Welcome to Expert Voices on Atrocity Prevention by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. I'm Jaclyn Streitfeld-Hall, Research Director at the Global Centre. This podcast features one-on-one conversations with practitioners from the fields of human rights, conflict prevention and atrocity prevention. These conversations will give us a glimpse of the personal and professional side of how practitioners approach human rights protection and atrocity prevention, allowing us to explore challenges, identify best practices, and share lessons learned on how we can protect populations more effectively. This is the second episode of a two-part series on the Russian invasion of Ukraine and international law. In part one, Professor Alexander Hinton, from Rutgers University, discussed the misuse of the term genocide to justify the invasion. In this episode, I'll be talking with Rebecca Barber, a research fellow with the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, and a PhD scholar with the TC Beirne School of Law at the University of Queensland, on the international response to the invasion, and available options under R2P. Before sharing our interview with Rebecca, we wanted to give a quick overview of the current state of the crisis to contextualize the conversation. So I'm here now with the Global Centre's Ukraine expert, Ms Sarah Hunter. Sarah, could you provide our listeners with an overview of the current situation in Ukraine?

Thanks, Jackie. So, we're here recording today, on the 24th of March, so one month since the invasion began, and unfortunately, what we're seeing in Ukraine is a full scale military invasion by Russian forces. We're witnessing attacks on many major cities in Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine, including the capital of Kyiv, in areas closer to the Russian and Belarusian borders, with Western cities like Lviv experiencing some strikes as well. Major cities like Kharkiv, and Mariupol, are on their way to being totally destroyed, with tens of thousands of people trapped by fighting. Russian forces have increasingly struck apartment buildings, schools, hospitals and known shelters for civilians with targeted weaponry. Major cities have also been subject to artillery shelling with indiscriminate weapons, including, reportedly, banned cluster munitions. These actions may absolutely amount to war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Even wars have laws, and directly targeting civilian populations and civilian infrastructure, using banned indiscriminate weapons, are all clear examples of atrocity crimes. And so, as of today, the UN has verified over a thousand civilians been killed, including ninety children. The number is likely much, much higher but verification of these killings is difficult given the security situation in many cities. The UN has also said that ten million people have been displaced by the conflict, internally or into neighboring countries. Also, at least twelve million people are trapped by the ongoing offensives and will be needing assistance. In Mariupol, for example, residents are now cut off from the outside world and encircled by Russian forces. Before International Press left, they documented civilians resorting to burying their dead in mass graves. It's just become a very devastating situation.

Jaclyn Streitfeld-Hall 01:37
One of the things that Professor Hinton briefly touched upon in the first part of this series, which I think is relevant to the discussion today, is that the situation didn't arise from nowhere. What are some of the factors that brought us here?

Sarah Hunter 03:38
Yes, Professor Hinton was absolutely correct, and I think, as he indicated, we could talk for a long time on the intricacies here but, in short, you know, there's multiple routes to this conflict. Firstly, on the political side, this conflict did not begin a month ago. There's been war in Ukraine since 2014, with, on one side Russian backed separatists fighting against Ukrainian Government forces in some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in southeastern Ukraine, an area known as Donbass. This conflict itself was sparked by a change of power in Ukraine, one that Russia believed to be a Western-backed overthrow of a Moscow-friendly Ukrainian Government. Multiple rounds of peace agreements have failed to bring about a resolution to this conflict, and in and of itself, that conflict, prior to the Russian invasion in February, had killed over 14,000 people, including almost 4000 civilians, and has displaced millions. At the same time, as that conflict broke out in Donbas, Russia occupied Crimea and illegally annexed it. In all of these areas, what they have in common, is a large, ethnic Russian population that Russian President, Vladimir Putin, claims to be protecting. On the historical side, once Ukraine became independent in 1991, following the collapse of Soviet Union, it's inched closer and closer to Western states, with aspirations to join both the EU and NATO. Putin, who idolizes this former prowess of the Soviet Union and the empires that preceded it, views the fall as not only the largest geopolitical disaster of his time, but also as the end to this historical idea of Russia. This idea is hundreds of years old, dating back to the ninth century in the Kievan Rus', where what is now areas of Russia and Ukraine were one, and Putin has continued to claim that Russia and Ukraine are one and the same given their close cultural ties, while Ukrainians largely disagree with this narrative. And the security angle as well, here, can be, kind of simplified into Russia feeling threatened by Western-allied, former Soviet states. Putin believes that NATO is a threat to the future of Russia and has accused NATO of desiring war over various political routes. He's called for a neutral and demilitarized Ukraine, saying he would accept a non-NATO aligned Ukrainian military and navy, among other things. Some say this conflict is, you know, NATO's own making, itself, sparking Russia's concern with its enlargement, following the end of the Cold War. NATO's members have also yet to fully walk back from promises in 2008, and calls for Ukraine and Georgia to join the bloc despite the unlikelihood of either state actually doing so, as they're, you know, NATO states are obviously, in this context, unwilling to cave to
any type of Russian pressure. And there's many other aspects too, but I think Putin's main goal here appears to be reestablishing Russian dominance, culturally, politically and security wise, over the former Soviet bloc, and including Ukraine.

Jaclyn Streitfeld-Hall 06:43
Thanks so much for that, Sarah. Now, we'll turn to our interview with Rebecca Barber. Thank you for joining us, Rebecca.

Rebecca Barber 06:53
Thanks for having me.

Jaclyn Streitfeld-Hall 06:55
So we started the podcast interviewing Professor Hinton on whether or not there had been a credible claim of evidence of genocide in Eastern Ukraine and now we want to talk about the invasion itself, and have a discussion about how the international community has responded to what is happening in Ukraine. So, I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about what steps have been taken, particularly through UN mechanisms since that's your area of expertise.

Rebecca Barber 07:25
Firstly, the situation was considered by the Security Council, as this is, as we know, obviously, the Security Council in the international system, established by the UN Charter, has primary responsibility for international peace and security, but as is also very well known, the Security Council has five permanent members, each of which has the power of veto over anything substantial that the Security Council does, and one of those is Russia. So a resolution was proposed through the Security Council condemning the aggression that was, of course, vetoed by Russia, and so what the Security Council then did was refer the matter to the General Assembly. The Security Council did that by reference to what is known as the Uniting for Peace procedure, which is based on a 1950 resolution passed by the General Assembly, which said that if there is a threat to international peace and security and the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity amongst its five permanent members, cannot exercise its responsibility for international peace and security, then the General Assembly will step in and consider the matter and make appropriate recommendations. And the Uniting for Peace Resolution said that, in the event that that happened, the Security Council could call for the General Assembly to convene an emergency special session, and that the General Assembly would consider the matter in that emergency special session - and if the Security Council refers a matter to the General Assembly and calls for an emergency special session, that is a procedural resolution of the Security Council and so not subject to the veto. So basically, that is a way of, sort of, getting around the veto requirement and transferring a matter from the Security Council to the General Assembly. So, the General Assembly then passed a resolution in an emergency special session, deploring Russia's act of aggression, demanding that Russia immediately cease its use of force, and demanding that Russia withdraw its forces from Ukraine. The resolution was passed with a very strong majority; 141 to five, with 35
abstentions, which really was a huge achievement for the sponsors of the resolution and I think that sent a very strong signal, but there is, of course, a lot more that the General Assembly can do, rather than just deploring the active aggression, and calling for Russia to remove its forces from Ukraine. In terms of the other options that have been pursued in the international system: so, Ukraine has lodged a creative case with the International Court of Justice on the basis of a claim that Russia has breached Article One of the Genocide Convention by falsely claiming that what Putin calls his special military operation in Ukraine, is based on the fact that Ukraine is committing, or the fact that genocide is being committed in the Donbas regions. Ukraine is asserting that there is no genocide and that for Russia to falsely invoke genocide, as a basis for its military intervention, is an abuse of Article One of the Genocide Convention. Ukraine is asking the International Court of Justice to declare that, contrary to what Russia has been saying, there's no genocide being committed in the Donbas regions, and that, as such, there is no lawful basis for Russia's intervention. It's in terms of the likely outcome of that, I think, it's probably most likely that the ICJ will declare a non-violation by Ukraine of the obligation not to commit genocide, I think, it's probably less likely that the Court will take the opportunity to get into the legality of Russia's aggression in Ukraine, but, I think the court will probably most likely confine itself to findings quite closely tied to the interpretation of the Genocide Convention itself, because that's the basis of its jurisdiction, but we will see.

Jaclyn Streitfeld-Hall  12:20
Interesting, and I know there's also been some movement at the Human Rights Council to create an investigative mechanism, as well as at the ICC where Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan announced a new investigation. I was wondering if you could elaborate a little bit on those.

Rebecca Barber  12:36
Yeah, so to start with the Human Rights Council, the Human Rights Council met and considered the situation in Ukraine, passed a resolution, firstly condemning the aggression, calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops and calling for the respect for international humanitarian law and human rights, and humanitarian access. More substantially, it also established an Independent International Commission of Inquiry to collect/analyze evidence of violations and abuses of human rights, document and verify evidence, identify the individuals responsible, and to make recommendations on accountability, on accountability measures. So similar to mechanisms that have been established recently by both the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council on Syria, and Myanmar, two really significant development steps taken by the Human Rights Council towards achieving criminal accountability for violations and abuses of human rights. You mentioned the International Criminal Court. So, the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court has opened an investigation into suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine, that was based on a referral by thirty-nine member states, so that is underway. The most significant limitation on the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is that it does not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Aggression is a crime in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, however, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in this case, and that is because the definition of the Crime of Aggression that was agreed in Kampala in 2010 only grants the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression of a state party to the Rome Statute, and Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute. The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression of a non-state party if the situation is referred by the Security Council, however, the situation in this case will
obviously not be referred to the ICC by the Security Council because of Russia's veto. And so, it's because of this gap in the ICC's jurisdiction in relation to what's happening in Ukraine that we have seen recently the declaration and the recommendation for the establishment of a special tribunal for aggression against Ukraine. So, we've seen, in the past week, a group of 40 very prominent international lawyers, and writers and politicians, launch a declaration calling for establishment of, what's called a Special Tribunal for the Punishment of the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine. The idea, in that proposal, is that Ukraine essentially delegates jurisdiction over the kind of aggression to an international tribunal that is supported by Ukraine and other states. There are different views on the likely effectiveness of that tribunal, and indeed, whether it’s a good idea to establish that tribunal at all, as opposed to investing more resources in the International Criminal Court. The key practical problem with the proposal is that almost all the suspects and the evidence are likely to be in Russia, because unlike war crimes and crimes against humanity, the crime of aggression takes place, obviously, on the territory of the aggressor state, and assuming Russia will not cooperate with such a mechanism, there's the question of how the tribunal would get access to suspects and the evidence on the assumption that Russia would likely not cooperate with such a tribunal. Russian cooperation, in that case, could really only be secured following regime change in Russia, and there is an argument that if that happens, the Russian Navy may be more likely to support the ICC jurisdiction anyway.

Jaclyn Streitfeld-Hall 17:14

And, I guess, with all of these different mechanisms, what types of international legal responsibility are we dealing with? Which individuals could be held individually liable? Could Russia as a state be held liable under international law?

Rebecca Barber 17:30

So, in the case of the case before the ICC, investigating the suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity, then you would be looking at the individuals whose actions could be connected directly to those crimes, which can be any individual in the Russian Armed Forces, feasibly, also, you know, much higher up the chain of command, feasibly all the way up to President Putin, but the issue with that is that it can be very difficult to connect the actions of forces on the ground to higher level officials, and particularly going all the way up to Head of State. The, if the case of aggression were to proceed in the special tribunal for aggression against Ukraine, then you would, you know, that is a leadership crime and so, certainly that, you know, Putin could feasibly be found responsible for the crime of aggression. In terms of the case before the ICJ, that is concerned with the responsibility of Russia, as a state, breaching Article One of the Genocide Convention, but by falsely claiming that Ukraine has been engaging in genocide in Ukraine as a basis for its use of military force in Ukraine.

Jaclyn Streitfeld-Hall 19:11

So, since you've been mentioning the crime of aggression, I think what's interesting now is that we're in a situation where there seem to be, kind of, two streams of violations that the international community is attempting to address with regards to the invasion. First, there's the fact that there is this act of aggression, and that Russia appears to have acted in violation of
the UN Charter and other international mechanisms. And then the second, sort of, facet of the conflict, right now, is that in their actions in Ukraine, they appear to be perpetrating violations that could amount to crimes against populations in terms of the use of indiscriminate weapons, targeting of civilian areas et cetera. So, I have a bit of a two part question here. What other steps can or should the international community pursue, particularly through the UN Charter to confront Russia's actions? And, I guess the second part of that question is, and what do you think the international community is expected to do to uphold R2P in this case?

Rebecca Barber 20:22

Yeah, so I think, two quite different questions, so I'll start with the one about what other options there are available to the international community, particularly through, including through the UN Charter, and I think, particularly relevant is through the General Assembly, in this case, given the paralysis of the Security Council, and the Security Council, obviously, cannot take any further action. So, we spoke earlier about the General Assembly resolution, which deployed the act of aggression, demanded that Russia immediately cease its use of force, withdraw its forces from Ukraine, you know, great words, but there are actually more, there are more substantive things that the General Assembly can do if the situation continues to escalate as indeed its seeming to do. So, the first thing that the General Assembly can do is call upon states to support Ukraine in exercising its right of self defense, that's very squarely within the competence of the General Assembly to do that. It would be recommending that states use force in a manner that is, in any case, lawful within the scope of the UN Charter, with or without a General Assembly resolution. Secondly, the General Assembly can recommend sanctions, I think this is probably one of the most important things that the General Assembly can do, and the General Assembly, in the past, has recommended a vast range of different types of sanctions. It has recommended boycotts, just to provide a few examples, boycotts on trade, arms embargoes, and other embargoes of various types, the severance of diplomatic relations, things like bans on cultural and sporting engagements, and it's gone so far as to recommend comprehensive mandatory sanctions. If you look at the steps that the General Assembly has taken in relation to apartheid in South Africa, Portuguese territories in the colonial era, then you'll see some very substantive steps that have been taken by the General Assembly in terms of recommending sanctions. In the case of Russia, obviously, many states are imposing sanctions anyway, even without a resolution from the General Assembly or recommendations from the General Assembly, but I think if the Assembly were to recommend sanctions, it could achieve a number of things. It could encourage other states to come on board, it could recommend additional sanctions similarly to what was done in the past, in previous situations. It could feasibly increase the likelihood of coherence and consistency in the sanctions that are in any case being imposed. And if the General Assembly were to recommend the sanctions it could also take the opportunity to emphasize the importance of sanctioning states complying with their international legal obligations, for example, by ensuring that sanctions that negatively impact human rights in Russia, and I think, as sanctions continue to step-up and become more severe, I think this is going to become an increasingly important issue, making sure that the international community as a whole has got this balance right, between ensuring that sanctions are as coercive as possible, but at the same time, being as careful as possible to minimize impact on human rights for the population in Russia. Another option that is available to the General Assembly that has been canvassed is the option of suspending Russia from the United Nations by way of rejecting the credentials of its representatives. There is a provision in the UN Charter that allows for a member state to be suspended, that's Article Five of the UN Charter, but Article Five of the Charter says that a member state can only be suspended from the UN upon the recommendation of the Security Council. So, suspension under the UN Charter
pursuant to Article Five is not an option, in this case, because of the Security Council veto. However, if a member state were, at any time, to raise an objection in the General Assembly to the presence of Russia's representative, that is Russia's individual delegate sitting in the General Assembly, the General Assembly could then decide not to accept the credentials of that individual, and that would have the effect of temporarily excluding Russia from participation in the UN General Assembly. It wouldn't be a suspension in name, but it would be in effect. The only time this option has really been used, in vaguely comparable circumstances, is in relation to South Africa in 1974 when the option was used to protest against South Africa's policy of apartheid. The competence of the General Assembly to suspend a member state in this way, through the credentials process is not uncontroversial. There are some who argue that the credentials process can't be used to get around Article Five and the requirement of a Security Council recommendation regarding suspension, but, the fact is that the General Assembly has utilized this option in the past, and if its done so in the past, well, it can do so again. I mean, that's obviously an option that is not particularly likely to be pursued in the immediate future, but I think in the circumstances with which we are faced it's useful to have all of the options on the table, and I think having the options on the table, these sorts of very ambitious options on the table, can help to contribute to a shift in thinking regarding the significance of the role that can feasibly be played by the General Assembly in these types of situations. I think it's also really important to just put out there that in international law, states have an obligation to cooperate to end serious breaches of peremptory norms of international law. In the articles of state responsibility, article forty-one, two, it says specifically, states have an obligation to cooperate to bring to an end any serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law, and that was affirmed by the International Law Commission recently in 2019, in the Draft Conclusions on Peremptory Norms of International Law. The crime of aggression is recognized as being a peremptory norm of international law, as are the basic rules of international humanitarian law. So, in other words, states, under the laws of state responsibility, have a legal obligation to cooperate to end Russia's aggression in Ukraine, and also to end any serious violations of international humanitarian law being committed in Ukraine. It's quite unclear what exactly the obligation to cooperate requires states to do, but one thing that is very clear, is that the obligation has particular relevance for the way in which states should use their memberships, their membership of international organizations, and specifically the General Assembly. The International Law Commission's commentaries to the articles on state responsibility, say, specifically, that cooperation could be organized in the framework of a competent international organization, including the UN, and the more recent commentaries to the Draft Conclusions on Peremptory Norms, say similarly, that the collective system of the UN is the preferred framework for cooperative action between states. What I think is a really important comment in those commentaries, with regards to the role of international organizations and the obligations of states through international organizations, and that is that where an international organization has discretion to act, the obligation to cooperate imposes a duty on the members of that organization to act with a view to the organization exercising that discretion in a manner to bring to an end the breach of a peremptory norm of international law. So, the situation in Ukraine, at the moment, is a situation in which we are faced with serious breaches of peremptory norms of international law. There is an international organization, the General Assembly, that is competent to act, to do a number of things, so, I think, what that statement from the International Law Commission means is that if the General Assembly has the discretion to, for example, pass a resolution recommending to states that they impose sanctions, and such a recommendation might assist in bringing Russia's aggression in Ukraine to an end - it doesn't need to be shown that it definitely will achieve that objective, but even just that it has a possibility to assist - then the obligation to cooperate should require states to support that resolution. So, I think, that's just important to have out there that states do actually have legal obligations to cooperate, to bring these sorts
of situations to an end, so far as possible, and within their competence to do so. I'll move to the second part of your question about the Responsibility to Protect. I think this is a good question to be asking now because, I read something the other day about Responsibility to Protect and Ukraine suggesting that the lack of military intervention by the international community, presumably talking about the lack of military response in support of Ukraine, basically signalled the death toll of R2P, and said that, you know, we should all stop talking about R2P, and sort of admit that, you know, it was an idea whose time has come, and, I think, that sort of, analysis really does a disservice to this principle of Responsibility to Protect, which doesn't necessarily call for military intervention in this particular situation. So, as you said, yes, we certainly, we are seeing increasing evidence that, in addition to being very clearly a crime of aggression, Russia is also, it appears, committing war crimes in Ukraine, targeting civilians and civilian objects, humanitarian corridors, and certainly launching attacks in the knowledge that those attacks will cause disproportionate civilian harm. The Responsibility to Protect principle, as defined in the General Assembly's World Summit outcome document in 2005, so that is the Responsibility to Protect principle that all states agreed to and committed to, said that the international community has the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, firstly, using diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, and that states were prepared to take collective action through the Security Council to protect populations from those crimes, when peaceful actions are inadequate. The Responsibility to Protect principle, as defined in the World Summit outcome document, did not envisage military intervention not authorized by the Security Council. So, the Responsibility to Protect as defined in 2005, would not in that case, provide a basis for states to intervene militarily in Ukraine, i.e. NATO going into direct conflict with Russia in this case, because we don't have a Security Council authorization. There is a broader interpretation of the Responsibility to Protect, and that is the principle as originally conceived and developed in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty - the Canadian government-sponsored commission that first defined the principle of R2P, and that version of R2P did suggest that R2P could feasibly require states, or envisaged states to use force in situations in which there was no Security Council authorization. That report said that military intervention for humanitarian protection purposes should always, sorry that Security Council authorization should always be requested, if it was proposed that military force be used for humanitarian protection purposes, but it did not say that such an intervention must always be authorized by the Security Council. And it specifically said that if the Security Council fails to discharge its responsibility in conscience-shocking situations, then we couldn't rule out the possibility that concerned states may decide to act anyway. So, in that broader interpretation of the Responsibility to Protect, it was seen as possible that force may be used without a Security Council authorization. But I think, the really important part in that report describing the border interpretation of the Responsibility to Protect, is that it prescribed a number of precautionary criteria to be considered before a military intervention be launched for humanitarian protection purposes or pursuant to the principle of R2P. And, one of those criteria, was the criteria of reasonable prospects - so, specifically, does the proposed military action stand a reasonable chance of halting or averting the atrocities or suffering that triggered the intervention? Or, put otherwise, would the consequences of embarking upon the intervention likely be worse than if there is no action at all? And, I think this is the really important criteria in the Ukraine scenario. Specifically, the authors of that report proposed that a military action for limited human protection purposes cannot be justified if, in the process, it triggers a larger conflict. They said it will be the case that some human beings simply cannot be rescued except at unacceptable cost, perhaps of a larger regional conflagration, involving major military powers, and that in such cases, however painful the reality, coercive military action is no longer justified. And, particularly pertinent to the current situation, it's said that application of this precautionary principle would mean that on purely utilitarian grounds, it would likely preclude
military action against any one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, even if all of the other conditions for intervention described were met. So, I think, that is really important because I think it suggests that in this kind of situation, on an R2P analysis - whether one looks at the narrow interpretation of R2P, as defined by the General Assembly in the World Summit outcome resolution, or the broader interpretation, as defined by the Canadian-sponsored mission in 2001 - either way, R2P would not necessarily require third states to intervene militarily in support of Ukraine, in this situation. So, I just think that's important to have out there because, I don't think it's, sort of, constructive, and it's not, you know, it doesn't further our goals of galvanizing international action in support of Responsibility to Protect, or prevention of atrocity crimes, to say that this situation and the fact that third states are not jumping to intervene militarily in support of Ukraine is, sort of, the death knell of R2P, and indicative of the fact that the R2P norm is an outdated idea whose time has come.

Jaclyn Streitfeld-Hall 38:32
I really appreciate that point that you've just made because, I think, certainly all of us at the Global Center, but I'm sure you and others in the R2P community have read our own obituaries a few too many times, and it's almost always in that context of military intervention, and, because we can't militarily intervene, therefore, R2P doesn't work. And I think a lot of the other measures that you mentioned earlier, in terms of what they can do, what the Human Rights Council has already done, those types of measures are also things that can be done under the umbrella of R2P.

Rebecca Barber 39:16
On that point, there was an excellent paper that I just read the other day, which is available on SSRN, by Justice Richard Humphreys and Lauma, I'm not going to pronounce her name correctly, but Paegkalna, and they suggest four types of responses which they refer to as ‘sub warfighting combat.’ They also, as have many others, take the approach that direct conflict between the West and Russia is not where we want to go, and so, their 'sub warfighting combat' options, are: first, an information war; second, legal proceedings; third, sanctions; fourth, diplomatic isolation; and fifth, assisting Ukraine to defend itself militarily. And under each of those headings, they spell out a number of different options and show that under each of those, there are so many more steps that could be taken, all of which falls short of direct military conflict with Russia, and I think that, again, thinking of what R2P actually requires states to do, that that is the way that we need to be thinking, not "R2P clearly doesn't work because we're not, you know, we're holding back on going into direct conflict".

Jaclyn Streitfeld-Hall 40:52
Thank you for joining us for this episode of Expert Voices on Atrocity Prevention. If you'd like more information about the Global Centre's work on R2P, mass atrocity prevention, or populations at risk of mass atrocities, visit our website at globalr2p.org and connect with us on Twitter and Facebook at GCR2P.