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**Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up
to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences
and summits in the economic, social and related fields**

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

**The responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity**

Responsibility to protect: 20 years of commitment to principled and collective action*

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The year 2025 marks two decades since the 2005 World Summit, at which the General Assembly committed to the responsibility to protect, thereby affirming the need for purposeful and collective action by the international community to prevent, and protect populations from, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In the present report, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution [75/277](#), the Secretary-General provides an overview of the current global context regarding atrocity crimes, takes stock of 20 years of the responsibility to protect and proposes concrete steps for the implementation of the mandate.

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I. Introduction

1. At the 2005 World Summit, Member States unanimously committed to the responsibility to protect as a principle for action. In paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome,¹ world leaders affirmed the responsibility of individual States to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including through the prevention of these crimes and their incitement. World leaders also agreed to encourage and help other States, as appropriate, to exercise that responsibility. To that end, they committed to the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations; they also expressed readiness to take timely and decisive collective action through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations. Furthermore, they agreed that the international community should, as appropriate, support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

2. In paragraph 140 of the World Summit Outcome, Member States also reaffirmed their support for the mission of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. The Secretary-General later informed the Security Council² that he intended to designate a Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, who would share a joint office with the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide for reasons both of efficiency and of the complementarity of their mandates. Their mandates require in-depth strategic and operational cooperation, as well as intensive cooperation with all United Nations entities, regional bodies and Member States.

3. In his first report on the responsibility to protect,³ the Secretary-General advanced a three-pillar strategy for its implementation, in which pillar one was the protection responsibilities of the State, pillar two was international assistance and capacity-building, and pillar three was timely and decisive response. Detailed guidance on the three-pillar strategy was offered in successive reports.⁴

4. The United Nations works to advance the protection of populations from atrocity crimes by assisting Member States with the implementation of the responsibility to protect through a broad range of mechanisms that have a potential capacity for early warning and prevention.⁵ These mechanisms include observer and special political missions, peacekeeping operations, human rights and humanitarian bodies, and an array of mandates in areas including monitoring, fact-finding, investigation, capacity-building, technical cooperation and mediation.

5. Over the past 20 years, the Security Council, General Assembly and Human Rights Council have issued various resolutions⁶ in which they reaffirmed the commitment to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter and international law and to implement the responsibility to protect.

¹ General Assembly resolution [60/1](#).

² See [S/2007/721](#).

³ See [A/63/677](#).

⁴ See para. 70 for more details.

⁵ See [A/ES-10/794](#) and [A/78/901](#).

⁶ Security Council resolutions [1674 \(2006\)](#) and [1894 \(2009\)](#); General Assembly resolutions [63/308 \(2009\)](#) and [75/277](#); and Human Rights Council resolutions [44/14 \(2020\)](#), [7/25 \(2008\)](#), [22/22 \(2013\)](#), [28/34 \(2015\)](#), [37/26 \(2018\)](#), [43/29 \(2020\)](#), [49/9 \(2022\)](#) and [55/13 \(2024\)](#).

6. In his policy brief entitled “A New Agenda for Peace”,⁷ the Secretary-General emphasized the rapid transformation of the global peace and security landscape in the light of emerging patterns of violence, compounded by other intensifying threats such as climate change, the weaponization of new technologies, misinformation and disinformation, growing inequality, shrinking civic space and the deterioration of human rights and the rule of law in many parts of the world. These profound changes are shaping the character and dynamics of atrocity crimes today. The responsibility to protect represents one aspect of the efforts required to meet these new challenges.

7. In September 2024, the General Assembly reaffirmed its strong support for the multilateral system and international law by adopting the Pact for the Future,⁸ in which it emphasized the need to address the drivers and root causes of armed conflict and ensure accountability for the most serious crimes under international law, including genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other atrocity crimes and other gross violations, such as the use of starvation of civilians as a method of war and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence.⁹ In the Pact, the General Assembly called for renewed commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter. The responsibility to protect aligns with these commitments and offers a pathway to the realization of a sustainable, just and peaceful global order that upholds the rule of law and human rights.

8. Eighty years since the end of the Second World War and the horrors of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, the commitment embodied by the phrase “never again” remains just as important as ever. Despite this commitment, the promise of an end to atrocity crimes remains unfulfilled. In conflict settings around the world, there is an ongoing disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law by both State and non-State actors, and a lack of concerted action to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes. Too often, early warning information about the risks of atrocity crimes and alleged evidence of crimes committed are met with indifference, denial or repression. In some instances, decisions to prevent and halt atrocity crimes are not taken in a timely manner or simply not taken at all, and sometimes selective practices or double standards are applied. This collective failure to protect populations erodes the legitimacy and credibility of multilateral institutions.

9. No society is immune from atrocity crimes and prevention must begin at the societal level. Renewed strategic investment is required, and the time has come for policies and strategies that promote prevention of and protection against atrocity crimes to be implemented on a permanent and consistent basis across the three pillars of the responsibility to protect. Such efforts are necessary in order to strengthen capacities and generate political will so that Member States, regional entities and multilateral bodies fulfil their commitment to prevent, and effectively protect populations against, atrocity crimes.

10. The Secretary-General begins the present report with an overview of the current global context regarding the commission of atrocity crimes, including recent trends and challenges. He then takes stock of 20 years of operational initiatives and conceptual development and identifies lessons learned and good practices. Finally, he proposes concrete steps to advance the implementation of the responsibility to protect in the future. The report was drafted on the basis of surveys and consultations conducted by the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, with input from Member States, national human rights institutions, regional organizations, civil

⁷ See A/77/CRP.1/Add.8.

⁸ See General Assembly resolution [79/1](#).

⁹ Ibid., para. 35 (g), action 14.

society organizations, researchers, experts and other relevant actors from across all regions.

II. Global context and emerging patterns of atrocity crimes

11. Over the past 20 years, serious violations of international law have continued to shock the conscience of humanity. The alarming increase in serious allegations of atrocity crimes points to a widespread deterioration in respect for international norms. Many States are rolling back fundamental freedoms and human rights. Repression and persecution are on the rise.

12. While the legal determination of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity is a matter for national and international courts, too often, the early warnings of such violations and allegations that they have been committed have failed to result in preventive and protective action being taken in a timely manner.

A. Historic number of global conflicts characterized by atrocity crimes

13. The responsibility to protect was established in response to a failure to prevent the commission of genocide and of other atrocity crimes arising from the systematic targeting of populations based on identity. Tragically, the targeting of groups on the grounds of national, ethnic, racial and religious identity, or on the basis of political identity, has increased over recent years.¹⁰ The world is experiencing the highest number of conflicts since the end of the Second World War. Thousands of civilians continue to be killed and injured in indiscriminate attacks, and millions are displaced and in need of urgent humanitarian assistance.¹¹

14. Reported violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law are a feature of ongoing conflicts, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar, the Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen. In some cases, these violations may amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, such as conflict-related sexual violence, attacks on civilian infrastructure, including schools and hospitals, the serious infringement of children's rights, forced displacement, restricted access to humanitarian aid and attacks against humanitarian workers.¹² The prolific use of explosive weapons in densely populated urban areas has wrought untold suffering on large numbers of civilians.

15. In certain contexts, despite ongoing violations of international law, some Member States continue to support and/or supply weapons and finances or undermine institutions that adjudicate accountability.¹³ Furthermore, while many Member States are working towards sustainable solutions to major conflicts, the Security Council often remains paralysed due to the use of the veto power, which leads to perceptions of double standards and hinders effective decision-making.¹⁴

16. While armed conflict was predominantly an intra-State phenomenon in 2005, inter-State conflicts involving regional or international actors are becoming an

¹⁰ See [A/77/246](#).

¹¹ See [S/2024/385](#).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ *Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024*.

¹⁴ See [S/2024/434](#).

increasingly significant feature of the international peace and security environment. The responsibility to protect must be implemented in a manner that reflects the changing realities of armed violence, which has global ramifications and consequences.

B. Humanitarian impact of conflict

17. Current major armed conflicts are characterized by a widespread disregard for the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, including distinction, proportionality and precautions. As a result, the risk of atrocity crimes being committed is elevated, and violence against civilians is at its highest level since 2015.¹⁵

18. In 2023, civilian casualties in armed conflicts rose by 72 per cent compared with the previous year, with 7 in 10 recorded deaths occurring in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory.¹⁶ In 2024, major conflicts in the Great Lakes region, the Lake Chad basin, Myanmar, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Sahel region, the Sudan and Ukraine resulted in large-scale civilian fatalities, including as a result of indiscriminate and targeted attacks on civilians, including along identity lines, which also led to large-scale displacement.¹⁷

19. Counter-terrorism operations,¹⁸ as well as the use of mercenaries and private military contractors,¹⁹ are exacerbating human rights violations in certain conflict situations. This state of affairs may enable actors to evade their responsibilities under international humanitarian law and human rights law, further entrenching such practices and strengthening a culture of impunity.²⁰

20. In addition to deaths and injuries, ongoing conflicts have resulted in the widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure, which, in turn, has led to significant population displacement. In some cases, such as in the Occupied Palestinian Territory²¹ and specific locations in Myanmar²² and the Sudan,²³ the destruction has been extensive.

21. The global population of forcibly displaced persons has risen dramatically in the past two decades, from 37 million in 2005 to a historic 123 million by October 2024, with over 72.1 million people internally displaced as of June 2024.²⁴ Displaced populations in conflict and crisis zones face acute protection risks, including attacks, abductions and disappearances, gender-based violence, forced recruitment and torture,²⁵ some of which may constitute atrocity crimes. Vulnerable groups, including identity groups, those with chronic illnesses or disabilities and the elderly, face increased barriers to protection.

¹⁵ See <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2024/Goal-16/>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ See [A/78/901-S/2024/434](#).

¹⁸ See [A/77/718](#).

¹⁹ See [A/78/535](#).

²⁰ See [A/HRC/55/48](#).

²¹ See www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/04/02/joint-world-bank-un-report-assesses-damage-to-gaza-s-infrastructure.

²² See www.unocha.org/publications/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-33-2-october-2023.

²³ See [A/HRC/55/29](#).

²⁴ See www.unhcr.org/news/stories/unhcr-s-grandi-urges-joint-action-tackle-soaring-displacement; and www.unhcr.org/au/about-unhcr/who-we-are/figures-glance.

²⁵ See <https://globalprotectioncluster.org/protection-issues>.

22. Heightened levels of global conflict in recent years have also led to an increase in conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls, as well as men and boys.²⁶ Furthermore, in 2022, 20 per cent of civilians killed in conflicts were women and 10 per cent were children.²⁷ By 2023, the figures were 40 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively,²⁸ and grave violations against children had risen by 21 per cent.²⁹

C. Access to humanitarian assistance and attacks against humanitarian workers

23. In its resolution [2417 \(2018\)](#), the Security Council strongly condemned the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and called upon warring parties to comply with international humanitarian law and ensure civilian access to adequate food. In 2024, blockades and restricted access to essential goods such as medicines and humanitarian aid had a severe impact on civilian populations, including in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, North Darfur in the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, leading to acute food insecurity.³⁰

24. In its resolution [2286 \(2016\)](#), the Security Council underscored the fact that, under international law, attacks intentionally directed against hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided that they are not military objectives, as well as attacks intentionally directed against buildings, material, medical units and transport and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law, are war crimes. Nevertheless, between January and December 2024, the World Health Organization documented 1,637 attacks against healthcare facilities in 16 countries and territories.³¹

D. Use of explosive weapons and new technologies in populated areas

25. The leading cause of civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian objects in current conflicts is the indiscriminate use of aerial missiles, bombs and other explosive weapons, including the presence of unexploded ordnance in populated areas.³² The proliferation of uncrewed aerial vehicles in conflict zones and the vast quantities of landmines being placed in rural and urban contexts are concerning. The increase in the use of improvised explosive devices and non-traceable weapons could affect post-conflict environments for decades to come.

26. Artificial intelligence and new technologies present novel challenges on the battlefield. The difficulty in determining who is responsible for deploying technology enabled by artificial intelligence may not only undermine accountability, but also encourage the use of such technology, potentially leading to increased violations of

²⁶ See [S/2024/292](#).

²⁷ See <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2024/Goal-16/>.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ See [A/78/842-S/2024/384](#); and www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/opt/20241106-Gaza-Update-Report-OPT.pdf.

³⁰ World Food Programme and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Hunger Hotspots: FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: June to October 2024 Outlook* (Rome, 2024).

³¹ See <https://extranet.who.int/ss/Index.aspx>.

³² See [A/78/901-S/2024/434](#); see also *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 48: 2023 (United Nations publication, 2024); www.unocha.org/explosive-weapons-populated-areas; Cluster Munition Coalition, *Cluster Munitions Monitor 2023* (2023); and International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor 2023* (Geneva, 2023).

international humanitarian law and the commission of additional atrocity crimes. Cyberattacks have been used to block and damage critical infrastructure and disrupt essential services, such as healthcare, and therefore risk widespread civilian harm.

E. Atrocity crimes in non-armed conflict contexts

27. Atrocity crimes are often the consequence of long-term systemic injustice, human rights violations and abuses, as well as exclusionary attitudes and practices that, when left unaddressed, may lead to collective violence under extreme conditions. The potential for such direct violence is present in all societies and cultures.

28. Having faced statelessness, discrimination and persecution for decades, the Rohingya minority suffered widespread attacks in Rakhine State, Myanmar, in 2017. Those attacks resulted in the forced deportation of over 700,000 Rohingya and 10,000 were reportedly killed.³³ In 2020, the International Court of Justice issued an order of provisional measures requesting that the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, in relation to members of the Rohingya group in its territory, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.³⁴ Despite the pronouncement of the Court and the five-point consensus of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to seek a solution to the situation in Myanmar, the Rohingya in Myanmar continue to suffer widespread discrimination, destruction and displacement.³⁵

29. Challenges to human rights and national governance continue to exist in many societies across all regional contexts. States experiencing fragility,³⁶ defined as those with extremely low levels of governance capacity and with weak authority and legitimacy, are at high risk of lapsing into violence, including the potential commission of atrocity crimes. Haiti is currently facing a serious human rights crisis,³⁷ marked by widespread violence, corruption, severe social and economic challenges, and a deepening humanitarian emergency, particularly in the capital, Port-au-Prince.³⁸

30. In certain cases, the denial of civil and political rights may be an early warning indicator of the risk of atrocity crimes. The importance of protecting civic space, freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly and respect for democratic processes was reaffirmed in Our Common Agenda.³⁹ Attacks on journalists and the media, the spread of racism and the use of hate speech against identity groups and other minority populations have raised deep concerns about the realization of fundamental human rights and transparent and accountable governance.⁴⁰ Technology, including social media, is being exploited by actors with ever-greater reach to promote exclusionary ideologies, dehumanization and incitement to violence, all of which are conducive to atrocity crimes.⁴¹

³³ International Criminal Court, document ICC-01/19, para. 71.

³⁴ See www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/178/178-20200123-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf.

³⁵ See A/HRC/57/56.

³⁶ See <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/fb0f93e8e3375803bce211ab1218ef2a-0090082023/original/Classification-of-Fragility-and-Conflict-Situations-FY24.pdf>.

³⁷ See www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/01/haiti-over-5600-killed-gang-violence-2024-un-figures-show.

³⁸ See S/2025/28.

³⁹ See A/75/982 and A/77/CRP.1/Add.8.

⁴⁰ See A/79/319.

⁴¹ See A/77/CRP.1/Add.7.

31. Discrimination and violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity, coupled with measures to curb freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and association, contribute to a climate of fear and self-censorship. They are also a root cause of systematic discrimination and violence meted out by State and non-State actors alike that create fertile terrain for identity-based atrocity crimes.⁴²

32. Gender-based discrimination against Afghan women and girls under Taliban rule has made it impossible for them to complete their education, find work or participate in public life. That state of affairs has caused a severe deterioration in their living conditions, highlighting the urgent need to address gender-based discrimination as part of efforts to prevent atrocity crimes.⁴³

33. Indigenous Peoples often face acute vulnerabilities stemming from factors including unaddressed and persistent legacies of violence, discrimination and forced displacement, despite protection under international law.⁴⁴ Extractive industries and environmental degradation are causing irreparable harm to livelihoods, cultural heritage and the sustainability of Indigenous practices, posing a risk to the survival of individuals and of entire groups. Indigenous Peoples living “in voluntary isolation and initial contact”,⁴⁵ are in urgent need of prevention policies and protection initiatives. Some special procedure mandate holders of the Human Rights Council provide relevant reports about the specific combination of risks that threaten Indigenous Peoples globally.⁴⁶

34. Constructive management of diversity helps to build the resilience of societies in order to prevent atrocity crimes and protect populations,⁴⁷ including by safeguarding minority rights⁴⁸ and Indigenous rights, eliminating discrimination⁴⁹ and protecting civil and political, economic, social and cultural rights, which are often the first rights to be denied prior to physical targeting and violent conflict.⁵⁰ Deportations of minorities without guarantees of safe return have been reported,⁵¹ as have breaches of the principle of non-refoulement, such as pushbacks of asylum-seekers and improper processing of asylum claims.⁵²

35. In summary, the past 20 years have seen a significant decline in respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law by both State and non-State actors. This deterioration is also evident from the recurrent failure to prevent and protect populations against atrocity crimes. At the same time, however, tremendous efforts have been made to identify situations of risk and to strengthen the prevention and protection architecture, as well as to ensure accountability in line with

⁴² See [A/HRC/56/49](#).

⁴³ See [A/79/797-S/2025/109](#).

⁴⁴ See [A/HRC/EMRIP/2009/6](#); International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169).

⁴⁵ See [www.un.org/en/desa/protecting-rights-indigenous-peoples-voluntary-isolation-and-initial-contact](#); and [E/C.19/2025/4](#).

⁴⁶ See [www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-indigenous-peoples](#); and [https://social.desa.un.org/issues/indigenous-peoples/participation-of-indigenous-peoples-at-the-un](#).

⁴⁷ See [www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/publications-and-resources/Genocide_Framework%20of%20Analysis-English.pdf](#).

⁴⁸ Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (resolution [47/135](#)).

⁴⁹ The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination requires States to combat racial discrimination and hate speech against minorities.

⁵⁰ See [A/HRC/49/46](#) and [A/HRC/46/57](#).

⁵¹ See [www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-condemns-forced-returns-thailand](#).

⁵² See [www.unhcr.org/us/sites/en-us/files/2023-03/background-guide-challenge-1-ensuring-the-safety-of-asylum-seekers_0.pdf](#).

the objectives of the responsibility to protect. In the coming years, the systematic integration of an atrocity prevention lens across all these efforts, and across the three pillars of the responsibility to protect, could enhance the capacity of the international community both to prevent atrocity crimes in a timely manner and to boost the effectiveness of protection measures for vulnerable communities.

III. Fulfilling the objectives of the responsibility to protect: good practices and lessons learned, 2005–2025

36. While many efforts to prevent, and protect populations from, atrocity crimes have been conducted explicitly under the aegis of the responsibility to protect, others have instead focused more broadly on the promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law, which are part of sovereign States' obligations. Atrocity prevention is an important element of those obligations.⁵³ Thus, while some of the initiatives listed below fall explicitly under the responsibility to protect, others are simply aligned with its objectives or seen as complementary.

A. National prevention strategies

37. Since 2005, at least a dozen Member States⁵⁴ have established national mechanisms for atrocity prevention in line with the Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination established by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.⁵⁵ These efforts were aligned with the pioneering efforts led by the African Union⁵⁶ and the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty to establish the responsibility to protect.⁵⁷ National mechanisms have especially gained momentum since the publication of the first report on this topic, in which Member States were encouraged to integrate the principles relating to the responsibility to protect into local values and standards.⁵⁸

38. In the New Agenda for Peace, Member States were encouraged to develop their own national strategies in recognition of the fact that the prevention of violent conflict and peacebuilding is their primary responsibility.⁵⁹ These national experiences⁶⁰ can offer a unique opportunity to integrate an atrocity prevention lens into all national prevention and peacebuilding strategies to ensure the fulfilment of the New Agenda for Peace and the responsibility to protect.⁶¹

39. National human rights institutions, which exist in 118 countries,⁶² are domestic mechanisms mandated to prevent the commission and recurrence of serious human rights violations and abuses by addressing root causes and preventing conflicts.

⁵³ See [A/63/677](#).

⁵⁴ Including the Central African Republic, Kenya, Liberia, the Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.

⁵⁵ See <https://icglr.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/protocol-for-the-prevention-of-the-crime-of-genocide-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity-and-all-forms-of-discrimination.pdf?x55657>.

⁵⁶ See www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf.

⁵⁷ See <https://web.archive.org/web/20070731161527/http://www.iciss-ciise.gc.ca/report2-en.asp>.

⁵⁸ See [A/63/677](#).

⁵⁹ See [A/79/552-S/2024/767](#).

⁶⁰ See https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org/peacebuilding/files/documents/chairs_summary_-_pbc_ambassadorial-level_meeting_on_national_efforts_for_prevention_and_peacebuilding_in_kenya_norway_and_timor-leste_-_final.pdf.

⁶¹ See [A/78/901-S/2024/434](#).

⁶² See www.ohchr.org/en/countries/nhri and [A/75/224](#).

Supporting national human rights institutions in integrating an atrocity prevention lens into their work is a valuable avenue through which Member States might strengthen domestic implementation of the responsibility to protect.⁶³

40. Member States have also established international and regional partnerships and networks to share good practices and support prevention efforts. One such example is Global Action against Mass Atrocity Crimes,⁶⁴ a State-led network involving civil society and academic institutions that supports national and regional efforts by producing tools, including a manual for the creation of national atrocity prevention entities⁶⁵ and training toolkits.⁶⁶ The network's working groups for Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean play a key leadership role in these efforts.

41. A total of 61 countries and two regional organizations have appointed responsibility to protect focal points to advance the implementation of that mandate and 56 Member States and the European Union are members of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect.⁶⁷ The Group serves as an important platform that allows for the exchange of good practices, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in the framework of the United Nations, in both New York and Geneva.

42. A guidance note on the prevention of violent extremism and mass atrocity crimes⁶⁸ has been published by Parliamentarians for Global Action to support the prevention and protection efforts undertaken by its network of some 1,200 legislators in 141 multiparty parliaments worldwide.⁶⁹

43. Increasingly, transitional justice is being employed to address the legacy of atrocity crimes and strengthen the capacity of States to fulfil their obligations regarding the rights to truth, justice and reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence⁷⁰ as a means of preventing the repetition of such crimes.⁷¹ Significantly, in the past few decades, peace agreements in Colombia, Nepal, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and in other contexts have included transitional justice provisions with a prevention lens.⁷²

44. Furthermore, in the past two decades, Australia,⁷³ Canada,⁷⁴ Finland,⁷⁵ Norway,⁷⁶ Sweden⁷⁷ and, more recently, Switzerland⁷⁸ have acknowledged their responsibility in the commission of crimes, some of these amounting to atrocity crimes, against national minorities or Indigenous populations, and have taken steps towards a constructive management of diversity. As part of a prevention and protection strategy, the Government of Colombia has recently decided to formalize a

⁶³ See A/HRC/41/24; and A/78/901-S/2024/434.

⁶⁴ See www.gaamac.org/community-members/.

⁶⁵ See www.gaamac.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/RL_AWG-manual-on-best-practices.pdf.

⁶⁶ See www.gaamac.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/RL_AWG-toolkit_FINAL_EN.pdf.

⁶⁷ See www.globalr2p.org/group-of-friends-of-the-responsibility-to-protect/.

⁶⁸ See <https://issuu.com/migsinstitute/docs/380461454-preventing-violent-extrem/6>.

⁶⁹ See <https://www.pgaction.org/membership/our-members.html>.

⁷⁰ See E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1.

⁷¹ See A/HRC/37/65.

⁷² See <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/04/202307guidancenotetransitionaljusticeen.pdf>.

⁷³ See <https://yoorrookjusticecommission.org.au/>.

⁷⁴ See www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/aboriginal-heritage/royal-commission-aboriginal-peoples/Pages/final-report.aspx.

⁷⁵ See <https://sdtsk.fi/en/home/>.

⁷⁶ See www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Organene/sannhets--og-forsoningskommisjonen/.

⁷⁷ See <https://sanningskommissionensamer.se/en/about-the-commission/>.

⁷⁸ See www.bak.admin.ch/bak/fr/home/sprachen-und-gesellschaft/les-yeniches-et-les-manouches-sont-une-minorite-nationale/autres-informations.html.

territory spanning 2.7 million acres of Amazonian forest for Indigenous Peoples “living in voluntary isolation and initial contact”.⁷⁹

45. Civil society organizations play a key role in advancing atrocity prevention at the global level.⁸⁰ Their work with at-risk communities is essential in detecting early warning signs of atrocity crimes and supporting the development of long-term prevention strategies.

B. Regional initiatives

46. Regional and subregional organizations are critical to the implementation of the responsibility to protect given their greater understanding of national contexts and historical associations between neighbouring States.⁸¹ Regional organizations such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of American States have successfully employed mediation, preventive diplomacy and good offices to defuse violent conflict and protect civilians within their regions, thereby contributing to the goals of the responsibility to protect.⁸² For example, the coordinated response by the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union in 2017, which was endorsed by the Security Council,⁸³ helped to manage the serious post-electoral crisis in the Gambia, thereby preventing potential escalation.

47. The African Peace and Security Architecture was developed by the African Union to support early warning of, and the response to, atrocity crimes,⁸⁴ and was further strengthened with the recent appointment by the African Union of a Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities. The Constitutive Act of the African Union contains three elements that provide the Union and its member States with the means to respond to crises in the region, including in the context of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.⁸⁵

48. The European Union and the Organization of American States have developed specific capabilities, manuals⁸⁶ and toolkits⁸⁷ to coordinate their respective regional strategies to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes in a proactive and coherent manner.

49. The Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities⁸⁸ and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights⁸⁹ of OSCE both support States in their efforts to build domestic strategies to promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights, tolerance and non-discrimination. When requested, these Offices conduct investigations and preventive diplomacy in response to ethnic tensions that could lead to violence.

⁷⁹ See www.andesamazonfund.org/news-blog/first-of-its-kind-territory-will-safeguard-indigenous-peoples-in-isolation-in-remote-colombian-amazon/.

⁸⁰ See <https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol9/iss3/7/>.

⁸¹ See A/65/877-S/2011/393.

⁸² See www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/mediation_and_dialogue_for_genocide_prevention.pdf.

⁸³ See Security Council resolution 2337 (2017).

⁸⁴ The Peace and Security Council of the African Union is the main pillar of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture, which has four institutional components: the African Standby Force; the Continental Early-Warning System; the Panel of the Wise; and the Peace Fund.

⁸⁵ Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000), arts. 4 (h), 4 (j) and 9.

⁸⁶ See www.oas.org/fpdb/press/R2P-and-the-OAS.pdf.

⁸⁷ See www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_r2p_atrocity_prevention_toolkit.pdf.

⁸⁸ See www.osce.org/hcnm.

⁸⁹ See www.osce.org/odihr.

50. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights promotes actions that support the prevention of and protection against atrocities based on the Declaration on the Culture of Prevention for a Peaceful, Inclusive, Resilient, Healthy and Harmonious Society⁹⁰ and the Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security, both adopted by ASEAN in 2017.⁹¹

51. The ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights is a network of over 140 current and former parliamentarians from eight countries in South-East Asia who advocate the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the region's most vulnerable and persecuted populations and accountability for international crimes.

52. National leaders have requested support from regional actors to prevent escalation that could lead to the commission of atrocity crimes. This was the case, for example, in the African Union-led mediation process in Kenya (2007–2008)⁹² and the assistance provided and investigation conducted by OSCE in Kyrgyzstan (2010).⁹³

53. Regional networks and partnerships⁹⁴ among civil society, practitioners and experts in the prevention of genocide and the responsibility to protect have been essential in disseminating good practices and training officials in relation to early warning, prevention, protection and countering hate speech. For example, the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect⁹⁵ has helped to build a normative consensus around the responsibility to protect and to promote its implementation across the region. Since 2019, it has produced three major reports measuring progress towards implementing the responsibility to protect and identifying risk factors for atrocity crimes. The conclusions of those reports are that, while there has been a net increase in the effective implementation of the responsibility to protect within the Asia-Pacific region, the structural nature of many of the risk factors and a legacy of unaddressed atrocity crimes inhibit significant progress.

C. Mobilization of the responsibility to protect by Member States through multilateral bodies

54. Increasing polarization and systematic attacks against existing international norms and standards threaten the global commitment to multilateralism. In response, numerous Member States have mobilized creatively to advance prevention, international accountability and the protection of populations from atrocity crimes through innovative and mutually reinforcing institutional pathways.

55. The 56 States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect have been at the forefront of efforts to advocate the advancement of the responsibility to protect at the United Nations. The Group initiates resolutions and presents joint statements to the General Assembly, the

⁹⁰ See www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/9.-ADOPTION_12-NOV-ASCC-Endorsed-Culture-of-Prevention-Declaration_CLEAN.pdf.

⁹¹ See www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/8.-ADOPTION_Joint-Statement-on-Promoting-Women-Peace-and-Security-in-ASEANACWC-Endorsed_rev2.pdf.

⁹² See www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Kenya_OccasionalPaper_Web.pdf.

⁹³ See www.oscepa.org/en/news-a-media/press-releases/press-2010/pa-special-representative-kiljunen-organizing-international-investigation-into-recent-violence-in-kyrgyzstan.

⁹⁴ See [www.auschwitzinstitute.org/programs/latin-american-network-for-genocide-and-mass-atrocity-prevention#:~:text=Latin%20American%20Program,policy%20development%20in%20this%20field;https://r2pasiapacific.org/APPAP#:~:text=The%20Asia%20Pacific%20Partnership%20for,to%20Protect%20\(R2P\)%20principle;andwww.facebook.com/r2pwestafrica/](http://www.auschwitzinstitute.org/programs/latin-american-network-for-genocide-and-mass-atrocity-prevention#:~:text=Latin%20American%20Program,policy%20development%20in%20this%20field;https://r2pasiapacific.org/APPAP#:~:text=The%20Asia%20Pacific%20Partnership%20for,to%20Protect%20(R2P)%20principle;andwww.facebook.com/r2pwestafrica/).

⁹⁵ See <https://r2pasiapacific.org/r2p-and-atrocity-prevention-asia-and-pacific>.

Security Council and the Human Rights Council. The Co-Chairs of the Group of Friends hold regular meetings with the rotating presidencies of the Security Council to explore strategies for strengthening efforts to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes.

56. Over the past 20 years, various United Nations organs and bodies have adopted resolutions containing references to the responsibility to protect and noting the obligations of States under international law and the Charter.⁹⁶ These resolutions represent progress towards building a common approach for concerted action within the international community.

57. Since 2005, Member States have been engaging in discussions aimed at finding common approaches to implement the responsibility to protect under pillar three: timely and decisive response. It should be recalled that while Security Council resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) were aligned with the responsibility to protect, the implementation of resolution 1973 (2011) drew criticism and had a negative impact on subsequent responses to atrocity crimes. In response, the Government of Brazil put forward the concept of “responsibility while protecting”,⁹⁷ in an effort to constructively emphasize the need for greater clarity and accountability when exercising the responsibility to protect. This concept constitutes an important basis for further discussions aimed at strengthening the implementation of the responsibility to protect under pillar three.

58. Several initiatives have been launched by Member States to address the impact of the veto, or the possibility of inaction by the Security Council, on at-risk situations, such as the resolution entitled “Uniting for peace”⁹⁸ adopted by the General Assembly in November 1950 and, more recently, the code of conduct of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group⁹⁹ and the initiative on veto restraint in cases of mass atrocity.¹⁰⁰ Member States called for emergency special sessions of the General Assembly¹⁰¹ to be convened to address conflict situations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in Ukraine following the casting of vetoes in the Security Council on those matters. In 2022, the General Assembly adopted a resolution¹⁰² requiring the President of the General Assembly to convene a formal meeting within 10 days of a veto being cast by one or more permanent members of the Security Council to debate the situation in question. These initiatives reflect the strong commitment of the General Assembly to protecting norms and standards and strengthening the working methods and effectiveness of the Security Council, notably in contexts where there are serious allegations of atrocity crimes being committed.

59. Throughout the past 20 years, Member States have shown remarkable and constant commitment to ensuring accountability and supporting human rights mechanisms and instruments,¹⁰³ including the universal periodic review, the special procedures of the Human Rights Council, fact-finding missions, commissions of

⁹⁶ Resolutions of other organs of the United Nations. See also www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/responsibility-protect/key-documents#collapseThree.

⁹⁷ See A/66/551-S/2011/701.

⁹⁸ General Assembly resolution 377 (V).

⁹⁹ See A/70/621-S/2015/978; and www.globalr2p.org/resources/list-of-signatories-to-the-act-code-of-conduct/.

¹⁰⁰ See www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations-security-council/why-france-wishes-to-regulate-use-of-the-veto-in-the-united-nations-security-65315/.

¹⁰¹ General Assembly resolution 377 (V).

¹⁰² General Assembly resolution 76/262.

¹⁰³ See www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-and-mechanisms; www.globalr2p.org/resources/un-general-assembly-resolutions-referencing-r2p-2/; www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/HRC-Resolutions-R2P-5-April-2024.pdf.

inquiry and investigative missions. These mechanisms monitor situations, establish the facts surrounding ongoing or potential atrocity situations and produce early warnings to prompt early action by the international community. Special envoys on country situations and thematic issues support preventive action and protection by drawing attention to specific risks and needs and by facilitating operational support.¹⁰⁴

60. The number of international courts and judicial mechanisms that address accountability for atrocity crimes, including domestic courts that exercise universal jurisdiction,¹⁰⁵ has grown since 2005. Member States have indicated their willingness to pursue the protection of populations from atrocity crimes through wider institutional pathways and by invoking international law. Four cases related to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide have been submitted to the International Court of Justice.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, 15 situations are currently under investigation at the International Criminal Court regarding allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

61. Progress has been made towards the elaboration of a legally binding instrument on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity. The General Assembly has decided to convene the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity in 2028 and 2029.¹⁰⁷

D. Deeper integration of the responsibility to protect across the United Nations system

62. The prevention and protection of populations from serious international crimes requires a whole-of-system effort. The Office on Genocide Prevention¹⁰⁸ and the Responsibility to Protect¹⁰⁹ provides early warning and recommendations on situations that could result in atrocity crimes. It cooperates with the United Nations system at large, Member States, regional bodies and civil society organizations. The Office has developed key tools for early warning and atrocity risk identification, such as the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes,¹¹⁰ and has briefed the Security Council on an ad hoc basis.¹¹¹ In addition, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide serves as focal point for the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, which is instrumental to the prevention of genocide and other atrocity crimes.

63. In recent decades, significant progress has been made across the United Nations system in developing early warning systems and institutional capacities for prevention and protection. Key achievements include reforms in peacekeeping,¹¹² the establishment of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture since 2005 and the expansion of United Nations mediation, preventive diplomacy and early warning

¹⁰⁴ See www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-is.

¹⁰⁵ See <https://ujim.trialinternational.org/>.

¹⁰⁶ *The Gambia v. Myanmar* (2019); *Sudan v. United Arab Emirates* (2025); *South Africa v. Israel* (2023); *Ukraine v. Russian Federation* (2022).

¹⁰⁷ General Assembly resolution 79/122.

¹⁰⁸ See S/2004/567.

¹⁰⁹ See S/2007/721.

¹¹⁰ See www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/about-us/Doc.3_Framework%20of%20Analysis%20for%20Atrocity%20Crimes_EN.pdf.

¹¹¹ See https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/Briefing_Security_Council_Special_Adviser_Prevention_Genocide_Sudan_21_May_2024.pdf and www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/media-resources/publications.

¹¹² See <https://reform.un.org/content/peace-and-security-reform-0>.

capabilities. The United Nations has worked to expand national early warning and prevention capacities in contexts of disaster, conflict and fragility.¹¹³

64. The development and the institutionalization of prevention and protection across thematic areas, including concerning children and armed conflict,¹¹⁴ the protection of civilians,¹¹⁵ women and peace and security,¹¹⁶ conflict-related sexual violence,¹¹⁷ violence against children¹¹⁸ and youth and peace and security¹¹⁹ can be seen as having helped to expand the understanding and implementation of the responsibility to protect. To date, 16 United Nations peacekeeping operations have operated with a protection-of-civilians mandate,¹²⁰ responding to the protection needs of affected communities, in particular identity-based communities, in conflict and post-conflict stabilization settings.¹²¹

65. While fulfilling their respective mandates, United Nations entities responsible for crisis response and humanitarian assistance can contribute to the protection of vulnerable populations through their efforts on the ground. The need to assess multidimensional risk, including atrocity crime risk,¹²² and to further develop shared understandings and practices for protection, including prevention across the United Nations system, is affirmed in the United Nations agenda for protection.¹²³

66. The 2025 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture may also provide a unique opportunity for deeper cooperation and integration of atrocity prevention capacity across the United Nations system, including intergovernmental and field capacity that is aimed at sustaining peace. Integrating an atrocity prevention lens into existing programmes and strategies could enhance the capacity to prevent and protect populations against atrocity crimes across the system.

67. The special meeting organized by the Economic and Social Council in 2023 on the theme of “Social and economic measures to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” constituted another promising initiative to strengthen the implementation of the responsibility to protect.¹²⁴

IV. Responsibility to protect: conceptual development, 2005–2025

68. Over the past 20 years, Member States, together with civil society, independent scholars and experts, have generated substantial findings and analyses on the conceptual development of the responsibility to protect.

69. The annual reports of the Secretary-General and the contributions of Member States during the annual dialogues on the responsibility to protect in the General

¹¹³ For example, see <https://dppa.un.org/en/peace-and-development-advisors-joint-undp-dppa-programme-building-national-capacities-conflict>.

¹¹⁴ Security Council resolution 1261 (1999).

¹¹⁵ Security Council resolution 1265 (1999).

¹¹⁶ Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).

¹¹⁷ Security Council resolution 1820 (2008).

¹¹⁸ General Assembly resolution 62/141.

¹¹⁹ Security Council resolution 2250 (2015).

¹²⁰ See <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/protection-of-civilians-mandate>.

¹²¹ See https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2023_protection_of_civilians_policy.pdf.

¹²² United Nations, “United Nations agenda for protection: strengthening the ability of the United Nations System to protect people through their human rights”, February 2024, p. 18.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ See <https://ecosoc.un.org/en/events/2023/ecosoc-special-meeting>.

Assembly have been the main vehicles for its conceptual development and implementation during this time.

70. The Secretary-General, in his first report, published in 2009,¹²⁵ advanced the three-pillar strategy for the implementation of the responsibility to protect and, in successive reports, offered detailed guidance on that strategy that focused variously on early warning and assessment,¹²⁶ the role of regional and subregional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect,¹²⁷ timely and decisive response under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter,¹²⁸ State responsibility and prevention,¹²⁹ international assistance and the responsibility to protect,¹³⁰ early warning,¹³¹ mobilizing collective action¹³² and the core elements that are essential to the implementation of the responsibility to protect.¹³³

71. More recent reports of the Secretary-General have covered intersecting thematic areas, including accountability and human rights,¹³⁴ women,¹³⁵ children and young people¹³⁶ and sustainable development,¹³⁷ lessons learned for prevention¹³⁸ and reflections on approaching the development of atrocity prevention and protection as a continuous endeavour.¹³⁹

72. A conclusion that can be drawn from the 20 years' worth of conceptual development and implementation is that, when early warning, prevention and protection are fully integrated into the public policy agenda at the domestic and regional levels, effective prevention and protection become not only possible, but successful and sustainable.

73. To become more effective, however, new modalities of partnerships and working methods are required. Ownership and continuity, which entail the formulation of nationally led policies and strategies through participatory and concerted efforts, are essential to build and strengthen an inclusive consensus among Member States across the three pillars and to enable Member States to take effective and timely decisions to prevent atrocity crimes from happening and to protect populations.

74. Considerable conceptual and practical progress has been made since 2005. Despite the deterioration of the international situation, the fundamental conviction underpinning the responsibility to protect remains, as demonstrated by the efforts described above. There must, however, be new ways and innovative approaches to deliver on the promise of "never again".

V. Conclusions and next steps

75. Over the past 20 years, the responsibility to protect has served as a relevant framework for action in the context of complex and multiple crises and a useful guide

¹²⁵ See [A/63/677](#).

¹²⁶ See [A/64/864](#).

¹²⁷ See [A/65/877-S/2011/393](#).

¹²⁸ See [A/66/874-S/2012/578](#); and www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.

¹²⁹ See [A/67/929-S/2013/399](#).

¹³⁰ See [A/68/947-S/2014/449](#).

¹³¹ See [A/72/884-S/2018/525](#).

¹³² See [A/70/999-S/2016/620](#).

¹³³ See [A/69/981-S/2015/500](#).

¹³⁴ See [A/71/1016-S/2017/556](#).

¹³⁵ See [A/74/964-S/2020/501](#).

¹³⁶ See [A/76/844-S/2022/428](#).

¹³⁷ See [A/77/910-S/2023/409](#).

¹³⁸ See [A/73/898-S/2019/463](#).

¹³⁹ See [A/78/901-S/2024/434](#).

for meeting the responsibilities and obligations of sovereignty. The responsibility to protect is based on a shared understanding of the responsibility of States in line with the Charter. Nevertheless, in the face of emerging negative global trends, renewed efforts are required to translate the conceptual and empirical knowledge accumulated over the past 20 years into strategies that will prevent atrocity crimes and protect populations effectively. While digital technologies have the potential to enhance the capacity to anticipate and respond to atrocity crimes, further cooperation is needed to regulate these technologies in line with the principles agreed in the Global Digital Compact and consistent with the responsibility to protect.

76. Today, three main areas for possible action emerge. First, a greater emphasis should be placed on developing permanent prevention mechanisms at the national level. Second, regional consultations would be helpful for sharing experiences and lessons learned and strengthening relations between national and regional entities. Third, the development of strategic and technical guidance on implementing the responsibility to protect at the domestic, regional and multilateral levels should be explored.

77. The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect will consider each of these areas in cooperation with Member States and other stakeholders. I encourage Member States to cooperate with the Special Adviser in this effort.

78. I also invite Member States to participate in the annual debate on the responsibility to protect in the General Assembly, to share their experiences regarding the implementation of the recommendations set out in the 16 previous reports on the responsibility to protect¹⁴⁰ and to continue to implement them.

79. The responsibility to protect is a joint commitment by Member States to prevent atrocity crimes and protect populations, acknowledging that our global well-being is inextricably linked with the well-being of the most vulnerable among us.

80. For the past 20 years, the willingness and ability to fulfil this commitment has been the measure of the international community's success or failure in confronting atrocity crimes. The responsibility to protect remains a path forward in this common endeavour as a global community and, to this end, I call upon all Member States to strengthen and increase their individual and joint efforts to prevent atrocities and protect populations within their territories.

¹⁴⁰ See www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/responsibility-protect/20anniversary.