preservation of personal power, allowing mistrust to deepen ethnic divisions and fuel violence.
A pervasive culture of impunity continues to perpetuate resentment, recurring cycles of violence and atrocity crimes. Neither the government nor opposition groups have held perpetrators within their own ranks accountable for past or current atrocities. Despite authorities signing into law the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing Act and the Compensation and Reparations Authority Act in 2024, none of the transitional justice mechanisms provided for by the R-ARCSS, including the Hybrid Court, have been established or are operational.
The continued influx and accessibility of small arms, light weapons and ammunition among armed groups, government forces, civilians and youth groups have further militarized society and made inter-communal clashes increasingly deadly. The war in Sudan has significantly expanded illicit arms flows into South Sudan, with looted weapons from Sudan trafficked across porous borders through Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and the Abyei region. Ongoing armed conflict and continued violations of ceasefire agreements underline the importance of the UNSC-imposed arms embargo and targeted sanctions.
All parties must urgently adopt measures to de-escalate tensions, prevent the further escalation of conflict and recommit to the R-ARCSS as the foundation for peace and stability in South Sudan. This includes restoring the TGoNU in full compliance with the agreement, ensuring inclusive governance, respect for political freedoms and a return to the peace process roadmap to prevent further political fragmentation. The authorities must release all political leaders currently held in detention. In the absence of a functioning TGoNU, the international community should intensify diplomatic pressure on all parties to guarantee the R-ARCSS’s full and unconditional implementation, including security sector reform.
All armed groups must immediately cease hostilities and respect IHRL and IHL to prevent further civilian harm. All parties must also address the root causes of inter-communal violence and ensure the safety and security of all populations. Promoting accountability and professionalism across all security forces remains critical to preventing further violence and breaking the cycle of local and national conflict.
Given the recent changes to the mandate of UNMISS, the UNSC should remain attentive to developments on the ground and be prepared to respond and consider further measures should the situation escalate. The UNSC must impose additional targeted sanctions on individuals who undermine the peace process. The AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and neighboring countries should rigorously enforce the existing arms embargo to stem the flow of weapons fueling conflict.
Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies
The Graduate Center, CUNY
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