Peacekeeping, Civilian Protection and the Responsibility to Protect:
A Handbook for Trainers
Acknowledgements

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About the Global Centre

The Global Centre is a non-governmental organization based in New York and Geneva with a mandate that includes promoting implementation of the Responsibility to Protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. In order to fulfill this mandate, the Global Centre works with the United Nations - including the Office of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on Genocide Prevention and R2P - and Member States to facilitate the adoption of measures aimed at preventing and responding to the four mass atrocity crimes. Since the Global Centre’s inception in 2008, we have published timely analysis on country situations where populations are most vulnerable to mass atrocity crimes and recommended actions aimed at their protection.

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, CUNY Graduate Center
365 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5203, New York, NY 10016, United States
Website: http://www.globalr2p.org/
Email: info@globalr2p.org

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Introduction

Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld once noted that the “UN wasn’t created to take mankind into paradise, but rather, to save humanity from hell.” UN peacekeepers are a physical manifestation of the international community’s determination to uphold its responsibility to protect men, women and children at risk of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. At a time when we are witnessing a general erosion of respect for civilian lives and human dignity, and direct attacks on the norms that safeguard humanity, the presence of peacekeepers can still mean the difference between life and death for the world’s most vulnerable populations.

Historically, no issue has done more to tarnish the reputation of the UN than the failure to halt mass atrocities. From Rwanda and Srebrenica during the 1990s to other complex crises in the world today, the mass killing of civilians strikes at the very idea of an international community and undermines the UN’s founding principles. Over the two decades that have passed since Rwanda and Srebrenica substantial progress has been made to ensure peacekeepers protect civilians more effectively. UN Security Council mandates now recognize that a core function of peacekeeping is to help restore peace and to protect civilians from these conscience-shocking crimes. However, emerging challenges to international peace and security necessitate a more robust, coherent and comprehensive approach throughout the various stages of conflicts.

The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect has developed this course in order to assist and enhance the effectiveness of UN peacekeepers when responding to mass atrocity situations. I hope this handbook will provide you with practical guidance on the risk factors for mass atrocity crimes, as well as operational strategies to improve the protection of civilians.

Dr. Simon Adams
Executive Director
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM:</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AU:</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR:</td>
<td>The Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRSV:</td>
<td>Conflict Related Sexual Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR:</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPKO:</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DRC:</td>
<td>The Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>HIPPO:</td>
<td>High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
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<td>ICC:</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP:</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IED:</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IHL:</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>JMAC:</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Centre</td>
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<td>JOC:</td>
<td>Joint Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSCA:</td>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MINUSMA:</td>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUJUSTH</td>
<td>UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO:</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>POC:</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
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<td>QIP:</td>
<td>Quick Impact Project</td>
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<td>R2P:</td>
<td>The Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>SRSG:</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SSR:</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>UN:</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID:</td>
<td>The African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNESCO:</td>
<td>UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNFIL:</td>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNISFA:</td>
<td>UN Interim Security Force for Abyei</td>
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<td>UNMIL:</td>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMISS:</td>
<td>UN Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOCI:</td>
<td>UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>WPA:</td>
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Overview of the Course

This course aims to introduce participants to the principles of the Responsibility to Protect populations from mass atrocity crimes and to strengthen the capacity of UN peacekeepers to identify the warning signs of atrocities and understand the means the mission has at its disposal to respond to such crimes.

Module 1 will provide a broad conceptual overview of R2P and atrocity prevention, as well as how these concepts relate to peacekeeping and civilian protection.

Module 2 will discuss how R2P and the Atrocity Prevention Lens aid in addressing existing gaps in the capacity of peacekeepers to protect civilians. This module addresses how these concepts add value to the existing work of peacekeepers with regards to the Protection of Civilians as well as upholding responsibilities for Child Protection and the prevention of Conflict Related Sexual Violence.

Modules 3 and 4 will address how R2P and the Atrocity Prevention Lens can be used in the day-to-day work of UN peacekeepers. Module 3 specifically addresses how using the Atrocity Prevention Lens during situational awareness activities can enhance the threat assessments carried out by peacekeepers. Module 4 will highlight how to use risk management tools in order to prioritize and respond to threats to populations.

Modules 3 and 4 will both emphasize that acting within the spirit of R2P to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes does not require peacekeepers to undertake action outside of their existing mandates. Rather, the addition of the Atrocity Prevention Lens is intended to improve the protection of civilians by enhancing peacekeepers’ ability to understand the nature of the threat faced by the population they are mandated to protect. The Atrocity Prevention Lens lends itself to creating a culture of awareness among peacekeepers about the risks associated with these crimes. Equipped with this lens, peacekeepers will be able to draw on additional tools to assess civilian threats and identify appropriate tactical responses.

Note to Facilitators: This training is meant to serve as a supplemental resource to trainers facilitating courses on the Protection of Civilians; Women, Peace and Security; Child Protection or related topics. As such, it does not necessarily need to be implemented from beginning to end, as laid out in this booklet. Rather, trainers are encouraged to choose those topics and activities most appropriate to their courses in order to enhance peacekeepers’ awareness of the risk of mass atrocity crimes and how to mitigate and respond to such risks.
## MODULE 1: WHAT IS THE “RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT?”

### Objective:
This module will lay the foundation for the course, clearly defining the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), explaining why the concept was developed, and highlighting where it fits within existing mandates for UN peacekeeping.

### Learning Outcomes:
By the end of Module 1, learners will be able to:

- Explain R2P and the responsibilities it commits various actors to uphold
- Understand the historic context of the development of R2P, including the grave consequences of failing to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes
- Define the four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing
- Identify the three pillars of R2P, list relevant actors for implementing each pillar, and describe different actions that can be taken by these actors under each pillar
- Understand the basic structure of the United Nations, its organs and departments as it relates to peacekeeping
- Understand the relationship between R2P and other protection agendas

### Methods:
- Opening video presentation
- Group discussions
- Lecture
- Activities:
  - “In-and-Out”
  - Scenario-Based Identification of the Four Crimes

### Resources:
- Video (on USB in folder with Module 1 slides)
- Slides
- Title cards for “In-and-Out” activity
- Available resources on your USB:
  - What is R2P?
  - Definitions of the four crimes
  - UN Secretary-General’s 2009 report on R2P
  - UN Security Council mandates for UN peacekeeping missions that refer to R2P
# Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

## Lesson Map

Module 1, including the introduction to the course, should take approximately one day.

Estimated timing:
- 30-60 minutes of introduction to the course
- 30 minutes on video and subsequent discussion
- 4.5 hours of lecture and group activity
- 15 minutes of closing exercise

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<th>Situating R2P within the Current World Context</th>
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Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

**Video Presentation – Rwanda and Srebrenica**

Show a 16-minute video created by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect on the failure to prevent atrocities in Rwanda and Srebrenica. (The video is on the USB in the folder with Module 1 slides).

Following the video presentation, facilitators may pose the following questions:

1) These scenarios occurred before UN missions had a Protection of Civilians (POC) mandate. If a POC mandate had existed in these scenarios, how do you believe the missions could have responded differently?

2) Do you think missions today have the capacity to prevent such atrocities? If yes, how would they have protected populations differently? If no, what gaps exist that prevent them from providing the necessary protection?

**Note to Facilitators:** When posing the questions above, consider introducing examples from current missions with civilian protection mandates to give some context to existing scenarios.

Close the activity by explaining that the purpose of the video was to set the tone for the course. The genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica show the gravity of the crimes addressed by R2P. The tragedies in these countries show that a UN peacekeeping presence alone is not enough to stop mass atrocity crimes. Under mandates currently authorized by the UN Security Council, peacekeepers are called upon to take action that could prevent such crimes from occurring. Implementing R2P and utilizing the Atrocity Prevention Lens can enhance this ability.

Genocides and other atrocities require planning; they do not spontaneously occur. In most cases, enough early warning exists that atrocities can be prevented or their escalation halted through effective early action by peacekeepers and other international actors.

While the failures to protect populations in Rwanda and Srebrenica were not solely the failure of UN peacekeeping, no actions of the UN are judged with as much public scrutiny as the failure of UN peacekeeping in preventing atrocity crimes.
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

Situating R2P within the Current World Context

Note to Facilitators: This section should be regularly reviewed and updated. The current text reflects the state of the world in mid-2018.

Despite national and global efforts to better protect populations, there are currently more than 68.5 million people displaced as a result of conflict, persecution and atrocities. This is more than double the number displaced at the time when the tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica occurred.

In many states – such as Syria, Myanmar and Burundi - the government and its allies play a crucial role in perpetuating cycles of violence and persecution against certain portions of the population; in others, like the Central African Republic (CAR), the government lacks the capacity to provide adequate protection from armed groups. New actors – such as armed extremist groups – have emerged as threats against populations and terrorist organizations have begun perpetrating atrocity crimes as part of their tactics. Over the past few years the entire international human rights and protection architecture has been under attack, with various actors, including governments and armed groups, flagrantly violating international human rights and humanitarian law as they perpetrate attacks against civilian populations.

According to research and analysis done by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, populations are currently at risk of mass atrocity crimes in Myanmar, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Sudan, CAR, Burundi, Somalia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Eritrea.

Many of these countries – DRC, South Sudan, Sudan and CAR – also host some of the UN’s largest peacekeeping missions. Somalia also hosts a UN-supported African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission. It is for this reason that this course aims to increase the awareness of UN peacekeepers to the risks associated with mass atrocity crimes and the means for preventing their occurrence.
R2P emerged as a norm in response to the failures to protect populations during the genocides in the 1990s. It was designed as a new operational and political response to accomplishing the aim of “Never Again” – the idea that the world should never stand idly by when populations are suffering from genocide. This new approach would be based not just on crisis response, but also on taking steps to prevent the conditions that facilitate and ultimately lead to the commission of mass atrocity crimes.

Developed in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, heads of state and government agreed to uphold R2P at the 2005 UN World Summit. Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the UN World Summit Outcome Document articulate the Responsibility to Protect.
R2P is a political commitment made by states affirming their responsibility to protect populations from four mass atrocity crimes:

- Genocide
- War crimes
- Crimes against humanity
- Ethnic cleansing

All four crimes constitute massive violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. The first three crimes – genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes – have strict legal definitions within the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Genocide Convention, while ethnic cleansing is considered a subset of crimes against humanity without its own legal definition.

**States have the primary responsibility to protect** their populations from these mass atrocity crimes. If they lack the capacity to do so, the international community has a responsibility to assist them in building such capacity. If a state is unwilling or unable to protect populations, the international community has a responsibility to respond through timely and appropriate action in accordance with the UN Charter.

Since 2009 this responsibility has been further articulated in the ten annual reports on R2P presented to the UN General Assembly by the UN Secretary-General, eight annual interactive dialogues and two formal debates held within the UN General Assembly on R2P, as well as within other international forums. In 2008, the UN Secretary-General also appointed his first Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect.
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

Slide 4

The first report of the UN Secretary-General conceptualized R2P into three pillars:

- **Pillar I:** States have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from the four mass atrocity crimes – genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

- **Pillar II:** The international community has a responsibility to provide assistance to other states to strengthen their capacity to protect populations.

- **Pillar III:** When a state is manifestly failing to protect its population – or is itself the perpetrator – the international community has a responsibility to take timely and decisive action to protect populations in accordance with the UN Charter.

Pillar III tools are often conceived as either “coercive” or “non-coercive” measures. Non-coercive measures include mediation and use of “good offices” while coercive measures may include targeted sanctions, arms embargos or, in extreme cases and as a last resort, military intervention. Coercive measures must be undertaken in accordance with the UN Charter and must be authorized by the UN Security Council.

**Note to Facilitators:** If the situation in Libya is raised, refer to the following information: R2P and its Third Pillar are frequently viewed only through the lens of coercive action as a result of the Security Council mandated action in Libya, with many critics associating the norm with regime change. It is important to remember that the spirit of R2P is preventive and actions span all three pillars, including non-coercive action.

The resolution establishing intervention in Libya was to some extent motivated by R2P – populations were at imminent risk of mass atrocity crimes perpetrated by the national government and affiliated armed forces. The events that occurred in Libya, however, were the result of how the mandate was interpreted and implemented, as well as how participating actors addressed the aftermath of the intervention.
Activity 1.1: In-and-Out Exercise – Identifying Elements of R2P and the Four Crimes (Slide 5)

Materials:  
- Chart Paper
- List of crimes (see below)

Time Estimate: 15 Minutes

Purpose: The purpose of this activity is to see if participants can designate various crimes or events as being “in” our “out” of the four crimes that are included in R2P (genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity).

Instructions:

1) Clear a large space in the middle of the room and instruct participants to come and stand in the middle of the space. Designate one half of the room as “IN” and one half as “OUT.”

2) The facilitator will hold up individual signs with the crimes/events listed, asking participants to declare whether they are “IN” or “OUT” based on their knowledge of what each of the four crimes entails. If they feel the crime/event displayed fits within the categories of one of the four crimes, they should move to stand on the side of the room designated as “IN.” Conversely, if they feel the crime/event does not fit within one of the four crimes, they should move to stand on the “OUT” side of the room.

Note to Facilitators: For some categories, participants may be tempted to advocate for an “It Depends” column. While encouraging the group to reach consensus on where to place the item, encourage discussion on why they believe the crime or event is conditional. This subject will be further addressed in the next lesson, in particular through concepts such as “widespread,” “systematic,” “intent” and/or the type of government response.

For example: Famine is not one of the four crimes; however, deliberate starvation of a population is. Participants may wish to discuss ideas such as whether the famine is man-made or if the government response to famine biases one group over another.

Murder in some contexts constitutes a crime against humanity. In order to be considered such a crime, murder must be widespread (such as in the case of mass killings) or systematic. When murder is committed by one individual against another outside of this context it is a criminal offense, and does not constitute an atrocity crime.
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

3) During the activity, the facilitator should not correct participants’ inputs; allow for group discussion without intervening.

4) As the participants go through each crime/event, note down on chart paper what the consensus (or majority) is for each one. Explain that the list will be saved “as is” for participants to reassess after having gone through definitions of the four crimes.

5) **AFTER LESSON TWO**: Compare the slides with the “In-and-Out” responses of the participants. Did group responses line up correctly with the definitions? Provide any necessary correction and clarification. Address questions surrounding the “it depends” answers.

**Alternatively**: If the class setting is not conducive for moving around, the exercise can be done by a simple show of hands for each crime/event, with the facilitator noting the group consensus on chart paper. The facilitator should encourage group discussion throughout the exercise.
### Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

#### Activity 1.1: List of Crimes/Events:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“IN”</th>
<th>“OUT”</th>
<th>“IT DEPENDS”</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
<td>Murder (depends upon widespread or systematic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enslavement</td>
<td>Deadly flood</td>
<td>Rape and sexual slavery (depends upon widespread or systematic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass deportation</td>
<td>Deadly famine</td>
<td>Forced pregnancy (depends upon widespread or systematic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforced disappearance</td>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>Destruction of cultural heritage (depends upon widespread or systematic and/or intent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of poisonous weapons</td>
<td>Systematic mass corruption</td>
<td>Forcible displacement (depends upon widespread or systematic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child recruitment in conflict</td>
<td>Massive pollution</td>
<td>Violent responses to protest (depends upon the tactics used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary executions</td>
<td>Endemic poverty</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deliberate blocking of humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Ebola outbreak</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Apartheid</td>
<td>Nuclear proliferation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack directed against any civilian population</td>
<td>Piracy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted killings of members of another ethnic group</td>
<td>Political instability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persecution against any identifiable group</td>
<td>Authoritarian regimes repressing political freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental catastrophes, such as major oil spills</td>
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Lesson Two: Defining the Four Crimes

R2P is specifically focused on preventing and responding to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. While R2P is a political commitment with no legally binding provisions, it is underpinned by international legal instruments and obligations. These include protections guaranteed under international humanitarian and human rights law through the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute of the ICC.

Slide 6

**Definition of the Crimes: Genocide**

“acts committed in a deliberate attempt to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”

This includes such acts as:

- Killing members of the group
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group

**Genocide**: acts committed in a deliberate attempt to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.

This includes such acts as:

- Killing members of the group
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group

To constitute genocide, there must be a *proven intent* on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy, in whole or in part, a group based on nationality, ethnicity, race or religion.

Victims of the crime of genocide are not randomly targeted: they are deliberately chosen, based on their real or perceived membership to one of the four groups.

The crime of genocide is codified in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention). The Convention has been ratified by 149 States (as of January 2018).
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

Slide 7

**War Crimes**

“acts which constitute grave breaches and other violations of the laws and customs of armed conflict, particularly those in violation of the Geneva Conventions”

This includes such acts as:

- Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities
- Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives
- Employing poison or poisoned weapons

There is no single international legal document that codifies all war crimes. However, among the documents that do address such crimes, the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols are the most significant.

War crimes include acts that constitute grave breaches of the laws and customs of armed conflict, particularly those of the Geneva Conventions.

War crimes can only be committed in the context of an armed conflict or protracted armed violence. The character of the war dictates what constitutes a war crime, in particular whether it is an international or non-international armed conflict.

Combatants and non-combatants can both be considered victims of war crimes.
**Crimes against humanity:** acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.

This includes such acts as:

- Murder
- Torture
- Enslavement
- Forcible transfers of populations
- Rape and sexual violence
- Persecution

Crimes against humanity are not yet codified in a separate treaty; however, they are clearly defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Crimes against humanity are committed as part of a *widespread* or *systematic* attack directed against a civilian population.

Widespread refers to the large-scale violence in relation to the number of victims or its extension over a broad geographic area.

Systematic means that it is part of a wider policy or plan: this excludes random, accidental or isolated acts of violence.
Ethnic cleansing: While there is no formal legal definition of ethnic cleansing, it involves the systematic forced removal of distinct minority groups from a given territory, often with the intent of making it ethnically homogeneous.

This includes such acts as:
- Forced migration (deportation, population transfer)
- Intimidation
- Mass murder

The crime "ethnic cleansing" has not been recognized as an independent crime under international law and is therefore considered as a subset of crimes against humanity.

The term emerged in the context of the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and has been used in UN Security Council resolutions and in the UN General Assembly. It is furthermore acknowledged in judgments and indictments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, but it did not constitute one of the counts for prosecution.

The UN Commission of Experts, established to examine and analyze the situation in the Former Yugoslavia, defined ethnic cleansing as "rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons/groups."

Coercive practices include: murder, torture, arbitrary arrests and detention, extrajudicial executions, rape and sexual assault and deportation.
Note to Facilitators: During this portion of the lesson, discuss the threshold of “widespread” or “systematic” for mass atrocities, as well as the idea of “intent” with regards to the commission of genocide and other crimes. Emphasize that the commission of atrocities on a massive scale often requires mobilization of possible perpetrators, preparation, and planning.

When thinking about these crimes occurring on a “mass” atrocity scale, ask whether perpetrators showed intent to destroy a population (genocide), whether the crimes were widespread (occurring on a large scale), or systematic (occurring as part of a clear plan or policy).

At the conclusion of these slides, return to the “In” and “Out” lists, making necessary corrections as to how the crimes or events were categorized. Also, take time to address any crimes which may have fallen in to an “It Depends” category, utilizing the concepts of widespread, systematic, and intent to help further clarify.
Activity 1.2: Scenario-Based Identification of the Four Crimes (Slides 10-15)

Materials: Scenarios (provided below and on slides 11-15; also in a printer-friendly version on USB)

Time Estimate: 45 Minutes

Instructions:

1) Now that the four mass atrocity crimes have been defined, see if participants can apply this knowledge to various scenarios. Each of the scenarios below describes a situation that may or may not meet the threshold for mass atrocity crimes.

2) Before dividing participants into small groups, work through 1-2 of the scenarios as a large group to demonstrate the activity. Read through the scenario as a group and facilitate a discussion on whether the situation described meets the threshold for mass atrocity crimes.

3) After going through 1-2 of the scenarios as a large group, divide participants into groups of 4-5. Provide groups with handouts of the remaining scenarios and have participants discuss the same question on these scenarios within their small groups.

4) After the groups have had a chance to discuss, invite them to share their findings on each scenario, explaining their conclusions of why each does or does not fit the criteria of a mass atrocity crime.

Note to Facilitators: Participants may be tempted to add additional context to the case studies provided based on their own knowledge of the situation. However, for the purpose of this exercise, encourage participants to base their assessment only on the information provided.
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

Activity 1.2: Scenarios (Slides 11-15)

Guinea

- During December 2008 the military in Guinea staged a coup, forming a junta government.
- The leader of the junta, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, pledged to abstain from running for president during the country’s January 2010 elections.
- During 2009 Camara broke his pledge, declaring his candidacy for the presidential race.
- This prompted opposition protests, which were banned in Guinea.
- On 28 September 2009 the opposition held a pro-democracy rally at a stadium in Conakry. During the rally hundreds of members of the government security forces entered the stadium and opened fire on the crowd. Other members of the security forces blocked the gates to prevent civilians from fleeing.
- At least 150 people were killed and over 1,200 were seriously injured. There were reports of security forces perpetrating rape and other forms of sexual violence targeting women and girls in the crowd. Groups of men were also arbitrarily detained by security forces.

R2P Situation: Yes

Crimes committed:
1. Crimes against humanity
   - Murder
   - Other inhumane acts of a similar character, intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health
   - Sexual violence (including rape)
   - Arbitrary detention (imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law)

Contextual element:
- Systematic attack directed against a civilian population
## Catalonia (Spain)

- During 2017 the autonomous Spanish region of Catalonia scheduled a referendum to vote on whether there was popular support for gaining independence from Spain.
- The Spanish government declared the vote illegal on 7 September and the Constitutional Court suspended the referendum.
- Despite this, a referendum was held on 1 October.
- Prior to the referendum, the government tried to block the vote by disabling internet, confiscating ballots and threatening to detain Catalonian officials.
- On the day of the vote, the government sent the National Police and Guardia Civil to block the vote and prevent people from entering polling stations.
- Violence broke out between civilians and the security forces, with reports of police using rubber bullets, hitting people with batons and physically dragging them from polling stations. Catalonian officials were threatened with arrest.
- At least 900 civilians and 30 security agents were injured.

### R2P Situation: No

Although there were violations of human rights, there was no systematic policy on the part of the government to injure or kill civilians.
Yemen

- During 2014 the Houthis, an armed movement originating in northeast Yemen, and military units loyal to deposed President Ali Abdullah Saleh, took control of numerous governorates across the country.
- In March 2015 a Saudi Arabia-led military coalition responded to a government request for regional military intervention. Fighting between the government, supported by the international military coalition, and the Houthis remains ongoing.
- On 1 November 2017 an airstrike by the Saudi-led coalition targeted a hotel and adjoining market in Houthi-controlled Sa’ada province, resulting in the death of at least 31 civilians.
- The market and hotel are reportedly not within the vicinity of any Houthi military sites, and there is no clear evidence that Houthi fighters were killed in the strike.
- The Saudi-led coalition has routinely targeted non-military sites in their airstrikes.

R2P Situation: Yes

Crimes committed:
1. War crimes
   - Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities
   - Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects (objects which are not military objectives)

Contextual element:
- In the context of a protracted armed conflict
### Myanmar

- The Rohingya, a Muslim minority group, have faced institutionalized discrimination in Myanmar for decades.

- Myanmar’s security forces have carried out *clearance operations* in Rakhine State since 25 August 2017 after an armed group calling itself the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked police posts and an army base.

- Since that date there have been widespread reports of the security forces imposing collective punishment upon the ethnic Rohingya community, including the unlawful killing of civilians, mass displacement, rape, and the burning of at least 400 villages.

- At least 720,000 refugees – mostly Rohingya – have fled across the border to escape violence, bringing the total number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to more than 900,000.

- Myanmar's authorities have begun seizing Rohingya land across Rakhine State. Local government officials have indicated that confiscated land will now be reclassified for other purposes, and that Rohingya refugees will not necessarily be allowed to return to their previous villages.

### R2P Situation: Yes

**Crimes committed:**

1. **Ethnic cleansing**
   - “Clearing operations”
   - Institutionalized discrimination
   - Seizing and confiscation of land

2. **Crimes against humanity**
   - Murder
   - Deportation or forcible transfer of population
   - Rape
   - Burning of villages (other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health)

**Contextual element:**

- Widespread attack directed against a civilian population
- Systematic attack directed against a civilian population

*Note that these crimes can be precursors to genocide*
### Iraq

- Between October 2016 and July 2017 the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) conducted a military offensive to recapture the city of Mosul from the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

- A United States-led military coalition lent significant air support to the Iraqi government during the offensive.

- Throughout the offensive, the UN received credible reports of ISIL forcibly displacing civilians and using civilians as human shields.

- On 17 March an airstrike on a building in the al-Jadidah district of Mosul, in which ISIL snipers were situated, led to the deaths of up to 200 civilians. The airstrike and civilian deaths were subsequently confirmed by a US military investigation.

- Investigations indicate that the airstrike had triggered explosives placed in the building by ISIL fighters, causing it to collapse. According the US investigation and the ISF, it was unknown that the building had been rigged with explosives.

### R2P Situation: Yes

**Crimes committed:**

1. War crimes committed by ISIL
   - Forcible displacement of the civilian population
   - Using civilians as human shields

**No war crimes committed by the ISF:**

- Given the intelligence, the target was deemed a military location, which can be legally targeted in armed conflict. Since the Iraqi Security Forces were not aware of the explosives within the building or proximity of civilians, the civilian casualties would not be deemed a violation of IHL.
Central African Republic

- The Central African Republic has experienced armed conflict since the Seleka rebel alliance, consisting of predominantly Muslim forces, overthrew the government in March 2013.

- In response, local militias, known as ‘anti-Balaka’ (anti-machete), consisting of predominantly Christian forces, were formed and they started to commit reprisals against Muslim communities.

- On 5 December 2013 anti-Balaka groups launched a coordinated attack on ex-Seleka forces in the capital, Bangui. Ex-Seleka forces responded with violence, eventually forcing the anti-Balaka to retreat after prolonged exchanges of gunfire. It was estimated that, in Bangui alone, the ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka killed some 1,000 people, mainly civilians, and 214,000 became internally displaced from 5 to 6 December 2013. Religious buildings such as mosques and churches were intentionally destroyed by both sides during the fighting.

- During the days that followed, anti-Balaka groups engaged in systematic door-to-door house searches in various neighbourhoods of Bangui, killing approximately 60 Muslim men. Many women and girls were raped and sexually abused while their husbands and fathers were killed.

- Among the ex-Seleka forces and anti-Balaka fighters were hundreds of armed children, many of them younger than 15.

- The attack triggered widespread violence between Christian and Muslim communities in Bangui and across the country.

R2P Situation: Yes

Crimes committed:
1. Crimes against humanity
   - Murder
   - Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity

Contextual element:
- Widespread attack directed against a civilian population

* Note that these crimes can be precursors to genocide

2. War crimes
   - Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

- Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, provided they are not military objectives
- Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups
- Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence

Contextual element:
- In the context of a protracted armed conflict
Lesson Three: Who has a Responsibility and What Does it Entail?

The primary actors involved in upholding R2P are states and the international community (including the UN Secretariat and its mechanisms, as well as regional institutions, individual states, etc.).

R2P is primarily a commitment to prevent mass atrocity crimes. Application of the “Atrocity Prevention Lens” includes assessing dynamics within the country as they pertain to the risk and potential commission of mass atrocity crimes and guiding the actions that need to be taken at the international, regional and domestic levels to prevent their perpetration.

Implementation of R2P requires action by an array of actors within these bodies, from government leaders to individual UN peacekeepers.

- **State** – primary responsibility to protect (undertaken by leaders, parliamentarians/policy makers, judiciary, security sector, national human rights institutions, etc.). The state also has a responsibility to assist other states in upholding this responsibility.

- Regional organizations, such as the African Union, European Union, Organization of American States, League of Arab States, etc. and sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Association of Southeast Asian States, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, etc.

- UN General Assembly
- UN Security Council
- UN Human Rights Council
- UN Secretariat (including the Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Political Affairs, Office for the Coordination of
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Refugee Agency, etc.)

Each of these actors should be viewing situations through the Atrocity Prevention Lens in order to know when to implement various measures aimed at protecting populations from mass atrocity crimes.

Note to Facilitators: Remind participants of the three-pillar structure introduced earlier, which will now be referred to again to outline key responsibilities for each of these actors.

Slide 17

Pillar I responsibility includes building societal resilience at the national level to mass atrocity crimes. A government can uphold its Pillar I responsibilities by creating a just and inclusive society as well as by instituting policies that bolster the capacity of the government to respond appropriately when grievances arise.

This includes activities such as:

- Protecting human rights and minority rights through constitutional and other legal protections
- Ensuring the responsiveness of the security sector
- Providing access to justice
- Creating conditions for the equitable distribution of resources
- Establishing laws against hate speech and hate crimes
- Providing education curriculum that does not privilege one group over another
- Memorializing and acknowledging past crimes
- Ratifying and upholding international treaties that protect rights
Pillar II responsibilities include providing financial and logistical assistance to states in order to assist them in building these capacities. This includes provision of development aid as well as sharing guidance on best practices regarding national institutions and mechanisms that may aid in the prevention of mass atrocity crimes. While providing such assistance, states have an obligation to ensure that their contribution to prevention does not bias one group over another or exacerbate existing divisions within society.

This includes activities such as:

- Financial, logistical, and economic assistance to a state to build the capacity of the government to fulfill its Pillar I commitments
- Development assistance
- Capacity building assistance for government institutions and programs
- Assistance to build the capacity of and reform the security sector
- Establishment of hybrid courts for transitional justice
- Denying the means to commit atrocities
Pillar III includes an array of measures aimed at preventing an escalation of violence to mass atrocities as well as tools to respond to the occurrence of atrocity crimes in order to provide populations with protection from further harm.

This includes activities such as:

- Use of UN Secretary-General’s and his representatives’ good offices
- Diplomacy
- Mediation
- Targeted sanctions
- ICC referral
- Arms embargoes
- Establishing no-fly zones
- Deployment of troops
- Deployment of peacekeeping missions
- Authorization of human rights monitors to collect information on crimes
- Establishment of or providing support to international tribunals

**Break:** Inform participants that the lesson will now transition from discussing the broad, conceptual elements of R2P to focusing on how it relates specifically to peacekeeping and the UN system.
The United Nations system comprises six “Principal Organs”:

- General Assembly
- Security Council
- Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
- Secretariat
- International Court of Justice (ICJ)
- Trusteeship Council

Within peacekeeping, the Security Council, General Assembly and Secretariat are the most pertinent. Each will be discussed below, with a focus on their specific contributions to peacekeeping.
Under the UN Charter, the Security Council holds the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Although peacekeeping is not explicitly mentioned in the Charter, the legal basis for peacekeeping is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII.

The Security Council determines when and where a UN peacekeeping operation should be deployed via the following process:

- Prior to the authorization of a mission, the Secretariat usually conducts a Strategic Assessment of the situation in the country or territory where the peacekeeping operation is being considered.
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

- Based on the findings of the Strategic Assessment, the Secretary-General will issue a report to the Security Council. This report presents options for the establishment of the peacekeeping operation.

- If the Security Council determines that the deployment of a peacekeeping operation is the most appropriate step to take, it will formally authorize it by adopting a resolution (requiring at least 9 out of 15 votes and no vetoes from the permanent five).

- The resolution sets out the operation’s mandate, including the mission’s size and tasks it will be responsible for performing.

The budget and resources are then subject to General Assembly approval.

Slide 23

While the General Assembly is not directly involved in political decisions regarding the establishment of peacekeeping operations, it does play a key role in financing. All UN member states share the costs of peacekeeping, based on the relative economic wealth of each state.

The General Assembly approves and oversees the peacekeeping budget. This includes how specific field operations are funded and equipped, based on detailed submissions provided to it by the UN Secretary-General.
The Secretariat is the administrative arm of the UN. It is divided into various departments and offices, and is headed by the Secretary-General. The various departments and offices of the Secretariat are tasked with serving the Principle Organs of the UN.

For the Responsibility to Protect, the most pertinent department of the Secretariat is the Office of the Special Advisers on Genocide Prevention and R2P.

Within peacekeeping, the most pertinent departments are the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support (DPKO and DFS).

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) provides strategic direction, management and guidance on UN peacekeeping operations. It oversees all traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping operations with military and/or police components, which may include elements of peacemaking and peacebuilding.

It also maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates.

DPKO is led by the Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Peacekeeping Operations, which is currently Jean-Pierre Lacroix of France (as of August 2018).

The Department of Field Support (DFS) provides support to peacekeeping and special political missions in coordination with member states and contracted service providers. It is led by the USG for Field Support, currently Mr. Atul Khare (as of August 2018).

DFS provides support to peace operations in the following areas:

- Finance
- Human resources
- General administration
- Information and communications technology
- Logistics
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

- Supply fuel
- Water
- Accommodation
- Food
- Offices
- Equipment
- Transportation
- Medical facilities

Missions and Mandates

Slide 25

There are three types of peacekeeping operations:

1. **Traditional**: often includes tasks such as monitoring, observation, supervision of a ceasefire, support to verification mechanisms and/or the creation of buffer zones. Traditional peacekeeping operations do not normally play a direct role in political efforts to resolve conflict nor do they engage in governance or capacity building exercises. Examples:
   a. UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
   b. UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
   c. UN Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
   d. UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights, Syria

2. **Multidimensional**: this is the most common form of UN peacekeeping operation. They are usually deployed in the dangerous aftermath of violent internal conflict,
once a peace agreement is in place. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations
are deployed as part of a broader international effort to help countries emerging
from conflict to transition to sustainable peace. They often employ a mix of military,
police and civilian personnel. Examples:

a. UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
b. UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African
Republic (MINUSCA)
c. UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUSCO)

3. Transitional: in rare circumstances, the Security Council may authorize a
multidimensional peacekeeping operation to temporarily take responsibility for
the legislative and administrative functions of the state in order to resolve
sovereignty questions. Examples:

a. UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
b. UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)
c. UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

In addition to the three types of peacekeeping operations listed above, there is a fourth
type of UN mission, which is a special political mission (SPM). These missions are
usually led by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) (with the exception of the UN
Mission in Afghanistan). SPMs comprise political field missions, special envoys and
expert panels to monitor Security Council sanctions. SPMs have few or no uniformed
personnel. Examples:

a. UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)
b. UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)
c. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)
d. UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)
e. UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA; led by DPKO)
There is no standard structure or organizational chart for UN peacekeeping operations, since each mission is unique. The organization of each mission is based on the Security Council mandate, informed by the Strategic Assessment.

**Mission leadership:** The UN has “operational authority” from member states over all military and police personnel participating in UN peacekeeping operations. This means that while member states retain responsibilities for their military and police in terms of pay, allowances, and promotions, they do not have direct influence over tactical decisions or operations, which are supervised by the military and/or police components in the mission.

- **Head of Mission (SRSG):** The Head of Mission (HoM) is appointed by the Secretary-General. He/she exercises operational authority over all personnel employed in the mission. The HoM and DPKO/DFS lead the planning for political, military, operational and support aspects of the peacekeeping operation.

- **DSRSG(s):** Most multidimensional peacekeeping missions have two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSGs). One is often termed the Principal DSRSG and may be in charge of the political, operational and/or rule of law aspects of the mission. The second DSRSG often serves as the Resident Coordinator and represents and coordinates the work of all UN agencies, funds and programs in the UN Country Team.

- **Mission Chiefs:**
  - Chief of Staff (COS): works closely with the HoM and is generally responsible for effective and integrated management of all the mission’s activities.
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

- Heads of Military and Police Components: there is also generally military and/or police leaders to address similar issues within the military and police components. In large missions, this is generally a Force Commander.

- Director/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS): most senior UN official within the mission authorized to expend UN funds associated with the mission’s allocated budget.

Slide 27

Mission components include uniformed personnel as well as:

- Civil Affairs
- Political Affairs
- Rule of Law/Judicial Affairs
- SSR
- DDR
- JOC/JMAC
- Public Information
- Mission Support
- DSRSG/RC/HC
- SRS’s Office
- Women Protection Advisers
- Child Protection Advisers
- Gender Advisers

All UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of a mandate from the UN Security Council. Over the years, the range of tasks assigned to missions has expanded significantly. As a result of this, a wide variety of actors are responsible for implementing the mission’s mandate and providing civilian protection. This includes:

- Civil Affairs officers
- Political Affairs
- Rule of Law/Judicial Affairs
- Security Sector Reform Officials
- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration units
- Joint Monitoring Offices such as Joint Observation Centers and Joint Monitoring and Analysis Centers.
- Public Information
- Mission Support (through DFS)
- The Head of Mission, Deputy Head of Mission, Resident Coordinator, etc.
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

- Women and Child Protection Advisers
- Gender Advisers
- And more.

Discussion Question: Where does UN Peacekeeping fit within R2P’s Three Pillars? (Slide 28)

After giving participants an opportunity to answer on their own, the facilitator should ensure that the conversation addresses Pillar II (assistance by peacekeepers in helping the host state uphold its responsibility) and Pillar III (response to the threat of atrocities or ongoing atrocities).

Participants may also wish to discuss Pillar I responsibilities of the host state.

After the discussion, the facilitator should show participants how/where R2P has been featured in UN peacekeeping mandates (Slides 29-32).
Lesson Five: R2P in UN Security Council Mandates

R2P reflects the primary responsibility of the state, but also an imperative of the international community, to prevent and respond to the four mass atrocity crimes faced by populations. The authorization of peacekeeping missions is a way for the UN Security Council to respond to situations where civilians are at risk of the four crimes. The authorization of peacekeeping missions can therefore be considered as the UN Security Council living up to its responsibility to assist host states in protecting their civilians from atrocity crimes.

A Security Council resolution authorizing peacekeeping missions consists of two parts: "preambular clauses" and "operative clauses." The preamble of a resolution or mandate often states the reasons for why the Security Council is acting on a certain issue. The preamble refers back to earlier adopted resolutions on the same issue and describes the broader political, social, humanitarian and security context of the situation. The numbered operative provisions of a mandate include action-oriented phrases that are intended to offer a solution to the situation described in the preamble.

In peacekeeping mandates, the concept of R2P is mentioned in the preambular paragraphs. A reference to R2P in the preamble of a resolution or mandate sets the tone for a clear theme of R2P throughout the operative provisions of the resolution, but does not in itself authorize peacekeepers to undertake specific tasks.

The UN Security Council has mentioned R2P in peacekeeping mandates in a number of ways:
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

Slide 29

Preambular paragraphs – pillar I:

“…recalling that the government of the DRC bears the primary responsibility to protect civilians within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, including protection from crimes against humanity and war crimes” (MONUSCO (DRC) Resolution 2348).

“…recalling that the CAR bears the primary responsibility to protect all populations within its territory from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (MINUSCA (CAR) Resolution 2399).

These references refer to the first pillar of R2P: emphasizing the primary responsibility of states. Similar language also appears for MINUSMA (Mali), AMISOM (Somalia), UNMISS (South Sudan) and UNAMID (Darfur).
Preambular paragraphs – pillar II:

“…reiterating its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, and for MINUSMA to assist the Malian authorities and the Malian people in their efforts to bring lasting peace and stability to their country, bearing in mind the primary responsibility of the Malian authorities to protect the population” (MINUSMA (Mali) Resolution 2374).

This reference refers to the second pillar of R2P: MINUSMA is mandated to assist the Malian authorities in meeting their responsibility to protecting their population.

Operative paragraphs – pillar II:

“advising and assisting the Government of South Sudan, including military and police at national and local levels as appropriate, in fulfilling its responsibility to protect”

UN Security Council Resolution 1986; UNMISS (South Sudan)

An R2P reference is rarely made in the operative provisions of a mandate. Peacekeeping missions are often mandated to support the state in a range of ways including by maintaining order, strengthening capacity for protection, and contributing towards creating an environment to build peace. Even though peacekeeping mandates do not
“authorize” missions to “do R2P,” the tasks that are associated with R2P’s second pillar enhance the protection of civilians.

Slide 32

Resolution 1975 is unique in a number of ways. The resolution uses language in the preamble to reaffirm the primary responsibility of states to protect populations while in the operative paragraphs it adjusted UNOCI’s mandate to authorize it to “use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its area of deployment, including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population.” While UNOCI already had a protection of civilians mandate, the amendment – particularly the part on “preventing the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population” was made in response to violations and abuses of human rights by security forces which presented a clear threat of potential crimes against humanity perpetrated against the population. In this sense, Resolution 1975 is considered to have been passed in the spirit of R2P’s third pillar because preventing crimes against humanity provided the impetus to reinforce UNOCI’s protective mandate.
As of August 2018, eight out of fourteen UN peacekeeping missions have POC at the core of their mandate, including: MINUSCA (CAR), MINUSMA (Mali), MINUJUSTH (Haiti), MONUSCO (DRC), UNAMID (Darfur), UNMISS (South Sudan), UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire; ended in 2017) and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Of these eight, five currently include a reference to the responsibility of states to uphold their responsibility to protect. (The mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), which ended in 2017, also referenced R2P).

Related protection regimes also have direct reference within peacekeeping mandates, including:

- Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV; the same five mandates that include R2P)
- Protecting children in armed conflict (the same five mandates that include R2P, plus UNIFIL)
- UNMISS is mandated to monitor and report on incidents of hate speech
- MONUSCO is mandated to assist the government in holding perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes accountable
Note to Facilitators: In the event that the topic of Libya is raised, refer to the following information:

The 2011 intervention in Libya was the first and only time the UN Security Council authorized the use of force, couched in terms of R2P, against the consent of the host state. UN peacekeeping operations, to the contrary, are always deployed with the consent of the host state.

Peacekeeping missions are often established and deployed because host states fail to live up to the responsibility to protect their populations and are therefore increasingly called upon to assist in upholding the international community’s responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes.

The reference to R2P in the preamble of resolution 1973 sets the tone for a clear theme of R2P throughout the operative provisions but does not itself authorize specific actions. In this sense, R2P’s presence in the Libya resolution was added in the same spirit as its status within preambular paragraphs of peacekeeping mandates – to establish that populations must be protected from the four atrocity crimes – without prescribing particular actions that may or may not be carried out.
Lesson Six: R2P and Other Protection Agendas

Slide 34

This lesson will look briefly at other protection agendas that are related to POC and R2P, but require a different lens or approach than broad protection strategies. Over the course of the next few modules we will briefly discuss how providing protection from Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, Child Protection, and Protection of Cultural Heritage sites and objects relates to preventing atrocity risks. This lesson will provide a brief introduction into these three prevention agendas.

Slide 35

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)

- "Incidents or patterns of sexual violence that includes rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity against women, men, girls or boys"
- Five missions have a specific mandate to combat CRSV: MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNAMID and UNMISS.

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: CRSV refers to incidents or patterns of sexual violence, including rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity against women, men, girls or boys. While women and girls are the predominant victims of such violence, it is important to recognize that all individuals may be targeted.
The following video will introduce you to how the UN views CRSV and the mechanisms available to missions and to the international community to stop such violence and ensure accountability for perpetrators.

**Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”**

In addition to showing some of the resources available within missions with a mandate to combat CRSV and the tasks that peacekeepers should undertake, there are other important messages from this video that are relevant to R2P and the Atrocity Prevention Lens.

First, as demonstrated by the opening statistics, sexual violence in conflict often occurs on a mass scale. The important thing to recognize when looking for patterns of CRSV is that incidents of sexual violence are used as a tactic by parties to a conflict – they are not opportunistic moments of rape, but rather part of a systematic attack on a population. Thus, perpetrators of these acts are not just committing crimes, but are committing crimes of an international character, including possible war crimes, crimes against humanity or a constitutive act with respect to genocide.

During 2018 the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war – as well as mechanisms for addressing this violence – was highlighted when Dr. Denis Mukwege and Ms. Nadia Murad were announced as recipients for the Nobel Peace Prize for their work with victims of CRSV. Dr. Mukwege works with victims of sexual violence in eastern DRC and has treated thousands of individuals who have been attacked in militia violence. Ms. Murad was herself a victim of atrocity crimes – including sexual violence – perpetrated by the Islamic State (ISIS) against the Yazidi minority in Iraq and she has worked to ensure accountability for such crimes.

Second, CRSV includes crimes that are among the least prosecuted in domestic and international criminal justice systems. The commitment to uphold R2P includes a commitment to hold perpetrators accountable. This responsibility means that it is important to recognize the early warning signs of such crimes, take action to prevent them from occurring and to protect populations that are at risk of violence or have already been victims of CRSV. It is also important to ensure evidence of crimes is documented and delivered to the appropriate authorities to ensure accountability.

The five missions with a specific mandate to combat CRSV (MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNAMID and UNMISS) all have Women Protection Advisers (WPAs) who are designated to assist the mission in fulfilling the above tasks and encouraging national ownership of processes for addressing CRSV.

**Note to Facilitators:** Video presentation - the image on Slide 15 is a clickable link to the video, “Combating Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Prevent, Deter, Protect.” It can also be accessed at the following link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4LQHc_O0KAw&feature=youtu.be
Child Protection in peacekeeping: Conflicts disproportionately affect children. Many are subject to abductions, military recruitment, killing, maiming and numerous forms of exploitation. Peacekeepers have a special role to play in their protection. This Module will briefly highlight the relationship between mandated child protection activities and the Atrocity Prevention Lens. Module 3 will discuss the unique vulnerabilities of children in greater depth.

UN peacekeepers are mandated to protect children from the “six grave violations” which include:

1. Killing and maiming
2. Recruitment and use of child soldiers
3. Abduction
4. Rape and sexual violence
5. Attacks against schools and hospitals
6. Denial of humanitarian access

(According to the Child Protection Module of the Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Training)

As with CRSV, each of these violations constitutes a breach of international humanitarian and human rights law, and may constitute one (or several) of the four mass atrocity crimes. Since children are disproportionately affected by conflict and may be incidental casualties, the Atrocity Prevention Lens encourages peacekeepers and monitors in the field to be attentive to the widespread or systematic nature of violations affecting children. Within these assessments it is also important to recognize the unique risks children face based upon their gender, with boys more frequently abducted for use as child soldiers, while girls are more frequently abducted for use as sexual slaves or wives of combatants, for example.
Demonstrating the gravity of these crimes: the first person detained by the ICC was Thomas Lubanga of the DRC who was found guilty in 2012 for recruiting, enlisting and conscripting child soldiers. Many countries have signed on to child protection protocols and worked with the UN to establish plans for eradicating the recruitment of children into conflict. Nevertheless, in recent years thousands of children have been abducted, recruited or subjected to other elements of the “six grave violations” in countries with a peacekeeping presence, such as the DRC, CAR and South Sudan.

There are several legal frameworks that support the protection of children in conflict and establish responsibilities of peacekeepers – such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Optional Protocol on Children and Armed Conflict and various UN Security Council resolutions.

**Slide 37**

**Protection of Cultural Heritage**

“...damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind...” – Preamble, Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 14 May 1954).

- Intentional destruction of cultural heritage is often part of a wider and systematic effort by state or non-state actors to destroy a group and its history.
- Culture is an intrinsic part of what constitutes identity of a people and an attack on cultural heritage can consequently be seen as an attack on the very identity of a group and its right to exist.
- The UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was previously mandated to protect and restore cultural heritage.

**Protection of cultural heritage:** “... damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind...” (Preamble, Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The Hague, 14 May 1954).

The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict was adopted in the wake of the horrors of World War II, which resulted not only in devastating human loss but also in widespread cultural destruction. The 1954 Convention was created with a view to protecting cultural heritage in future armed conflicts. Six decades later, however, the world continues to witness immense human suffering and unprecedented levels of cultural destruction. From Mali and Libya, to Iraq and Syria, the destruction of cultural heritage sites has produced an outcry within the international community and has led to efforts to strengthen the protection of cultural property.

During 2016, the ICC held its first trial focused solely on the destruction of cultural sites as a war crime, sentencing an Islamic militant, Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi, to nine years in
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

prison for partially destroying the UNESCO world heritage site of Timbuktu. In the words of the presiding Judge Raul Cano Pangalangan, the damaged parts of the site were “the heart of Mali’s cultural heritage [and] were of great importance to people of Timbuktu. Their destruction does not just affect the direct victims of the crimes, but people throughout Mali and the international community.” Notably, Mali hosts the one UN peacekeeping mission that was previously mandated to protect and restore cultural heritage (MINUSMA). MINUSMA has facilitated a number of projects aimed at restoring sites within Timbuktu.

Noting this landmark ICC case, on 24 March 2017 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2347, deploring destruction of heritage sites, smuggling of cultural property and related offences. This was the first UN Security Council resolution to address the issue of the protection of cultural heritage in armed conflict.

Beyond possibly constituting a war crime itself, intentional destruction of cultural heritage is often part of a wider and systematic effort by state or non-state actors to destroy a group and its history. Mass atrocity crimes are often committed against an identified population, which can be singled out by specific characteristics, whether ethnic, religious, linguistic or other. Culture is an intrinsic part of what constitutes identity of a people and an attack on cultural heritage can consequently be seen as an attack on the very identity of a group and its right to exist. This issue of intent cannot be overlooked in considerations on destruction of cultural heritage.

The principle of R2P is therefore uniquely positioned to reinforce existing tools and further advance momentum around the protection of cultural heritage.
Module 1: What is the “Responsibility to Protect?”

Conclusion

Slide 38

Module 1 Learning Outcomes - Review

By the end of Module 1, learners will:

- Explain R2P and the responsibilities it commits various actors to uphold
- Understand the historic context of the development of R2P, including the grave consequences of failing to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes
- Define the four mass atrocity crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing
- Identify the three pillars of R2P, list relevant actors for implementing each pillar, and describe different actions that can be taken by these actors under each pillar
- Understand the basic structure of the United Nations, its organs and departments as it relates to peacekeeping
- Understand the relationship between R2P and other protection agendas

Note to Facilitators: As a conclusion to Module 1, review the learning outcomes with participants, taking time to address any remaining questions.
## Objective:

Module 2 seeks to expand upon the foundation built during the first Module, highlighting where R2P adds value to the Protection of Civilians.

## Learning Outcomes:

By the end of Module 2, learners will be able to:

- Understand the relationship between R2P and POC
- Understand existing gaps in UN Peacekeeping and civilian protection
- Discuss ways in which using R2P and the Atrocity Prevention Lens can add value to existing POC activities

## Methods:

- Brief review of Module 1
- Group discussions
- Lecture
- Activities:
  - Terminology Comprehension Exercise
  - Case Study: Systemic Risk Analysis

## Resources:

- Slides
- R2P and POC Similarities and Differences Worksheet (Activity 2.1)
- Understanding the nature of threats worksheet and case study (Activity 2.2)
- Available resources on your USB:
  - Relationship between R2P and POC in UN Peacekeeping
  - Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians and list of signatories
  - Value added of R2P to Peacekeeping and the Protection of Civilians
  - Background to the “Cammaert Report”
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

Lesson Map

Module 2 should take approximately four hours.

Estimated timing:

- 2.5 hours of lecture and discussion
- 1 hour of case study activity
- 30 minutes of closing exercise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction: Review Module 1: definitions of R2P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesson One: An Introduction to POC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesson Two: What is the Relationship between R2P and POC?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 2.1: R2P and POC Similarities and Differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesson Three: R2P and Existing Gaps in UN Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesson Four: The Value Added of R2P to POC and Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 2.2: Understanding the Nature of Threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing Activity: Review</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

Introduction: Review of Module 1 (Slide 2)

Note to Facilitators: Begin the lecture by reviewing the closing portions of the previous day, focusing on the definition and development of R2P, and how it relates to UN peacekeeping. This will allow participants to demonstrate what they have already learned, prepare them for the value added lecture and provide an opportunity to answer any remaining questions from Module 1.

Explain to participants that now that they have been given a brief introduction to R2P conceptually, the next three Modules will address how to operationalize R2P within the context of peacekeeping, primarily building on their existing understanding of POC.

The motivation for doing this is that eight out of fourteen peacekeeping missions currently have POC in their mandates (96% of peacekeepers serve in these missions), and peacekeeping personnel are increasingly called upon to serve in operating environments with a risk of mass atrocity crimes. While R2P and POC have similar priorities, as will be shown in Module 2, they are distinct enough that adding an Atrocity Prevention Lens to existing protection work could enhance its efficacy.

Recent failures by various missions to protect civilians from physical violence – including atrocity crimes – demonstrate that there is a gap in the current protection mandate that R2P may be able to fill. The video shown at the start of Module 1 showed failures of peacekeeping that resulted in the creation of R2P and adaptation of POC for peacekeeping mandates. While the failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica were extreme examples of missions – and the international community more broadly – failing to prevent genocide, there are other frequent incidents in the field where peacekeepers could have potentially taken earlier and more strategic action to prevent physical harm to civilians.

Module 2 will demonstrate the value added of R2P and the Atrocity Prevention Lens to POC. It will also present some recent reviews of UN peacekeeping and protection mandates, demonstrating how upholding R2P complements the recommendations coming out of these processes.
Lesson One: An Introduction to POC

The Protection of Civilians was first mandated in 1999 for the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The concept was born out of recognition by the Security Council that “civilians continue to account for the vast majority of casualties in situations of armed conflict.”¹ In many mission settings, the effective implementation of POC is key to creating a secure and stable environment, which is a core function of peacekeeping. Therefore, the Security Council has increasingly tasked missions with POC, and it is now included in the majority of mission mandates.

POC is not an end goal for UN peacekeeping missions. It is a means to achieve the objective of helping host governments establish security and political stability.

Discussion Question: How is the Protection of Civilians defined in the context of UN peacekeeping? (Slide 3)

How is the Protection of Civilians defined in terms of UN peacekeeping?

Based on the language used by the UN Security Council in POC mandates, the physical protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping can be defined as: “all necessary action, up to and including the use of force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians.”

¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1894 (2009).
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

Slide 5

POC Guiding Principles: The DPKO-DFS Policy on POC (2015) sets out the following guiding principles:

- **Primary responsibility of the state**: similar to R2P, the host state always has the primary responsibility to protect civilians within its borders. This responsibility is not diminished when a peacekeeping mission with a POC mandate is deployed.

- **Grounded in international law**: POC mandates show the global community’s commitment to prevent violations of international law.

- **A whole of mission activity**: POC is not only a military task; it requires concerted and coordinated action between uniformed and civilian components of a mission under the mission’s POC strategy.

- **A priority mandate**: In all missions mandated to undertake POC, it must be prioritized in decisions regarding the allocation and use of available capacity and resources in the implementation of mandates.

- **Cooperation with humanitarian actors**: UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs support POC in many ways. Close and systematic coordination with these actors and full respect for humanitarian principles are essential for UN peacekeeping personnel.

- **Obligation of peacekeeping personnel**: While the state has the primary responsibility to protect civilians, sometimes they do not fulfill this responsibility. Sometimes government forces are the threat. Peacekeeping personnel are authorized and obligated to act, within their capabilities and area of deployment.

- **Community-based approach**: A mission should plan to protect civilians in consultation with the local community.

- **An active duty to protect**: a POC mandate entails an active duty to protect; missions do not engage in protection only in reaction to an attack. Activities to protect civilians should be planned, deliberate and ongoing. This includes presence in areas under
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

greatest threat, a credible deterrent posture and other activities in accordance with the mandate, the POC strategy and the military and police concepts of operations (CONOPS).

Consonant with the principles of peacekeeping: peacekeeping operations operate with the consent of the host state, are impartial in implementing their mandate and use force only in self-defense and as otherwise authorized by the Security Council, including for the protection of civilians.

Gender perspective and child protection concerns: a gender perspective means tailoring all actions to specific needs of women and girls, men and boys. It also means addressing the unequal impact of conflict and post-conflict, with girls and women often suffering most.

Slide 6

Slide 6

Defining threats under POC:

"Any impending or potential physical violence against civilians." This includes:

- Threats to life
- Threats to physical integrity
- Threats to freedom
- Threats to property

Within POC threats are defined as “any impending or potential physical violence against civilians.” This includes:

- Threats to life (murder; arbitrary, summary or extrajudicial executions)
- Threats to physical integrity (torture, rape, and other forms of sexual violence, abduction, deliberate deprivation)
- Threats to freedom (forced disappearance, arbitrary arrest, forced labor, restriction on freedom of movement)
- Threats to property (theft, looting)
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

Slide 7

**Three Tiers of Protection**

- **Tier 1:** Protection through dialogue and engagement (including conflict resolution and mediation, dialogue with potential perpetrators, etc.)
- **Tier 2:** Provision of physical protection (including military and police activities to show or use force to prevent, deter, and respond to civilians under threat of physical violence)
- **Tier 3:** Establishment of a protective environment (including programmatic activities with medium and long-term peacebuilding objectives)

The UN’s operational concept for implementing a POC mandate follows three tiers:

- **Tier 1:** Protection through dialogue and engagement (including conflict resolution and mediation, dialogue with potential perpetrators, etc.)
- **Tier 2:** Provision of physical protection (including military and police activities to show or use force to prevent, deter, and respond to civilians under threat of physical violence)
- **Tier 3:** Establishment of a protective environment (including programmatic activities with medium and long-term peacebuilding objectives)

Slide 8

**Responding to Threats to Populations**

The UN’s Protection of Civilians policy includes responses across four phases:

- Prevention
- Pre-emption
- Response
- Consolidation

POC Response: The UN’s POC policy on tactical response is broken down into four phases: prevention, pre-emption, response and consolidation. It is important to remember that while these phases exist as a guide, actions to respond to mass atrocities
are not necessarily sequenced in linear steps, but rather are on a continuum. Prevention and consolidation go hand-in-hand as consolidation may help prevent future violence. Similarly, tasks undertaken as part of prevention should remain ongoing even while peacekeeping personnel are responding to physical threats to populations.

**Prevention**: carried out before clear threats to civilians have been identified. Activities include human rights monitoring, conflict mitigation, community engagement and establishing early warning mechanisms.

**Pre-emption**: taking preventive action when threats are likely but have not yet occurred. Activities under pre-emption include public information and advocacy campaigns, and credible deterrence by police and military.

**Response**: triggered when physical violence is imminent or has occurred. Steps must be taken to stop aggressors, including through provision of physical protection and political engagement with parties to the conflict.

**Consolidation**: begins after violence against civilians has subsided; undertaken as part of a “peacebuilding” or “stabilization” process. Activities include reintegration programs and assistance in negotiating peace agreements.

- Activities that are undertaken as part of the consolidation phase, such as actions to support recovery/ensure non-recurrence, serve the dual purpose of ensuring the conditions that lead to the perpetration of crimes are addressed, and preventing a recurrence of atrocity crimes. These actions can be preventive in nature if undertaken prior to violence occurring (though often in a peacekeeping scenario, consolidation is part of a post-conflict phase). Such actions should be undertaken with the ongoing risks to civilians in mind. Even after violence has ended, the risks of atrocities may remain high.
Lesson Two: What is the Relationship between R2P and POC?

R2P is most closely relevant to UN peacekeeping within the context of POC. Eight out of fourteen peacekeeping missions currently have POC in their mandates (96% of peacekeepers serve in these missions), and peacekeeping personnel are increasingly called upon to serve in operating environments with a risk of mass atrocity crimes.

In 2005 the international community committed to the responsibility to protect when endorsing the World Summit Outcome Document paragraphs 138 and 139. The international community recognized that every member state has a responsibility to protect its populations against the four crimes. The best way to protect civilians is to prevent those crimes from happening. The main objective of R2P is therefore prevention. To enable member states and the international community to become better in preventing crimes and to make R2P “applicable”, paragraphs 138 and 139 and the broader political commitment of R2P can be translated in the so-called “Atrocity Prevention Lens”. This lens is an analytical tool that enables and assists missions in better understanding their operating environment and the specific risks faced by populations.

The Activity in this lesson asks participants to apply the definitions of POC and R2P introduced in the course so far, and discuss what the concepts have in common as well as how they are different.
Activity 2.1: R2P and POC Similarities and Differences (Slide 9)

Materials:  
- Similarities and differences worksheet (also in separate file on USB for ease of printing)

Time Estimate: 30 Minutes

Purpose: The purpose of this activity is to see if participants can identify the key similarities and differences between R2P and POC.

Instructions:
1) Divide participants into groups of 4-5.
2) Have participants work for 10-15 minutes in small groups to fill out worksheets.
3) Invite one participant from each group to present their findings on one of the categories on the worksheet. Ask them to explain whether for that particular category R2P and POC are similar or different, or both.
4) The facilitator should fill in any gaps in understanding during the large group discussion. (See the facilitator’s guide below for information to guide the discussion).
### Activity 2.1 R2P and POC Similarities and Differences Worksheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R2P and POC Similarities and Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What does each norm protect from?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Similar or Different?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explain:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who is protected under each norm?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Similar or Different?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explain:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under what circumstances does each norm apply?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Similar or Different?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explain:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who carries out the protection under each norm?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Similar or Different?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explain:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How might actors respond to threats under each norm?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Similar or Different?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explain:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

### Activity 2.1 R2P and POC Similarities and Differences – Facilitator’s Guide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R2P and POC Similarities and Differences</th>
<th>Explain:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What does each norm protect from?</td>
<td>• In the context of peacekeeping, POC is aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• R2P addresses protection of populations from the four crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The concepts differ on the types of threats they protect against, but some atrocity crimes may constitute threats of physical violence, meaning they frequently overlap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who is protected under each norm?</td>
<td>• POC applies to crimes against civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• R2P applies to crimes against populations – this includes civilians, but also combatants, refugees and all other individuals; this means no actor should be a target of atrocity crimes, regardless of their status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under what circumstances does each norm apply?</td>
<td>• POC is mandated in missions where civilians are under the threat of physical harm. In 1999 UNAMSIL was the first peacekeeping operation mandated to take the necessary action to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Since 1999 UN Security Council resolutions have further defined the role of peacekeeping in protecting civilians and the various mandated tasks that contribute to it. This Operational Concept has served as an important foundation for the POC concept in UN peacekeeping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• R2P protects against the four atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. As these crimes can also happen in the absence of armed conflict – R2P applies everywhere at all times and not only in a peacekeeping context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Both are international principles that protect vulnerable people in situations of violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who carries out the protection under each norm?</th>
<th>Explain:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Similar or Different?** | • For both norms, the primary responsibility lies with the state (the first pillar of R2P). Peacekeeping can also play an important role under the second pillar of R2P: the international community has the responsibility to assist states in upholding their R2P. The authorization of peacekeeping missions with POC mandates is a way for the UN Security Council (the international community) to respond to mass atrocity situations.  
• Within a peacekeeping context, POC involve multi-faceted/multi-layered protection: diverse actors (including military, police and civilian personnel) are called upon at different times to perform actions specifically tailored to their role and capacities. Within a peacekeeping context, no actor is actually called upon to “do R2P”. References to R2P can be found in the preamble of mandates, and therefore does not in itself authorize actors to undertake specific tasks. However, actions under POC contribute to the protection of populations from atrocities. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How might actors respond to threats under each norm?</th>
<th>Explain:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Similar or Different?** | • The UN defines POC as “*all necessary action*, up to and including the use of force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians.” Since 1999 the UN Security Council resolutions have further defined the POC and the various mandated tasks under “all necessary action” that contribute to it. It includes a range of activities from dialogue to provision of physical protection to structural peacebuilding initiatives.  
• R2P emphasizes the prevention of atrocity crimes through actions that reinforce good governance, strengthen mechanisms for human rights protection, and generate cooperation among diverse communities, etc.  
• When atrocities are ongoing, tactics to protect civilians from the four crimes are similar to POC.  
• POC, when implemented within UN peacekeeping, is undertaken with host state consent.  
• When R2P is implemented outside of a UN peacekeeping mission, it does not require host state consent, but does require authorization by the UN Security Council, in keeping with the UN Charter. |
Lesson Three: R2P and Existing Gaps in UN Peacekeeping

This lesson will introduce several recent assessments of UN peacekeeping and gaps that have been identified. In doing so, it will highlight where implementation of R2P and the use of the Atrocity Prevention Lens may help in addressing some of these identified gaps.

Slide 10

Recognizing the existing gaps in civilian protection, the UN and member states have undertaken a number of steps to assess and improve the protective capacity of missions. This includes various reviews of peacekeeping and POC, reviews of recent failures by UN peacekeeping missions to protect civilians and commitments to improve protective capacity.

These initiatives and reviews include:

- Independent Special Investigation into the violence which occurred in Juba in 2016 and UNMISS response (The “Cammaert Report”) (2016)
**Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?**

**Slide 11**

**High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations**

The HIPPO contributed to a generational review of peacekeeping. The panel’s final report put forward four recommendations for improving peacekeeping and the protection of civilians:

1. **Primacy of politics**
   - The primacy of politics emphasizes that lasting peace is achieved through political solutions – but political strategies must be informed by threats to civilians, particularly when solutions may exacerbate societal cleavages or when parties to the negotiations are also potential perpetrators.

2. **Responsive operations and tailored responses**
   - Missions must be designed on a case-by-case basis with the capacity to take action in response to specific threats within their unique operating environment.

3. **Stronger partnerships**
   - UN actors on all levels must coordinate better with regional organizations. Actors on the ground should also develop stronger partnerships with other elements of the UN country team – including coordinating strategies amongst peacekeeping personnel, development officers, and human rights monitors.

4. **Field-focused and people-centered approaches**
   - Peacekeeping missions should be designed based upon what best meets the needs of the people that they are mandated to protect, not based upon bureaucratic politics amongst states at the UN Secretariat. People-centered approaches also include strengthening mechanisms for community engagement to ensure the mission is meeting the needs of vulnerable populations.

The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians are a non-binding set of eighteen pledges for the effective implementation of POC in UN peacekeeping. The Kigali Principles address the most relevant aspects of peacekeeping, including assessment and planning, force generation, training and equipping personnel, performance and accountability. While they are framed around POC, the responsible implementation of the principles would address much broader deficiencies that undermine the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations conducted in volatile situations, including abuse by UN peacekeepers.

By endorsing the Principles, UN member states commit to better preparing their troops to uphold POC mandates, to holding those who fail to uphold mandates accountable, to identifying capacity gaps within missions and communicating it to the UN, and to being more proactive in response to warning signs of potential threats to civilians.

- Principle 8 specifically commits states to “Not to hesitate to take action to protect civilians, in accordance with the rules of engagement, in the absence of an effective host government response or demonstrated willingness to carry out its responsibilities to protect civilians.”

Member states also committed to ensuring the UN Security Council does its due diligence in reviewing mandates and calling upon the UN Secretariat to provide sufficient support for mandate implementation.

Forty-seven UN member states have signed on to the Kigali Principles.
Slide 13

Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

“Cammaert Report”

- The report investigates an incident in South Sudan during July 2016 when peacekeepers failed to provide protection to civilians when violence broke out in the capital.
- Major gaps addressed in the Report:
  - Reporting in “silos” vs. consolidated analysis
  - Decision-making by mission leadership
  - “Accountability for Protection”

Independent Special Investigation into the violence that occurred in Juba in 2016 and UNMISS response

This investigation, known as the “Cammaert Report,” focused on a specific incident in which UN peacekeepers failed to protect civilians in South Sudan.

Over the course of three days during July 2016, fighting between the army and an armed group that had been on opposing sides of the 2013-2015 civil war reignited in the capital of South Sudan. Some of the violence took place within or near the UN’s Juba headquarters as well as two POC sites sheltering thousands of Internally Displaced People (IDPs). Despite early warning of the violence and the presence of UN peacekeepers at all sites, civilians and humanitarian staff were killed, raped, beaten and robbed.

The UN commissioned a special investigation into why UNMISS had failed to protect civilians – the investigation concluded that the mission failed to properly prepare for elements that were raised in the early warning assessment, including that the UNMISS headquarters building would be caught in the crossfire, that they would need contingency planning for government restrictions on their movement and that civilians would likely flee to the POC sites.

Critical issues included:

- Mission reporting in “silos” instead of consolidated analysis
- Forces did not operate under a unified command
- Some leadership within the mission failed to instruct their troops to take action
- Various contingents refused to leave bases or form quick reaction forces

The incident and subsequent report have triggered an increased focus on “accountability for protection”:
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

- The UN has made increasing calls for greater accountability amongst the leadership of peacekeeping missions, peacekeeping personnel and the countries contributing troops and police to missions.
- The UN is currently developing a strategy for systematically assessing performance on protection responsibilities and holding missions accountable for failures.

Slide 14

"Cruz Report"

- Commissioned in 2017 in response to an increasing number of peacekeepers killed in "malicious acts" in the field
- Highlights gaps in both force protection and civilian protection
- Focuses on the changing nature of the threat faced by civilians and by peacekeepers in today's operating environments
- Recommendations include:
  - Consolidated situational awareness
  - Better pre-deployment training
  - More mobile forces with quick reaction capacity

Report on Improving the Security of UN Peacekeepers (the “Cruz Report”)

During 2017, the UN Secretary-General commissioned an investigation into the increasing number of peacekeepers killed in "malicious acts" in the field. More than 70 peacekeepers were killed in attacks during 2017.

The report’s findings note that this is largely due to the changing nature of the groups on the ground, which are threatening civilians and peacekeepers, their level of respect for the UN flag and what it represents in terms of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as well as their capacity to attack with weapons such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), etc.

It is important to note that many of these same threats also make it a more challenging environment for protecting civilians. Increased capacity for greater damage through weapons, increased disregard for IHL and other norms that safeguard humanity mean that groups are also more willing to inflict harm on civilian populations.

Some of the main deficiencies the report highlights include:
- Lack of leadership
- Inaction by troops
- Resources available to missions
- Quality of troop selection
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

- Quality of risk assessments
- Poor pre-deployment training.

While the report is ultimately about improving force protection, it notes the need for forces to be more proactive in responding to threats to civilian populations. In doing so, it recommends better pre-deployment training, improved and consolidated situational awareness, and more mobile forces, including quick/rapid reaction capacity.

Slide 15

Action for Peacekeeping (A4P)

During March 2018 UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched the “Action for Peacekeeping (A4P)” initiative. He called upon member states, the Security Council, host countries, troop- and police-contributing countries, regional partners and financial contributors to renew their collective engagement with UN peacekeeping. To respond to current challenges peacekeepers are facing, such as the absence of political solutions, complex threats in difficult environments, rise in fatalities and injuries of peacekeepers, delivering on protection mandates, the Secretary-General and member states developed a set of mutually-agreed principles and commitments to ensure peacekeeping operations are fit for the future.

This “Declaration of Shared Commitments” was developed after five consultations with member states and regional organizations in New York. The consultations centered around five main themes, that are reflected in the Declaration:

- Peacebuilding
- Performance
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

- People
- Partnerships
- Politics

As of 3 October 2018, the declaration has been endorsed by 150 member states and 4 regional organizations.

Slide 16

How can R2P and the Atrocity Prevention Lens aid in overcoming gaps identified in these reports?

- An Atrocity Prevention Lens enables UN peacekeepers to assess threats to a population and develop an appropriate response to emerging risks.
- As a primarily preventive doctrine, R2P may also enhance the work of peacekeepers by helping to avert potential crises before the risks necessitate a military response.
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

Lesson Four: The Value Added of R2P to POC and Peacekeeping

Slide 17

The Global Centre has identified three broad areas in which the Atrocity Prevention Lens strengthens work performed by peacekeepers:

1. Understanding the nature of the threat to populations
2. Identifying patterns that lead to atrocity crimes
3. Generating early response and different types of responses

In order to explain the first part of the value-add of the Atrocity Prevention Lens – understanding the nature of the threat – this lesson will employ a “Risk Management Framework.” This framework – introduced on the following slides – will be used in the remained of the course to demonstrate how the Atrocity Prevention Lens aid in identifying threats, analyzing those threats, and determining an appropriate response.
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

Note to Facilitators: The next three slides introduce the Risk Management Framework that will be utilized to explain Threat Assessments and Response throughout the next three Modules. You should familiarize yourself with the full risk management cycle prior to teaching this lecture. A full explanation of the Analyze, Treat, and Monitor portions of the cycle can be found in Module 4.

Slide 18


A “risk” is the likelihood of a threat occurring as a result of vulnerabilities.

Risk assessments analyze:

- Potential/actual threats (based on threat assessments)
- Likelihood of the threat occurring
- The potential impact it may have
- Potential responses (transfer, mitigate or accept)
Risk management is an ongoing process, not a one-time event. It is often thought of in terms of a cycle, which includes the following phases:

- **Identification** – the identification phase includes collecting and listing information on actors, materials, personal dynamics, patterns of behavior, and other variables in your environment that may contribute to risks.

- **Analysis** – the analysis phase includes a number of steps that includes assessing the variables identified to determine whether and how they may contribute to threats, and then assessing the likelihood of risks occurring and potential impact to the population if they were to happen.

- **Treatment** – the treatment phase includes prioritizing which risks should be addressed and devising a plan for responding to/preventing those risks.

- **Monitoring** – the monitoring phase involves the ongoing monitoring of threats – including identifying and analyzing new or changing information to assess how they impact the likelihood of threats occurring.
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

Slide 20

**Risk identification:** In UN peacekeeping, the identification of risks to civilians often happens in the process of conducting threat assessments. The threats identified in such assessments can be monitored and prioritized using risk management tools.

One part of this phase includes identifying systemic threats that impact the situation as a whole and can affect local-level dynamics.

Slide 21

**Defining Threats Under POC:**

“Any impending or potential physical violence against civilians.”

This includes:
- Threats to life
- Threats to physical integrity
- Threats to freedom
- Threats to property

**Understanding the nature of threats to populations:** As discussed in Lesson 2, POC threats are defined as: “Any impending or potential physical violence against civilians.”

In a risk management framework, this includes identifying:
- Threats to life (murder; arbitrary, summary or extrajudicial executions)
- Threats to physical integrity (torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, abduction, deliberate deprivation)
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

- Threats to freedom (forced disappearance, arbitrary arrest, forced labor, restriction on freedom of movement)
- Threats to property (theft, looting)

Effectively providing physical protection from such threats involves anticipating and reducing harm where vulnerable people are at risk, including through effective human rights monitoring and proactive political engagement.

R2P can be implemented through the Atrocity Prevention Lens, which includes assessing dynamics within the country as they pertain to the risk and potential commission of mass atrocity crimes. The Atrocity Prevention Lens thus reinforces elements of physical protection through the long-term identification of patterns that result in elevated risk during all phases of conflict (peacetime, ongoing armed conflict, post-conflict stabilization, etc.).

**Slide 22**

The Atrocity Prevention Lens provides a projection of risks that looks beyond immediate threats and also creates an understanding of what triggers will lead to mass violence. The Atrocity Prevention Lens adds to the response to these threats by increasing the understanding of systemic threats and conflict dynamics.

**Systemic threats:** The Atrocity Prevention Lens helps in understanding the difference between isolated incidents of violence versus triggers for atrocity crimes by analyzing political, societal and environmental patterns. It also identifies events and scenarios that could trigger systemic violence.

It assists in deciphering when violence is a part of routine criminality, opportunistic violence by an armed group or a targeted attack on a population based upon their identity that could be a part of a widespread or systematic campaign. This includes an understanding and awareness of groups that may be particularly vulnerable based on gender, ethnicity, religion or political affiliation, as well as potential perpetrators and the
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

means and motives with which they may commit atrocity crimes. (Module 3 will address victims and perpetrators in greater detail).

1. **Political patterns:** Actual as well as perceived bias in government can be a source of tension between groups, while changes in government policy may also be an indicator of upcoming tension.
   - Has the government made decisions that the population perceives as favoring one group over another?
   - Have changes in government – including who occupies which position of power – resulted in societal reactions?
   - Are there existing gaps in land rights?
   - Has the government imposed discriminatory policies targeting particular groups?
   - Has the government recently considered any laws or constitutional amendments that are perceived as controversial to some parts of the population?
   - Is there an increase in overall political repression?
   - Have security forces used disproportionate force against political demonstrations?
   - Is there a weakness of state structures in certain parts of the country that could serve as hot spots?

2. **Societal patterns:** The Atrocity Prevention Lens helps in recognizing shifts in inter-communal dynamics and triggers for such shifts, such as:
   - Risks surrounding certain religious holidays and rituals
   - Patterns of behavior resulting from economic inequality
   - History of crimes perpetrated amongst groups in a particular region and actions that may trigger a recurrence of violence
   - Increase in hate speech or incitement

3. **Environmental patterns:**
   - Change in environmental patterns that leads to increasing competition over diminishing renewable resources such as land and water
   - Seasonal changes that affect relationships between nomadic herding communities vs. sedentary agricultural communities
   - Conflict over high value natural resources such as oil, gas, minerals and timber

4. **Triggering events:** The Atrocity Prevention Lens helps in identifying what types of events can be triggers for atrocity crimes as well as where those triggers may be most salient.
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

- For example, elections can be conducted in a peaceful manner, but can also be a trigger for violence or more systematic crimes.
- Are there certain areas that may be considered “hot spots” for violence and rights abuses while others are not during triggering events?

Conflict dynamics: When a conflict is already occurring, the Atrocity Prevention Lens encourages peacekeepers to identify who the relevant actors are and what behaviors could lead to the commission of mass atrocity crimes. For example:

- Recognizing how the movement of armed groups affects civilian populations
- Understanding who the potential perpetrators are, their target group and their means for perpetrating crimes
- Understanding the tactics utilized by parties to the conflict. For example, knowing which armed groups specifically targeted women and girls in CRSV, which armed groups recruit children into conflict, which groups have a large supply of weapons vs. using other tactics to target populations, which groups attack sedentary villages vs. setting up roadblocks or ambushing populations in transit, etc.
- Identifying when/how government forces may act as a serious violator of human rights law and IHL
- Understanding when violence is indiscriminate vs. targeting particular sections of the population with an intent to harm or destroy a particular group, in whole or in part
- Understanding when civilians armed for self-protection may be mobilized as parties to the conflict through incitement

Slide 23

![Added Value of R2P to POC in Peacekeeping](image)

Identifying the patterns that lead to crimes:
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

- Because of its emphasis on widespread or systematic crimes, the Atrocity Prevention Lens assists actors in reframing analysis and intelligence gathering in order to recognize patterns of behavior that may precede mass atrocities. Such patterns may be missed in a POC assessment that is focused on addressing the imminent threat of physical harm to civilians.

- This long-term pattern recognition allows protection actors to understand when vulnerabilities may intensify, what triggers conflict escalation and how to protect civilians before it occurs.

Generating early response and different types of responses:

- The threat of atrocity crimes lends urgency to the response to risks assessment and analysis of patterns. Since atrocity crimes are of a particularly grave nature and may occur on a large scale – especially if they are widespread or systematic – evidence of these crimes may often trigger a faster response than every day violence or criminality.

- Recognizing patterns earlier should lead to earlier responses, when missions will typically have more options available to them.
  - This means that the Atrocity Prevention Lens may also trigger a different type of response than other protection incidents – particularly when responses are early and the mission has more options available. This could include the deployment of quick reaction forces to the affected area and/or monitoring and collecting evidence of crimes.
  - Protecting civilians may include traditional modes of protection (including protection through presence) as well as some out-of-the-box “extraordinary measures,” such as opening the gates to UN bases and/or creating POC sites or other areas of increased surveillance and protection to mitigate the imminent threat to civilians.

- Identifying risks of atrocities before they occur means missions will have opportunities to focus on POC’s Tier 1 and 3 activities to stabilize the environment and prevent crimes.

Note to Facilitators: Additional information on HIPPO Recommendations from the perspective of atrocity prevention. To further understand the added value of the Atrocity Prevention Lens to the context of peacekeeping, the following explanations look at the HIPPO recommendations through the lens of atrocity prevention.

Primacy of politics: The primacy of politics emphasizes that lasting peace is achieved through political solutions – but political strategies must be informed by threats to
civilians, particularly when solutions may exacerbate societal cleavages or when parties to the negotiations are also potential perpetrators.

- An Atrocity Prevention Lens brings a more tailored understanding of the broader political landscape and how it relates to the threat to civilians.

- It can prepare the mission and UN leadership in understanding what factors in the political process may act as triggers and what actions by state and non-state actors may exacerbate vulnerabilities faced by certain populations or certain regions of the country.

- Based on this analysis, the mission can prepare contingency plans for responding if political processes trigger violence and for continuing to protect civilians even if political actors and the government itself block their mobility.

Responsive operations and tailored responses: An Atrocity Prevention Lens assists missions in better understanding their operating environment and the specific risks faced by populations. Peacekeepers are thus able to tailor responses to the type of threats civilians are facing and are better prepared to respond to those threats before situations escalate.

- Atrocity threat assessments can help in identifying some of the root causes that contribute to those risks, such as a prior history of intergroup violence or disputes over land rights.

- Applying the Atrocity Prevention Lens also helps in understanding imminent priorities while sequencing missions. If the UN Security Council and mission leadership understand imminent threats, they can ensure mandates emphasize protection capacities when and where the risks of atrocities are high, and may emphasize accountability and capacity building priorities when situations have stabilized.

Stronger partnerships: The HIPPO recommendations emphasize the need for the UN to improve its use of partnerships with regional institutions, as well as to strengthen partnerships among the UN’s own entities. R2P clarifies and further emphasizes the strategic value of strengthening these relationships, by underlining that protection of civilians from atrocities is a shared responsibility by national, regional and international actors.

- In cases where a UN peacekeeping mission was already on the ground – such as in South Sudan and the DRC – regional institutions have played a role in constructing responses when new threats to populations have emerged, including through proposing more rapid reaction forces, providing support to political processes and supporting regional accountability mechanisms.

- By strengthening partnerships, the UN can provide better support to such mechanisms which serve a vital role in preventing an escalation or recurrence of crimes.

- R2P also demonstrates the value of stronger partnerships within the UN system.
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

- As noted in the “Cammaert Report” on South Sudan, unconsolidated analysis resulting from UN agencies acting in isolated silos has frequently hampered the ability of the UN to recognize trends that could lead to mass atrocity crimes. Similarly, gaps in the understanding of needs between the field, UN Headquarters, member states and the UN Security Council has resulted in slow responses and late action, which could be mitigated by stronger partnerships among these actors.

Field-focused and people-centered: R2P reinforces the need for the UN to improve its focus on how to produce better and faster results in the field without operations being inhibited by bureaucratic processes in UN Headquarters.

- By utilizing the Atrocity Prevention Lens, UN Headquarters can better articulate the gravity of needing to mainstream the process for getting personnel and resources to missions in the field.

- Such an awareness would also reinforce the value of strengthening measures for ensuring mission leadership is accountable to fulfilling its protection responsibilities.

- With regard to people-centered approaches, through better engagement with local community leaders, and women in particular, peacekeepers may learn vital information regarding inter-communal dynamics that may increase their ability to respond effectively to imminent threats. (This will be discussed in greater depth over the course of the rest of the training).
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

Activity 2.2: Understanding the Nature of Threats (Slides 24-25)

Materials:  
- Case study handout
- Worksheet handout (see below; also in separate file on the USB for ease of printing)

Time Estimate: 1 hour

Instructions:
1. Divide the room into groups of 4-5 participants.
2. Hand out the worksheets and the case scenario.
3. Give the groups 30 minutes to read and fill out the worksheet and talk through the case amongst themselves. Each group should use the worksheet to assess the existence of systematic threats in the scenarios.
4. The group should be able to identify political, societal and environmental patterns, as well as triggering events that could possibly lead to atrocity crimes.
5. Bring the groups back into plenary to discuss the patterns they identified. Note with participants that the group will go deeper into threat assessments and implementation in upcoming Modules, but that the purpose of this activity is for them to see if having a baseline understanding of how an awareness of atrocity risks adds to their general perceptions of the situation.

Discussion prompts:

Note to Facilitators: The purpose of this exercise is to give participants an opportunity to think about some of the factors just raised regarding the value added of R2P and the Atrocity Prevention Lens to understanding the nature of threats to populations through a real life case scenario.

Prior to starting the activity, you may wish to show the short film “DRC: Africa’s Deadliest Conflict” to emphasize the lasting impact of atrocities on populations.

The film is available here as well as on your USB: DRC: Africa’s Deadliest Conflict
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

1. What systemic threats – political, environmental and/or social – exist that might pose a risk of mass atrocity crimes occurring?

2. What specific triggering events may be present?

3. What risks might be anticipated going forward? What are the different risks associated within various political and social levels of activity? (For example, what risks are there associated with political tensions in the capital that could spill over into threats throughout the country? What are the local level risks among communities?)

4. Given previous discussions about R2P and the Atrocity Prevention Lens, are there any risks you perceive that you may not have noticed before?

Additional points:

- If it does not come up in participants’ responses, draw attention to important risk factors, such as: ethnic tensions, natural resource exploitation, political tensions surrounding the elections, weak state presence in the eastern regions, large number of armed self-defense groups, porous borders, etc.
Activity 2.2 – Case Study: Democratic Republic of the Congo

Between 1994 and 2003 the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) endured a conflict frequently referred to as “Africa’s first world war.” Millions of people were killed or died as a result of starvation and disease as Congolese militias, backed by armed groups from neighboring states, perpetrated atrocities against populations from rival ethnic groups. During the war, Tutsi militias marched on the capital, Kinshasa, and overthrew the government of Mobutu Sese Seko, installing Laurent Kabila in his place in 1997. Four years later, Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila, assumed his role as President. During President Joseph Kabila’s first term, the DRC continued to be the location of proxy wars between militias from various neighboring countries.

Despite the war being declared over in 2003, the east of the country continues to be unstable as dozens of armed groups fight for control of land and resources while targeting members of rival ethnic groups for attack. This instability is particularly strong in North and South Kivu provinces on the border with Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. During conflicts in these countries, notably the genocide in Rwanda, waves of Hutu and Tutsi populations have fled into eastern DRC, disrupting the ethnic balance of the region.

DRC’s porous borders have also allowed armed groups to enter the country, smuggling in weapons while extracting the region’s vast natural resources. North and South Kivu are resource rich areas with dense deposits of exploitable minerals, oil and charcoal. Four “conflict minerals” (gold, tin, tungsten and tantalum) are particularly profitable due to their use in jewelry, cell phones and cars.

The government of the DRC lacks a strong state presence in these provinces, with the capital, Kinshasa, located more than 2,500 kilometers away and relatively little investment in government infrastructure in the east. As a result, more than 30 rebel groups have been able to operate and compete for control of mines and transportation routes while frequently taking control of territory. In the absence of state authority and sufficient protection from the national armed forces of the DRC (FARDC), local self-defense militias have also emerged throughout the region. Such groups have engaged in widespread fighting with armed militias, often resulting in reprisal attacks on local populations. Local ethnic conflicts over customary succession or land rights have also been politicized by political elites, resulting in further fragmentation of groups and mobilization of violence.

Populations throughout eastern DRC have been victims of killings, sexual violence, abductions, torture, forced recruitment into armed groups and forced labor. Villages have been routinely attacked, with houses burnt, women singled out for attack, and men used to carry looted goods for rebels. Specific villages have been singled out by militias based upon ethnic affiliation and for being suspected hosts of enemy fighters and their families. More than two million displaced persons are scattered in camps and with host families throughout North and South Kivu.
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

The DRC has been undergoing a constitutional crisis since December 2016 when President Kabila’s second elected term was mandated to end. Disputes between the government and political opposition in the capital, Kinshasa, regarding the election process and whether President Kabila could run for a third term has resulted in delays. Legislative and local elections have also been put on hold until the government is able to organize the presidential elections. This crisis has had destabilizing effects throughout the country. There have been reports of increasing government repression, as it has reacted violently to peaceful demonstrations organized by the opposition in response to President Kabila’s refusal to step down in December 2016. Hate speech by politicians to mobilize ethnic groups and militias during the 2006 and 2011 elections has also raised concerns of incitement to violence once campaigning begins.

In eastern DRC repression and arrests of protesters has culminated in growing unrest amongst civilians and the mobilization of anti-government armed groups. Such groups have attacked FARDC posts and local government offices. In an attempt to address the threat posed by these groups, the FARDC launched several offensives in late 2017 and early 2018. The deployment of troops to these operations has left a power vacuum in parts of North and South Kivu, as well as Ituri province, that other militias have attempted to fill.
### Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

#### Activity 2.2: Understanding the Nature of Threats Worksheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Political patterns:</strong> What political patterns may exacerbate tension? (examples: changes in government policy, actual/perceived bias in government, gaps in land rights, discriminatory policies targeting particular groups, political repression)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social patterns:</strong> What social patterns may exacerbate tensions? (examples: risks surrounding certain religious holidays and rituals, patterns of behavior resulting from economic inequality, increase in hate speech or incitement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental patterns:</strong> What environmental patterns may exacerbate tensions? (examples: seasonal changes that affect relationships between nomadic herding communities vs. sedentary agricultural communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Triggering events:</strong> What type of events can be triggers for atrocity crimes and where may those triggers be most salient? (examples: elections)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based upon your assessment – do you think there are systemic threats that could lead to mass atrocity crimes?
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

Note to Facilitators: Please use the information below as a guide answering the questions from the worksheet regarding the DRC Case Study.

| Political patterns: What political patterns may exacerbate tension? (examples: changes in government policy, actual/perceived bias in government, gaps in land rights, discriminatory policies targeting particular groups, political repression) | Lack of governance and government security in eastern provinces.  
Competition for land rights.  
Constitutional crisis and tensions surrounding extension of President Kabila’s term.  
Increasing protests related to elections.  
Increasing government repression and arrests of protesters since December 2016. |
|---|---|
| Social patterns: What social patterns may exacerbate tensions? (examples: risks surrounding certain religious holidays and rituals, patterns of behavior resulting from economic inequality, increase in hate speech or incitement) | Prevalence of armed group and rise in local “self-defense” militias.  
Ethnic divisions between armed groups.  
Rising hate speech. |
| Environmental patterns: What environmental patterns may exacerbate tensions? (examples: seasonal changes that affect relationships between nomadic herding communities vs. sedentary agricultural communities) | Resource extraction – exploitable “conflict minerals” increasing in value.  
Militias competing for control of land containing minerals and other natural resources. |
| Triggering events: What type of events can be triggers for atrocity crimes and where may those triggers be most salient? (examples: elections) | Elections during December 2018.  
Campaigning prior to December elections.  
FARDC offensives against armed groups and redeployment of troops. |
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

Activity 2.2 – Alternative Case Study: South Sudan (Scenario adapted from UNMISS “Interim Report on Human Rights, South Sudan Crisis, January, 2014”).

During July 2013 South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir dissolved his cabinet, removing from office over a dozen government officials, including Vice President Riek Machar. The move generated fear of potential instability within the government of the world’s youngest state. When President Kiir announced his new government two weeks later, several key posts, including Vice President and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, were not reestablished. Despite this, former Vice President Machar remained a Deputy Chairperson of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) party.

Internal divisions are deeply rooted in the South Sudanese politics and society. Underlying tensions, ethnic divisions, and accountability for past crimes have never been fully addressed. Shortly after its independence in 2011, avoiding a renewed war with the North largely overshadowed the troubling internal rifts within South Sudan. But eventually, growing tensions began to emerge in parts of the young country.

On 13 December 2013 the SPLM’s National Liberation Council convened a meeting regarding the political status of the party and to review the party’s founding documents. Rising tensions within the SPLM, particularly between President Salva Kiir, former Vice President Machar and other key members of the SPLM leadership escalated and turned violent while the Council’s meeting was in progress.

Reports indicate that initial fighting broke out between members of the Presidential Guard. The fighting took an ethnic turn as soldiers from South Sudan’s two largest ethnic groups, the Dinka and Nuer, divided their loyalties to either President Kiir or former Vice President Machar, respectively. While the Dinka and Nuer were aligned within the SPLM party through Kiir and Machar and a shared history during the war for independence from Sudan, the two groups have a long history of inter-communal disputes, including violent clashes over land in Jonglei and Equatoria states during the 1980s and 1990s that resulted in massacres of Dinka and Nuer populations.

The government of South Sudan asserted that the December 2013 fighting within the National Liberation Council was sparked by Machar attempting a long-planned coup – an allegation which Machar denied. The fighting in Juba subsequently spread to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) headquarters and an armory, and by 16 December gunfire was reported throughout Juba.

UNMISS received reports of SPLA soldiers of Dinka origin targeting civilians of Nuer origin, who were beaten, arrested and killed. At least 225 civilians, primarily Nuer, were extra-judicially killed on 16 December. Between 16 and 18 December house-to-house searches for civilians of Nuer origin were conducted in areas near the armory. Nuer were killed at police stations, in the streets while fleeing, or in their homes. There were also widespread reports of abductions and enforced disappearances of Nuer civilians around Juba.

The fighting continued during the subsequent days and spread to Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States. The SPLA, into which various militias had been loosely integrated,
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

broke up with some forces remaining loyal to President Kiir and the government while others joined the SPLA-in-Opposition, lead by Machar.

In the subsequent days, fighting spread to Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states with Machar declaring his intention to bring down President Kiir’s government. Opposition forces took control of the capitals of the three states. Heavy fighting also ensued in the towns of Bor, Malakal and Bentiu.

Fighting between opposing armed groups took on ethnic dimensions with some civilians deliberately targeted along ethnic lines. A vicious cycle of retaliatory and revenge killings ensued. UNMISS also received reports of sexual and gender based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances and torture.

Within six weeks of the conflict starting, over 740,000 people had been displaced, with over 84,000 people taking refuge in six UNMISS bases.

Despite attempts to negotiate a ceasefire, the situation swiftly deteriorated into a civil war. UNMISS estimated that thousands of people were killed during the hostilities. Both parties to the conflict have been responsible for ethnically targeted attacks on civilians and have failed to comply with international humanitarian and human rights law. There have been reports of extrajudicial killings, conflict-related sexual violence, torture, looting, the destruction of property, the recruitment of children and other violations.
Module 2: Why is R2P a Useful Lens for Peacekeepers?

Conclusion

Slide 26

Module 2 Learning Outcomes - Review

By the end of Module 2, learners will:
- Understand the relationship between R2P and POC
- Understand existing gaps in UN peacekeeping and civilian protection
- Discuss ways in which using R2P and the Atrocity Prevention Lens can add value to existing POC activities

Note to Facilitators: As a conclusion to Module 2, review the learning outcomes with participants, taking time to address any remaining questions.
### Objective:

Module 3 will demonstrate the implications of identifying risks of potential mass atrocity crimes and how threat assessments performed by peacekeepers are enhanced by the Atrocity Prevention Lens.

### Learning Outcomes:

By the end of Module 3, learners will be able to:

- Understand the ways in which information on risks can be collected and communicated
- Identify the actors, motives and means that may be present when assessing the threat of mass atrocity crimes
- Explain how the Atrocity Prevention Lens enhances the ability to assess the potential risks faced by populations
- Define warning signs and risk factors for mass atrocity crimes

### Methods:

- Group discussion
- Lecture
- Activities:
  - Case Study: Threat Assessment
  - Case Study: Systemic Risk Analysis and Threat Assessment

### Resources:

- Slides
- South Sudan and Girano case studies (Lesson 2)
- Threat assessment activity worksheet (Activity 3.1)
- Understanding the nature of threats worksheet (Activity 3.2).
- Relevant readings on USB
  - UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes
  - USAID “Atrocity Assessment Framework: Supplemental Guidance to State/USAID Conflict Assessment Frameworks”
Module 3: Conducting Threat Assessments through the Atrocity Prevention Lens

Lesson Map

Module 3 should take approximately five hours.

Estimated timing:

- 2.5 hours of lecture and discussion
- 2.5 hours of group activities

| Introduction: Review of Module 2: definition of POC and Added Value of R2P |
| Lesson One: Collection of Information and Communication of Risks |
| Lesson Two: Tools of the Trade – UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes |
| Lesson Three: Identifying the Risk of Mass Atrocity Crimes |
| Activity 3.1: Threat Assessment |
| Activity 3.2: Systemic Analysis and Threat Assessment |
| Closing Activity: Review |
Introduction: Review of Module 2: Definition of POC and Added Value of R2P

Now that participants have an understanding of why R2P may be valuable to peacekeeping personnel, Modules 3 and 4 will focus on how to implement R2P in practice. This Module focuses on prevention through improved situational awareness by including mass atrocity risks within threat assessments. In this regard the Module is not focusing exclusively on formal threat assessments done by analysts for Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs), Joint Operations Centres (JOCs), etc., but also on risks that can be identified during military/police joint patrols, community engagement, etc.

When doing an assessment of atrocity risks, actors should consider a number of factors. By asking and answering questions about each of the variables that appear in this Module within a given situation, actors on the ground should be able to:

- Identify dynamics that underpin the risk of atrocities
- Develop a set of plausible atrocity scenarios that could occur
- Determine what key developments should be closely monitored
Lesson One: Collection of Information and Communication of Risks

Slide 1

**Risk identification:** Module 2 introduced the Risk Management Framework. Phase One – Identification of Risks – can be broken down into several parts. Module 2 demonstrated one part of this – understanding the systemic level features of a situation that may affect dynamics between populations. Module 3 will introduce a second part of identification: collecting information on various local-level variables in the situation being assessed.

There are several methods through which missions can obtain the necessary information to make an assessment of atrocity risks.

**Discussion Question (Slide 2):** For those participants that have prior experience in a field setting, how do you carry out situational awareness when on the ground?
Module 3: Conducting Threat Assessments through the Atrocity Prevention Lens

Slide 3

Information Collection in Daily Activities

With all day-to-day activities, peacekeeping personnel should be trained on the proper chain of command for reporting on identified risks and should know when and how to convey such risks to mission leadership. Information gained from situational awareness, human rights monitoring, community engagement, etc. is made more effective if it is consolidated and transferred upwards as quickly as possible.

Military and police personnel can collect information through daily activities such as patrols, formal and informal interactions with the community and Community Liaison Assistants and specific reconnaissance missions. Such activities may include:

- **Patrols**: reconnaissance patrols, information-gathering patrols, community engagement patrols.

- **Establishment of observation post and checkpoints**: established to monitor, observe and report on a certain area, object or activity/event. Such posts carry out specific survey, monitoring and information gathering activities and share observations with relevant stakeholders. When the threat of atrocities has been established, observation posts may be a useful tool for observing dynamics in areas that have been identified as potential “hot spots” for attacks.

- **Monitoring and reporting on human rights violations**: as noted in the Framework of Analysis, one of the earliest warning signs of impending atrocity crimes is an increase in human rights violations. The Human Rights component of peacekeeping missions conducts monitoring and analysis of human rights violations and issues public reports on situations of special concern.

- **Outreach and engagement with all actors in the area of responsibility**: it is important to understand how to engage with local actors and which local actors
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may give insight into patterns and risks of atrocities, particularly religious and community leaders and women.

- The aim of outreach and engagement is to reach out to all sections of the population, remote geographical locations within the area of responsibility and the various power centers with a view to generate trust and faith in the peace process, create safe and secure environments, facilitate freedom of movement and restore normalcy.

- Peacekeeping personnel should aim to build relationships with key groups and leaders within the community, especially women’s groups. Women often have a broader awareness of the risks within a community and building trust within such groups could facilitate better information sharing.

- Peacekeepers need to understand both how to engage with local actors and which local actors may give insight into patterns and risks of atrocities, particularly religious and community leaders and women. It is important for all peacekeeping personnel to understand the communications strategy of the mission and how they are individually expected to engage with the community. Peacekeeping personnel who are not equipped to engage with the community themselves should still communicate regularly with Community Liaison Assistants and Women Protection Advisers to assess what information they have received that could be indicative of risks to populations.

- Outreach can also occur during the implementation of Quick Impact Projects when peacekeeping personnel are operating with the community and trying to build trust with various parts of the community. Such projects should be undertaken with an awareness of any unintended consequence for inter-communal divisions, but once the impartiality of the mission has been established, peacekeeping personnel can establish contacts within the community that may be essential to information gathering later.

- Peacekeeping personnel should be encouraged to ask questions that can be used to assess potential risks, identify worrying trends and understand particular vulnerabilities that could make populations in the area susceptible to mass atrocity crimes.
Addressing the Specific Vulnerabilities of Women and Children

Monitoring and Assessment Tasks:
- Special attention should be paid to women and children’s protection risks in joint investigations and analysis. Reporting by JOCs/JMACs/Criminal Intelligence Units should include disaggregated data on gender security risks.
- Liaise with WPAs and Children Protection Advisers.
- Specialized reporting on CRSV, women and child abductions, recruitment into armed groups, sex trafficking and arbitrary killings that target women/children.
- Ensure female peacekeepers are involved in community engagement activities and establish relationships with women’s groups. Ensure women are consulted in threat assessments and use women as resources in monitoring and information gathering activities.
- Establish dial-in radio programs for women to report threats.
- Host radio programs raising awareness of child protection issues.

Addressing the Specific Vulnerabilities of Women and Children: Monitoring and Assessment Tasks

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Slide 5

Designated Situational Awareness Units

It is essential that peacekeeping personnel contribute information acquired in their day-to-day activities to specialized monitoring units. Similarly, peacekeeping personnel should familiarize themselves with outputs from these mechanisms, including daily situational reporting and special incident reports. When reviewing such reports and when conveying information to these structures, it is important to acknowledge specific atrocity risks.

- **JOCs and JMACs:** These joint centers bring together analysis from all components of the mission – including military, police and civilians – and produce integrated analysis and assessments that assists in identifying threats, informing strategic and operational planning, etc.

- **Military Intelligence Units:** Some battalions have designated intelligence officers and military reconnaissance units, but all troops have a responsibility to proactively acquire and analyze information about the mission’s area of operation. Military Intelligence Units may also have specialized capacities such as aviation units, drones (in MONUSCO, for example), etc.

- **Criminal Intelligence Units:** Police units have a dedicated situational awareness entity that gathers information and disseminates it to JMACs, JOCs and Police Liaison Officers.

- **Geo-spatial Information Systems:** Some missions have a geo-spatial component mandated to support situational awareness through protection of maps and provision of other satellite-derived information. Such units can be instrumental in showing where troops should be deployed to address attacks or risks and may provide evidence of crimes in the event of villages burned or otherwise destroyed, etc.
What is the Framework of Analysis?

The UN’s Framework of Analysis is one tool available to expand your comprehension of the circumstances under which various risks to populations arise. It can be a complementary tool to enhance threat assessments.

The Framework was developed by the Office of the UN Special Advisers on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. It was designed as an integrated analysis and risk assessment tool specifically for addressing atrocity crimes. In this sense it can accompany early warning mechanisms as well as monitoring and assessment tools.
What does the Framework include?

The Framework lists fourteen risk factors for atrocity crimes. Risk factors include various behaviors, circumstances or other elements that create an environment conducive to the commission of mass atrocity crimes. Risk factors include both structural issues – such as weakness of state institutions – as well as more dynamic issues such as triggering events.

Among those risk factors are ones that are considered “common” to all four mass atrocity crimes, such as situations of armed conflict or record of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. This means that under these circumstances, any of the crimes has a potential risk of occurring.

In addition, the Framework describes several risk factors that are specific to only one of the crimes – for example “signs of an intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group” is unique to the crime of genocide.
Indicators: Each risk factor also includes a list of indicators designed to help determine the degree to which a particular risk factor is present.

For example, under the risk factor “capacity to commit atrocity crimes,” indicators include:

- Availability of personnel and of arms and ammunition, or of the financial resources, public or private, for their procurement
- Capacity to transport and deploy personnel and to transport and distribute arms and ammunition
- Capacity to encourage or recruit large numbers of supporters from populations or groups, and availability of the means to mobilize them
- Strong culture of obedience to authority and group conformity
- Presence of or links with other armed forces or with non-State armed groups.
- Presence of commercial actors or companies that can serve as enablers by providing goods, services or other forms of practical or technical support that help sustain perpetrators
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- Financial, political or other support of influential or wealthy national actors
- Armed, financial, logistic, training or other support of external actors, including states, international or regional organizations, private companies or others

Slide 11

Utilizing the Framework of Analysis
- Collect reliable information on the situation
- Use information from the field to inform whether any of the risk factors or respective indicators are present
- Situate that analysis within the broader political context, assessing whether there are any mitigating factors that could prevent crimes

Important to remember:
- Not all fourteen risk factors need to be present for there to be a significant risk of atrocity crimes occurring
- The presence of several risk factors does not guarantee that crimes will occur

How is the Framework used?
The Framework is designed as a broad guide that can help monitors and analysts assess potential atrocity risks. If the risk factors and indicators are used as a guide in collecting and assessing information in the field, individuals may be better able to make qualitative assessments of the risk of atrocity crimes in specific situations.

In order to use the Framework, analysts and monitors should collect reliable information on the situation and use it to inform whether any of the risk factors and respective indicators are present. They should be particularly attentive to changes in indicators that may contribute to an increase or decrease in the likelihood of crimes occurring.

When using this tool, keep in mind:
- Not all fourteen risk factors need to be present for there to be a significant risk of atrocity crimes occurring.
- An assessment must situate atrocity risk factors within a broader political, historical and cultural context. If a society has various factors that help mitigate the risks of atrocities or a lack of potential triggers, then there could be several risk factors present and yet a low probability of crimes occurring.
  - Many countries, for example, have a record of serious violations of human rights, weak state structures and a capacity to commit crimes through arms flows across borders, but the violations perpetrated against populations do not reach a threshold that extends beyond violations and abuses of basic human rights.
That said, while there is no guarantee that the presence of risks leads to atrocities, the more risk factors and relevant indicators that are present, the higher the risk of atrocity crimes being committed. This is particularly true with regards to the “specific” risk factors.

**How can this be a useful tool within peacekeeping missions?**

Since no country is immune to mass atrocity crimes, it is possible for any of the fourteen risk factors to be observed within countries in which peacekeeping personnel operate. In fact, while peacekeepers may not be explicitly deployed to address mass atrocity risks, in many instances they have a mandate to address various indicators within the Framework of Analysis, such as decreasing the capacity to commit atrocity crimes by reducing the availability of arms through disarmament campaigns or strengthening state structures through security sector reform activities.

Peacekeeping personnel are often the eyes and ears of the UN on the ground to observe changes that relate to risk factors, such as noting preparatory actions by various groups, identifying potential triggering factors, observing building intergroup tensions or threats to specific populations.

As a result, the Framework can help attune peacekeeping personnel to specific atrocity risks in the areas they are deployed to protect. The list of indicators can be particularly useful in having a more nuanced understanding of atrocity risks for a thorough threat assessment and can help in deciphering between “common” risks for conflict or human rights violations versus changes that could result in mass atrocity crimes.

As participants will see in the threat assessment discussion in Lesson 2, many of the risk factors directly relate to variables that we have identified as essential to an assessment of atrocity threats – including motives, triggering factors, and capacity to commit crimes. By using the Framework of Analysis you can help situate those assessment variables in a broader societal context and also think through different elements of each of those variables.

Moreover, if senior mission leadership creates a demand for an atrocity risk assessment, by answering questions about the presence of various indicators in the Framework, analysts can provide a more thorough explanation of where and why risks are particularly high.
Note to Facilitators: The facilitator may wish to use the cases from Activity 1.2 in Module 1 (Scenario-Based Identification of the Four Crimes) to ask participants if their assessment of the cases gains any nuance from having the risk factors from the Framework.

Two examples have been provided on slides 12-13, but the facilitator may choose other options as well.

This is helpful in demonstrating that in some cases, crimes occur when only some risk factors were present, but not all. It will similarly demonstrate situations where crimes did not occur even though some risk factors were present in order to show that the presence of risk factors does not guarantee that atrocity crimes are the inevitable outcome.
In order to understand the nature of threats you need to do a threat assessment. By better understanding such threats to populations, peacekeepers and other protection actors can take steps to mitigate the risks of crimes occurring before the situation reaches a stage requiring physical intervention. Understanding atrocity risks for civilians includes identification of a number of variables in an area of operation. Identifying the threat of mass atrocity crimes includes answering the following questions:

**Perpetrators:** Which, if any, key actors currently have or might plausibly develop the motive, means and opportunity to carry out large-scale and/or deliberate attacks on civilians?

Answering this question requires an understanding and acknowledgement that perpetrators can come from all sectors of society – from government and its leadership to non-state armed groups or groups of civilians.

- Where are they located and how are they organized?
- What are their capabilities and potential vulnerabilities?
- What are their objectives (outside of civilian harm)?
- What are the internal dynamics of the group? (What is the leadership structure? Is it all male? What role do women play in perpetrating or facilitating crimes?)

**Target groups:** Which, if any, groups of civilians are currently being targeted or might plausibly be targeted for deliberate attack?

- What type of group are they and why may they be targeted? (Ethnicity? Political affiliation? Religion? Etc.)
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- What are their capabilities for self-defense and/or mounting reprisals?
- Could the targets also be perpetrators themselves?

Influential third parties: Which other actors are enabling atrocities, or playing protecting or peacebuilding roles with respect to ongoing or potential mass atrocities? Who are the positive influencers in this situation? Who are the potential negative influencers? What role do bystanders play?

- Are there any actors providing direct support to the perpetrators?
- Are there any international actors who are inadvertently contributing to the means or motives of perpetrators?
- Are there any actors who are inciting violence and/or encouraging peaceful resolution?
- Are there any women leaders in the society who can serve as a resource base for improving security or influencing relevant actors to stabilize the situation?
- Are religious leaders positively or negatively influencing the situation? And can they be engaged in a way that could aid in defusing the conflict?

Means for perpetration: What resources are available to perpetrators – is there a surplus of illegal (or legal) arms flowing through and into the country? If the government is the perpetrator, what military resources do they have at their disposal? Are there porous borders contributing to the flow of arms? Do perpetrators control tools for incitement, such as control of media for disseminating hate speech?

Potential motives: What is driving the perpetrators to commit crimes? Is there something influencing individuals to join groups of perpetrators? Are there historical details that are important to consider? Do the influential third parties have any motives worth noting?

Opportunity for perpetration: Has something changed, or is there an upcoming triggering event that increases the opportunities available to perpetrators? This can include new laws, change in deployment of troops with less protection in an area, major events like protests or elections, etc.

Early indicators of risk: This category is more dynamic than some of the others, as it asks the analyst to look at changes in their surroundings. Is there increasing hate speech? Is there a change in the patterns of behaviors by armed groups – have they started entering villages more or perpetrating small attacks? What patterns of behavior have recently emerged between the potential perpetrators and potential target groups?
Understanding vulnerabilities of particular groups: When we discuss “targets” it is important to understand that while all people have an identity made up of diverse features, one or more of those features may make them particularly vulnerable for attack. Moreover, that identity may be manipulated in a way that makes them vulnerable to particular types of attacks.

Such vulnerabilities could include:

- Ethnicity: inequalities in government leadership and/or the military could result in discrimination or excessive force targeting certain ethnicities
- Religion: being targeted in places of worship and/or on holy days
- Political affiliation: being targeted during political demonstrations or at polling stations
- IDPs/refugees: following displacement, populations are already vulnerable as a result of their current living situation. Living within camps or in host communities leaves them at particular risk if atrocities break out near their new location
- Other divisions relevant to the operating environment, such as agricultural vs. herding communities. In some contexts, seasons impact a population’s vulnerability for attack. This is particularly acute in transhumance corridors where nomadic cattle raising communities may graze in areas where agricultural communities rely upon the land. This also highlights the importance of recognizing the reasons for which a group may be targeted – often herding/farming is affiliated with particular ethnic groups and it is necessary to understand whether a group is being targeted for their occupation or the ethnic affiliation when determining the scope of the risks they face.
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Understanding gender and age-specific vulnerabilities: Women and children are often thought of as being uniquely vulnerable in the context of mass atrocity crimes. While this is true, it is important to understand that all genders and age categories present their own vulnerabilities:

Gender:

- Women are at particular risk of: being targeted during everyday tasks; conflict related sexual violence; abduction; forced marriage; risks associated with the consequences of violence, including risks following displacement
- Men are at particular risk of: forced labor; being targeted for perceived affiliation with armed groups or threat of joining/being recruited into armed groups

Age:

- Children are at particular risk of: being recruited into armed conflict; conflict related sexual violence; being targeted at school; abduction; risks associated with the consequences of violence, including risks following displacement.
  - In many of these instances, age and gender may play a role – for example, in Nigeria, Boko Haram was known for particularly targeting all girls schools for attack. In the DRC/South Sudan/CAR/Uganda the Lord’s Resistance Army targeted young boys for abduction and recruitment into armed groups, older women to gather and cook for them and young girls for abduction and subsequent marriage to rebels.
- Elderly: due to the challenges in fleeing violence, the elderly are particularly vulnerable during attacks on remote villages. Elderly populations are often either easily killed by armed groups because they cannot protect themselves, or are left behind in ravaged villages with few supplies for survival when their neighbors and families flee.
Activity 3.1: Threat Assessment (Slide 16)

Materials:  
- South Sudan case scenario  
- Threat assessment worksheets

Note to Facilitators: This activity utilizes a case study South Sudan. Whereas the activity in Module 2 assessed the scenario for systemic risk factors, this activity will consider relevant actors as well as means, motives and opportunities for perpetration. Additional cases have also been provided and may be used depending on the facilitator’s preference. The real life scenarios include CAR, DRC, and Mali.

Activity Introduction:

For this activity, participants will be conducting risk assessments using an Atrocity Prevention Lens. Participants will use the case of South Sudan to determine whether there is a presence of atrocity risks and to identify what the risks are.

This activity will help consolidate participants’ understanding of what atrocity risks look like in the field, as well as how various tools, like the questions in the threat assessment worksheets or the risk factors and indicators in the Framework of Analysis, may change how information is gathered and interpreted.

The worksheet asks participants to assess the situation based on the variables described earlier in the lecture. Below are some suggestions of things to encourage participants to consider for each variable:

- **Perpetrators:** Which, if any, key actors currently have or might plausibly develop the motive, means and opportunity to carry out large-scale and/or deliberate attacks on civilians?

- **Target groups:** Which, if any, groups of civilians are currently being targeted or might plausibly be targeted for deliberate attack?

- **Influential third parties:** Which other actors are enabling atrocities, or playing protecting or peacebuilding roles with respect to ongoing or potential mass atrocities? Who are the positive influencers in this situation? Who are the potential negative influencers? What role do bystanders play?

- **Means for perpetration:** What tools are available for perpetrators? This can include physical resources for perpetrating crimes, such as weapons availability or tools for incitement, such as control of media for disseminating hate speech. If
it is the government, to what extent can they control the actions of the military/police to perpetrate crimes on their behalf?

- **Potential motives:** What is driving the perpetrators to commit crimes? Is there something influencing individuals to join groups of perpetrators? Are there historical details that are important to consider? Do the influential third parties have any motives worth noting?

- **Opportunity for perpetration:** Has something changed, or is there an upcoming triggering event that increases the opportunities available to perpetrators? This can include new laws, change in deployment of troops with less protection in an area, major events like protests or elections, etc.

- **Early indicators of risks:** This category is more dynamic than some of the others, as it asks the analyst to look at changes in their surroundings. Is there increasing hate speech? Is there a change in the patterns of behaviors by armed groups – have they started entering villages more or perpetrating small attacks? What patterns of behavior have recently emerged between the potential perpetrators and potential target groups?

- **Unique vulnerabilities of populations:** As discussed previously, outside of being targeted for being part of a particular group, sometimes populations face unique challenges as a result of their gender, age and other physical features. In this particular category, individuals are asked to assess how those vulnerabilities may play a role in the situational dynamics. Are women doing household tasks in places that put them at particular risk of attack or abduction? Is the perpetrator known for targeting particular subsets of the population – for example do they prey on children for recruitment?

**Instructions:**

1. Divide the room into groups of 4-5 participants.
2. Hand out the worksheets and the fictional case scenario.
3. Give the groups approximately 30 minutes to read and fill out the worksheets and talk through the case together. Each group should use the worksheets to assess whether the situation is a potential atrocity situation or routine criminality/violence.
4. Groups should be able to identify perpetrators, means and motives and explain how the Atrocity Prevention Lens affected their perception of the threat.
5. After working in groups, participants will be brought back to discuss their outcomes as a large group with the facilitator.
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Additional Discussion Prompts:

1. Within the “Perpetrators” and “Target Groups” categories, are there certain groups that are only perpetrators or only targets? Are there groups that may only be bystanders without being targets or perpetrators?

2. How might the UN mission fit into the category of "Influential Third Parties" and “Means of Perpetration” (i.e., is the government or the clashing groups limiting the mobility of the mission in a way that contributes to an increased capacity to perpetrate crimes)?

3. For “Means” and “Opportunity,” ask participants what is driving recruitment into armed groups? Do seasons play a role in increasing the means of mobility, thus increasing opportunity?

4. For “Potential Motives,” encourage participants to think about inter-group dynamics. Why are the groups clashing? Are they fighting over resources? If so, are the resources becoming scarce in a way that will increase motives?

5. For “Early Indicators,” consider asking whether this event is isolated to one area, or if the scenario implies this has been occurring elsewhere in the country and could spread to this area.

6. For “Unique Vulnerabilities,” encourage participants to focus on unique vulnerabilities that are featured in the scenario as well as ones that have already been discussed. Can participants identify risks to other groups beyond what is listed, such as IDPs?

7. What is the geographical scope of the risk? Can the area at risk be isolated or is there a potential for this to spread?

8. What are the vulnerabilities of the perpetrators and how can the mission address them?

9. In what ways are the Missions’ means to address the risks limited by the situation (either by actors, environmental conditions, etc.)?

10. How can bystanders and others be mobilized to act as positive influencers?
### Activity 3.1: Threat Assessment Worksheet

| **Perpetrators** |  
| --- | ---  
| Which, if any, key actors currently have or might plausibly develop the motive, means and opportunity to carry out large-scale, deliberate attacks on populations? |  

| **Target groups** |  
| --- | ---  
| Which, if any, groups of populations are currently being targeted or might plausibly be targeted for deliberate attack? |  

| **Influential third parties** |  
| --- | ---  
| Which other actors are enabling atrocities, or playing protecting or peacebuilding roles with respect to ongoing or potential mass atrocities? |  

| **Means for perpetration** |  
| --- | ---  
| What resources are available to perpetrators – is there a surplus of illegal (or legal) arms flowing through the country? If the government is the perpetrator, what military resources do they have at their disposal? |  

### Potential motives
What divisions within a society may be driving one group to perpetrate crimes against another?

### Opportunity for perpetration
Is there a particular trigger for atrocities coming up? Are there moments in the political process that could breakdown and result in atrocities?

### Early indicators of risks
Are there any other early indicators of risks, such as increasing hate speech, movement of armed groups, changes in laws affecting some groups more than others or broader legal reforms restricting human rights, or increasing evidence of human rights abuses?

### Unique vulnerabilities of populations based upon
- ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, age, gender, other communal differences within your surroundings.

Based upon the variables above – do you think there is a risk of mass atrocity crimes? Which ones? Are there things you identified in this case that you would not have focused on prior to learning about the Framework of Analysis?
Case Scenario – South Sudan

Background

Decades of civil war within Sudan between the north and south finally ended in 2005. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 9 January 2005 between the Government of Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) ended Africa’s longest running civil war. The CPA also called for a referendum to take place to determine the status of southern Sudan. The result was an overwhelming majority, 98.83% of participants, voting for independence. On 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan became the newest country in the world.

However, independence did not bring an end to problems in southern Sudan. Conflicts between rival ethnic groups within South Sudan over cattle, land and grazing rights also escalated. During the civil war these groups were united in the common battle for independence. Now ethnic-based militias kill and conduct cattle raids in the Warrap, Unity and Jonglei States.

In July 2011, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established to consolidate peace and security, and help support the development of South Sudan.

Ethnic Conflict between Lou Nuer and Murle in Jonglei State, 2011-2012

The troubled state of Jonglei has a long history of ethnic tensions, cattle raiding, kidnappings and sometimes violent competition for scarce resources. Conflicts such as these “cattle vendettas,” as well as other clashes between rival groups, are common in South Sudan but have serious consequences on the civilian population and pose greater security risks to the displaced people.

For example, fighting between the rival Lou Nuer and Murle groups is common. The Murle and Lou Nuer are both agro-pastoralist groups that depend largely on subsistence farming and cattle-herding. Historically, ethnic clashes and cattle raids are a result of the demand for high bridal dowries.

In the past, such clashes were conducted with spears. Easy access to weapons led to a change. Following independence, ethnically based militias are now armed with assault rifles and vehicles. Women and children are targeted for killings and abductions as a tactic in these conflicts.

During the start-up phase of UNMISS, Murle militias raided the cattle from the Lou Nuer in August 2011. They also caused injury to men and women, and kidnapped children from the neighboring areas.

This triggered retaliatory action from the Lou Nuer. After having organized the self-proclaimed Nuer White Army made up of Lou Nuer, youths began to threaten revenge attacks against the Murle. They warned UNMISS to leave the area, and even threatened
to fight both UNMISS and the South Sudanese army if necessary, as they fought the Murle.

Efforts of negotiations to stop the fighting failed. In December 2011, without paying any heed to the international call to stop fighting, the Lou Nuer launched swift attacks on to Murle in different areas, killing approximately 600 people. The attacks were led by the Nuer White Army, a group of as many as 6,000 to 8,000 armed youths from the Lou Nuer ethnic group. The intention was to reclaim stolen cattle and the 180 kidnapped children that the Murle had allegedly taken from their communities.

The armed youths were largely from ethnic Lou Nuer villages in central Jonglei State, and attacked ethnic Murle villages in the eastern part of the state, including Murle civilians living in the remote areas of Pibor county. The attackers burned and looted homes; killed and injured people using machetes, sticks, knives, and guns; abducted women and children; seized hundreds of thousands of cattle; and forced tens of thousands of people to flee their homes to hide in the bush. A witness who was at the scene several days after the attack stated that he saw the dead bodies of civilians, including women who appeared to have been raped with blunt objects.

Murle then carried out retaliatory attacks in January and February 2012. During the period of 2011-2012 attacks and counter-attacks by Murle and Lou Nuer continued. Deaths included Murle, as well as Bor Dinka and Lou Nuer in revenge attacks by Murle during the same period.

The UN claims that about 350,000 people were displaced as a result of this kind of violence in 2011. At the beginning of 2012, South Sudan declared Jonglei State a disaster zone after as many as 100,000 people were forced to flee from fighting between the groups.

Many people from both Murle and Nuer communities were treated for machete and gunshot wounds at clinics in Pibor, Juba, and Malakal. International aid groups struggled to provide assistance to more than 140,000 people affected by the fighting.
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**Perpetrators**
Which, if any, key actors currently have or might plausibly develop the motive, means and opportunity to carry out large-scale, deliberate attacks on populations?

- Murle
- Lou Nuer, particularly “Nuer White Army”

Note that not all Murle and not all Nuer are involved in the fighting, so the entire group is not a perpetrator, but rather certain elements within the whole group.

**Target groups**
Which, if any, groups of populations are currently being targeted or might plausibly be targeted for deliberate attack?

- Murle
- Lou Nuer
- UNMISS
- Bor Dinka
- *Particular targeting of women and children

*What type of group are they and why may they be targeted? (Ethnicity? Political affiliation? Religion? Etc.)*

- Targeted based upon ethnicity and access to land and cattle

*Could the targets also be perpetrators themselves?*
Yes. As noted above, it is also likely that some members of the group may be perpetrators while others may be targets by association.

**Influential third parties**
Which other actors are enabling atrocities, or playing protecting or peacebuilding roles with respect to ongoing or potential mass atrocities?

- As written, UNMISS is the only third party in the scenario. However, it is possible to think of other actors in the area who could play a role, such as religious and other community leaders within the Nuer and Murle.

**Means for perpetration**
What resources are available to perpetrators – is there a surplus of illegal (or legal) arms flowing through the

- The scenario notes that the rival ethnic groups have “easy access to guns and vehicles”
- Attacks were also perpetrated with machetes, sticks and knives
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential motives</th>
<th>Opportunity for perpetration</th>
<th>Early indicators of risks</th>
<th>Unique vulnerabilities of populations based upon: ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, age, gender, other communal differences within your surroundings.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| What divisions within a society may be driving one group to perpetrate crimes against another? | The Nuer White Army was also able to take advantage of the large number of available youth to recruit fighters | The seasonal movements of cattle presents certain opportunities for cattle raiding activities. As the case notes, a history of violence related to “cattle vendettas” has plagued the region. There may be particular times of year when the environment is more conducive to raiding cattle. | Perpetrators utilized abduction of women and children as a tactic  
Tens of thousands of people became IDPs and were at risk of further attack in addition to other humanitarian and security issues associated with displacement  
Risk of abduction to be child soldiers |
| Scarcity of resources  
Cattle raids  
Retaliatory action – the case specifically notes retaliation for stolen cattle and abducted children | | The initial attack by the Lou Nuer on civilians – combined with the history of fighting between the groups – could have been an early indicator of potential for violence and atrocities if the risk of retaliatory fighting had been identified. | |
Activity 3.1 Optional Additional Case Scenario 1 – The Central African Republic

Background

The present crisis in CAR began in December 2012 with the launch of theSeleka rebellion against the government of President Francois Bozize. Human rights violations perpetrated by the predominantly Muslim Seleka rebel group, largely against the Christian majority of CAR, between December 2012 and March 2013 were grave and widespread. The rebellion culminated in the overthrow of President Bozize by Seleka forces on 24 March 2013.

Seleka attacks against the civilian population continued after March 2013, leading to the emergence of predominantly Christian and animist local self-defense groups called “anti-balaka” (anti-machete) in towns and villages in the north and west of the country. Anti-balaka factions began launching attacks against ex-Seleka forces and targeting Muslim communities for violent reprisals in September 2013. Fighting between the anti-balaka and Seleka fighters, in Bangui and Bossangoa on 5 and 6 December 2013 left more than 1,000 people dead and engrained religious identity as a defining feature of the conflict. By April 2014 approximately 80% of the country’s Muslim population was forced to flee or was killed and those that remain are still at high risk of attack.

Following the violence in late 2013, the UN established a Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSCA) to support peacekeeping efforts. France and the European Union also had forces within CAR helping to stabilize the situation during the peak of the crisis.

During 2014, international forces pushed the Seleka out of the capital, Bangui. Ethnic divisions, rivalries, disagreements over resource control, and disputes over strategy quickly tore the Seleka apart. By late 2014, the Seleka split into several factions, each controlling its own area. Despite relative stability in the country following January 2016 elections, rebel groups continue to control territory in the majority of the country.

As of January 2018, 688,000 people were internally displaced and 546,000 others had sought refuge in neighboring countries. After France withdrew its forces during October 2017, MINUSCA remained the sole source of security in many parts of the country that lacked a government presence.

Fractured alliances and escalated fighting

In late 2016, tensions grew between the separate ex-Seleka elements as they competed for control of territory and resources, including cattle grazing land and access to mines. Violence essentially pitted two ex-Seleka factions - the Unité pour la paix en centrafrique (UPC) and the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) – against one another, and uniting some ex-Seleka factions and anti-balaka groups.
The conflict between the FPRC coalition and UPC led to repeated attacks on the ethnic Fulani population – a predominantly herding community - over its perceived affiliation with UPC. The pattern of violence coincided with an increase in cattle migrating into eastern CAR, generating friction between local farmers and herders and Fulani herders or armed militia, causing animosity towards the Muslim community. Anti-balaka aligned with the FPRC coalition also targeted Muslim communities in the south and east.

During November 2016, fighting erupted between the FPRC and UPC over control of roads to diamond mines near the central town of Bria. As fighting broke out, leaders from both the UPC and FPRC reportedly incited violence against civilian populations, with members of their respective groups targeting civilians based upon their ethnicity or religion. The head of the FPRC’s military wing in Bria said he wanted all Fulani and UPC out of Bria.

The FPRC reportedly singled out ethnic Fulani in the town, carrying out house-to-house searches, killing, looting and abducting residents. The FPRC also occupied hospital buildings, preventing wounded Fulani from receiving medical treatment.

This pattern of fighting between the UPC and FRPC, as well as affiliated militias, continued with a severe impact on civilians as violence spread to areas previously unaffected by the conflict. During December 2016, the UPC engaged in targeted attacks aimed at civilians in Ouaka prefecture, reportedly perpetrating summary executions of individuals perceived to be affiliated with the anti-balaka. Anti-balaka also continued their targeted attacks on Fulani and Muslim populations and throughout early 2017. By May 2017, anti-balaka attacks included targeting humanitarian convoys and MINUSCA bases, limiting civilian access to essential services and protection.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that the violence should “set off loud alarm bells” and the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has warned that this wave of violence could rapidly escalate and result in more reprisal attacks.
Module 3: Conducting Threat Assessments through the Atrocity Prevention Lens

Activity 3.1 Optional Additional Case Scenario 2 – The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Background

For more than thirty years, the territory of Beni has experienced cycles of violence which are at the root of grave human rights and humanitarian law violations committed against civilians. The natural resources of this region such as timber and gold, as well as its fertile land favorable for agriculture have continued to fuel the greed of politicians and local armed groups.

In 1995, after being driven out of Uganda from where its members originate, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an armed group with a radical Islamist orientation, established its rear base in the territory of Beni following an alliance with the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), another Ugandan rebel movement already present in the territory of Beni since 1988. The group invested in local economic activities in Beni and in the illegal trafficking of natural resources such as timber and gold, while forming close ties with local leaders.

The armed forces of the DRC (FARDC) launched several offensives to eradicate the ADF. During operations against the ADF the FARDC was accused of grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.

Rise in ADF attacks

Since 2014, following the FARDC offensives, the ADF intensified its activities in the DRC, perpetrating massacres against local populations. Between 1 October and 31 December 2014 at least 237 civilians were killed, including 65 women and 35 children, by ADF combatants in Beni territory. Some 47 civilians were also wounded, 20 abducted and 2 sexually abused. In total, ADF combatants attacked 35 villages. Attackers used machetes, hammers and knives, among other weapons, to wound or execute civilians. Some had their throats slit, were shot at while trying to flee or were burned alive in their homes. The majority of the attacks were carried out at sunset, when the population was returning from working in the fields.

During July 2016 the FARDC and the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) received warning of suspected planned attacks on villages in Beni, including the growing presence of unidentified armed men in the area.

Following initial warnings, armed men killed 9 civilians in a field in Oicha, just outside of Beni, on 5 July 2016.

Weeks later, on 13 August, presumed ADF elements massacred at least 50 civilians, including 15 women and 2 children, in the Rwangoma and Beni areas, on the border with Virunga National Park. The assailants, disguised as park rangers, established a barrier at the entrance of the park, near Paida, where they detained, tied up and killed farmers returning to their homes. The assailants then proceeded towards Rwangoma, torching houses along the way and killing more civilians.
There remains an ongoing risk of additional attacks by the ADF. Local self-defense militias have also formed as a result of perceived failure by the FARDC and MONUSCO to protect civilians.
Activity 3.1 Optional Additional Case Scenario 3 – Mali: Retaliatory Attacks, February 2017

Background

In January 2012, the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) launched a rebellion seeking to gain independence for northern Mali. In March, the military launched a coup against then-President Amadou Toumani Touré in protest of what they viewed as the government’s inadequate response to the rebellion. MNLA and armed extremist groups took advantage of the chaos to claim most of the North.¹

In 2013, these groups sought to increase their territory, triggering a French-led military intervention. The French operation largely ended the MNLA’s occupation in the North and a peace deal was signed by the Malian government and two coalitions of armed groups in 2015.²

The uprising and violence in the North drew focus to that area of the country, which led to a diminished state presence in central Mali. Armed extremist groups took advantage of this to secure safe havens and recruit locals who were frustrated with ongoing poverty, public sector corruption, inadequate security and the lack of investigations and justice for communal violence and criminality.³

Throughout 2015 and 2016 these armed groups increased their presence in central Mali where they executed civilians and government officials and committed other abuses. Their presence, and recruitment of local residents, inflamed and exploited tensions among the Fulani, Bambara and Dogon ethnic groups.⁴ The sedentary Bambara and pastoral Fulani communities have a history of disputes, and the growth of armed groups in the area has resulted in increased violence and casualties when these clashes occur.

February 2017 violence

On 11 February 2017, near the town of Ke-Macina in the Ségou region, alleged Fulani fighters killed a Bambara shopkeeper known for his opposition to the growing radical influence in the area. This sparked retaliatory attacks on houses mostly inhabited by members of the Fulani ethnic group, killing at least 20 people.

On 19 February, in another attack allegedly in retaliation for the 11 February attack, unidentified men summarily executed 9 civilians in Niono, Ségou region.

Both Fulani and Bambara witnesses reported that villagers were terrified as large groups of armed men had been seen driving around on motorcycles and vehicles in their villages in central Mali.\(^5\)

Following that incident, at least 16 more people, including civilians and members of armed groups, were killed in an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks. As a result of these incidents, at least 9,000 civilians in the Mopti and Ségué regions were displaced.\(^6\)


\(^6\) (SG Report March 2017)
Activity 3.2: Systemic Analysis and Threat Assessment  
(Slides 17-18)

Materials:  
- Girano case scenario  
- Threat assessment worksheets  
  (Module 3)  
- Understanding the nature of threats worksheet  
  (Module 2)

Time Estimate:  
- 2.5 Hours

Note to Facilitators: This activity utilizes the fictitious scenario of Girano. For this activity we will assess the scenario for systemic risk factors, as well as consider relevant actors, means, motives and opportunities for perpetration. Now that you have done a systemic risk factor analysis and threat assessment separately for two cases, the Girano scenario will give an opportunity for participants to get a comprehensive understanding of a situation as well as how the systemic risks and factors within the threat assessment are related. Participants should be instructed to assess the Girano case utilizing the worksheets from both the Threat Assessment Activity and from the Understanding the nature of threats activity in Module 2.

1. Groups should be able to identify perpetrators, means and motives and explain how the Atrocity Prevention Lens affected their perception of the threat.

2. The groups will return to participate in a role-play in which they brief a “Sector Commander” on the situation in their area of responsibility and the risks of atrocity crimes in Girano. The Sector Commander can either be the course facilitator or a designated member of the group.

3. Give the groups approximately 15 minutes to prepare a short presentation to their Sector Commander. The participants can decide what particular risks they want to brief their Sector Commander on and do not necessarily need to discuss all the separate categories of the both worksheets. Participants should be instructed to convey a threat analysis in a story-telling format regarding the risks, rather than using the worksheets as a “check-list” with points they must address in order.

4. The purpose of this activity is for participants to convey a threat analysis in a story-telling way to inform decision makers within a mission context. By outlining what they identified and explaining why this can be considered a risk of atrocity crimes, participants are better able to demonstrate how the systemic risks are related to the factors within the threat assessment.
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Case Scenario Fact Sheet

Country Names
Naruba
Girano, gained independence from Naruba

Inhabitants
Naruba: Approximately 40 million people
(After Girano gains independence: 28 million people)
Girano: Approximately 12 million people

Religious affiliation
Naruba: Christian: 60%
            Muslim: 30%
            Other: 10%
Girano: Christian: 10%
            Muslim: 89%
            Other: 1%

Ethnic Groups
Girano: Lunga: 55%
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Barado: 40%
Tibisi: 5%

**Political system**

Presidential System

**Political leadership**

**Naruba:**
- President: Mr. Bernard Baako, elected January 1993
- Religion: Christian

**Girano:**
- President: Ms. Khadija Kamisi, appointed January 2015
- Head of Girano Freedom Democracy Movement (GFDM)
- Religion: Muslim
- Ethnic group: Lunga

Vice-President: Mr. Ahmed Al-Aziz, appointed January 2015
Former GFDM – establishes the Girano Barado Freedom Democracy Movement (GBFDM) in April 2017
- Religion: Muslim
- Ethnic group: Barado

**Peace Agreement**

**Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA)**
Signed in 2014 to end the civil war between north and south and created independent state of Girano (south Naruba)

**Girano Political Pact (GPP)**
Singed in 2017 between GFDM and GBFDM

**UN Mission**

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Girano (UNSMIG)
Mission size: 9000 military, 3,000 police personnel

**Mandate:**

UNSMIG was established in 2015 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is established to support the Government of Girano in peace consolidation, thereby fostering longer-term state building and economic development.

The operational tasks of the mandate include (among other things):

(a) Protection of civilians:

i. To protect civilians under threat of physical violence, within its capacity and areas of deployment, with specific protection for women and children;
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ii. To deter violence against civilians, especially through proactive deployment, active patrolling and identification of threats and attacks against civilians, including through regular interaction with civilians and working closely with humanitarian, human rights and development organizations, in areas that are at high risk of conflict, including, as appropriate, schools, places of worship, and hospitals;

iii. To implement a mission-wide early warning strategy, including a coordinated approach to information gathering, monitoring, verification, early warning and dissemination, and response mechanisms to threats and attacks against civilians that may involve violations and abuses of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law;

(b) Monitoring and investigating human rights:

i. To monitor, investigate, verify and report publicly and regularly on abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including those that may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity;

(c) Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

i. Provide support to the DDR process to reintegrate combatants not suspected of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or abuses of human rights and their dependents to a peaceful civilian life, paying specific attention to the needs of women and children formerly associated with armed forces and groups;

ii. Support government authorities and relevant civil society organizations in developing and implementing community violence reduction (CVR) programs, including gender-sensitive programs, in cooperation with development partners and together with communities of return;

(d) Security sector reform

Work with the Government of Girano:

i. To reform the police and military, including by enhancing accountability, efficiency, self-sustainability, training, vetting and effectiveness;

ii. For the implementation of any appropriate recommendations for justice and prison sector reforms, including on the fight against impunity for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, in order to develop independent, accountable and functioning justice and security institutions
Girano Background
Naruba is a small country, comparable in size to Uganda, with approximately 40 million inhabitants, located in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The country has been plagued by a history of civil war since it gained independence from colonial rule in 1963, in particular between the Christian majority and Muslim minority (located primarily in the southern state of Girano). The Christian majority has typically controlled both political and economic power in Naruba. The most recent civil war between the Government of Naruba and the Muslim minority, represented by the Girano Freedom Democracy Movement (GFDM), erupted in 2009 when President Baako imposed emergency laws and extraordinary security measures that eroded fundamental rights in Girano. During the civil war, atrocities were committed by the armed forces of Naruba against the populations in Girano. In response the armed wing of the GFDM also committed crimes against Christians. Over 3 million Muslims, belonging to the Barado and Lunga ethnic groups living in the north, were displaced during the war and fled into Girano. No one was ever held accountable for the crimes committed during the civil war.

The civil war in Naruba ended in November 2014 with a UN and African Union (AU) negotiated Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), which rendered independence to the southern state of Girano. In January 2015, following the signing of the CPA, the leader of the GFDM, Ms. Khadija Kamisi, was appointed interim President of Girano. Mr. Ahmed Al-Aziz, a key figure of the GFDM, was appointed interim Vice President. Elections in Girano are scheduled for March 2019.

The UN
In February 2015 the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Girano (UNSMIG) with a mandate to support the government of Girano in peace consolidation, thereby fostering longer-term state building and economic development. UNSMIG’s mandate includes providing assistance to the authorities in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, protecting civilians, developing capacity to provide security by training military and police, establishing the rule of law, and strengthening the security and justice sectors in the state.

The initial authorized strength of the Mission stands at up to 9,000 military personnel, including military liaison officers and staff officers, up to 3,000 police personnel, including as appropriate formed units and an appropriate civilian component, including technical human rights investigation expertise.

Developments in Girano
By early 2016, fractures began to appear between President Kamisi and Vice-President Al-Aziz over allocation of government posts and resources. In media interviews, Al-Aziz began voicing his perception that the most important government positions were disproportionately being given to the majority Lunga ethnic group, to which President Kamisi belongs.
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For many years, Kamisi and Al-Aziz, who are both Muslims and members of the GFDM, yet representing different ethnic groups, were united in their common fight for autonomy from the Christian majority government of Naruba. However after independence was granted to Girano, internal rifts within the GFDM began to appear along ethnic lines.

Ethnic Groups in Girano

In Girano the two largest ethnic groups are the Barado and the Lunga. The Barado communities are largely pastoralist, whereas Lunga communities are primarily agricultural. Although the two ethnic groups have generally lived together peacefully, skirmishes over access to land and grazing have remained a feature of societal relationships between them. The recurring skirmishes become more frequent between the months of September and December, when the monsoons end. The onset of the dry season enables the groups to mobilize quickly because the unpaved roads throughout the region become accessible. After the civil war, with the increased militarization of communities due to the flow of arms, the skirmishes have become more violent.

In November 2016 in the Makal region, a violent clash between Lunga and the Barado left 150 people dead. Medicins Sans Frontieres reported that a local field hospital treated over a 100 people with moderate to severe injuries, mainly children and elderly people. Additionally, at the 2016 annual fair of cattle traders held in the Kota region, clashes between Lunga and the Barado communities left over 60 dead and over 100 injured. At least 20 women and girls, and some men, have been raped and sexually assaulted with sticks and mutilated with knives in ethnically-charged sexual attacks.

Between 10 and 15 November, UNSMIG received reports of Lunga soldiers conducting house-to-house searches for civilians of Barado origin in areas near Raga. Barado civilians were killed, houses were marked and later destroyed.

On 20 November, a group of Islamic leaders, the “Six Imams,” launched the Action Plan for Peace to try to create neutral spaces for dialogue to address the underlying ethnic and political tensions. In Girano, Imams are among the most respected individuals and have played a key role in local reconciliation to halt inter-communal violence for many years.

Climate and Environment

As a result of a shortage of rainfall and long dry seasons, populations in Girano continue to face severe food insecurity. This has led to increasing clashes in communities that are hosting large displaced populations from the Christian majority parts of Naruba that moved to the south during the civil war. The displaced populations live in camps and are often discriminated against by the host communities of both Lunga and Barado ethnic groups. The severe droughts between 2012-2015 have further exacerbated community and ethnic tensions with multiple violent outbreaks reported across Girano.

State Institutions

Girano’s leadership has struggled to mitigate ethnic tensions, in particular as its police and military capacities are weak. Although the Girano’s National Police Service (GNPS)
remains the lead agency for internal security, several local militias have formed along ethnic lines to provide self-defense and community security. Acquiring a gun, ammunition and other small arms in Girano is relatively easy and has created a highly militarized society. Over 65% of the population of Girano’s population is below the 25 years of age and a lack of economic opportunities contributed to youth joining these militia groups.

The newly created state institutions in Girano lack sufficient resources. Access to justice and basic government services remains poor. Government officials including the police receive salaries intermittently, encouraging a culture of corruption.

Since its establishment, UNSMIG has been mandated to build the capacity of the state of Girano; however, beginning in late 2015 UNSMIG has been increasingly called upon to provide protection to populations from ethnic violence. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Mr. Abdullah Omar has continued to report on the worsening security situation in the country, which has severely limited the Mission’s ability to assist the government in capacity building activities. SRSG Omar meets regularly with the President and Vice-President and is perceived to be well regarded by both.

As a result of the diplomatic efforts of the SRSG and other countries in the region, President Kamisi convened a “Unity Meet” of GFDM’s National Council in March to discuss the future of the party with Vice-President Al-Aziz. However, the Unity Meet failed, as Kamisi and Al-Aziz did not interact constructively and could not agree on the future of the party. Al-Aziz ultimately left the Unity Meet early.

Political rifts between President Kamisi and Vice-President Al-Aziz came to a head, when on 17 April 2017 Al-Aziz announced the launch of a new political party, the Girano Barado Freedom Democracy Movement (GBFDM). At the launch of the political party, Al-Aziz declared that the manifesto of the party included advancement of the Barado people within Girano. The launch of the party was met with celebrations among the Barado community and led to some incidents of violence between the youth militias of Barado and Lunga community.

The international community greeted the political move with caution. Commentators believe that a rift between Kamisi and Al-Aziz could derail the peacebuilding activities in the community and could further fracture Girano along ethnic lines.

On 28 April a group of Barado youth militia fighters attacked Boli town, mainly inhabited by Lunga people, where they burnt down and looted houses, leading to an unknown number of casualties, including civilians. Multiple sources reported clashes between Barado and Lunga rebels in the town of Raga, in the east of the country. In Kota State, in the town of Tuba, gunfire has been exchanged between the two armed groups. Lunga rebels allegedly raped a group of seven women who were on their way to the market. The Chief of the Girano National Police Service allegedly ordered the cops present in Tuba to not intervene or arrest when violence broke out.
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**Systemic Risk Analysis**

| **Political patterns:** What political patterns may exacerbate tension? (examples: changes in government policy, actual/perceived bias in government, gaps in land rights, discriminatory policies targeting particular groups, political repression) | **•** Promotion of ethnicity or religion as a determinant of national allegiance or allegiance to a party of the conflict  
**•** Involvement of state institutions or high-level political or military authorities in violent acts  
**•** Fracturing relationship between political leaders  
**•** Perception of bias in distribution of government resources between two ethnic groups  
**•** Weak state institutions |
|---|---|
| **Social patterns:** What social patterns may exacerbate tensions? (examples: risks surrounding certain religious holidays and rituals, patterns of behavior resulting from economic inequality, increase in hate speech or incitement) | **•** Increased inflammatory rhetoric, propaganda campaigns or hate speech targeting protected groups, populations or individuals  
**•** Inter-ethnic divisions between Barado and Lunga communities  
**•** Large displaced communities from previous inter-communal fighting  
**•** Poverty and lack of economic opportunities  
**•** History of armed conflict |
| **Environmental patterns:** What environmental patterns may exacerbate tensions? (examples: seasonal changes that affect relationships between nomadic herding communities vs. sedentary agricultural communities) | **•** Resource conflict among pastoral and agricultural communities  
**•** September to December dry season  
**•** Shortage of rainfall extending dry season and leading to severe droughts  
**•** Increased mobility of armed groups during dry season |
| **Triggering events:** What type of events can be triggers for atrocity crimes and where may those triggers be most salient? (examples: elections) | **•** September 2018 elections  
**•** End of monsoons in September  
**•** Media interview |

Note to Facilitators: Please use the information below as a guide answering the questions from the worksheet regarding the Girano Case Study.
## Module 3: Conducting Threat Assessments through the Atrocity Prevention Lens

### Threat Assessment

| Perpetrators | • Barado youth militia  
|              | • Barado rebels  
|              | • Lunga rebels  
|              | • Girano military and police (and heads of each)  |
| Target groups | • Barado populations  
|              | • Lunga populations  
|              | • Elderly, children and women singled out for attack in previous clashes.  |
| Influential third parties | • UNSMIG  
|                         | • African Union  
|                         | • “Six Imams” and other religious leaders  
|                         | • Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Abdullah Omar  
|                         | • Local civil society and locally-based international groups, such as Medicins Sans Frontieres.  
|                         | • International human rights organizations  
|                         | • Girano military and police  
|                         | • Girano government – particularly President Kamisi and Vice-President Al-Aziz  
|                         | • Neighboring countries, including Naruba  |
| Means for perpetration | • Flow of arms across borders and ease of acquiring ammunition  
|                         | • Military weapons  |
## Module 3: Conducting Threat Assessments through the Atrocity Prevention Lens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential motives</th>
<th>Opportunity for perpetration</th>
<th>Early indicators of risks</th>
<th>Unique vulnerabilities of populations based upon: ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, age, gender, other communal differences within your surroundings.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| What divisions within a society may be driving one group to perpetrate crimes against another? | • Land and resource disputes between communities (agriculture vs. pastoral livelihood)  
• Unequal distribution of government positions amongst ethnic groups and perceptions of bias within government  
• Allegiance to President or Vice-President  
• Revenge for previous attacks | • Upcoming elections (campaigning period, voting period, and announcement of results all serve as triggers)  
• Failure to adhere to peace agreements | • Targeting of women, children and the elderly in previous attacks  
• Pattern of sexual violence  
• Women targeted in transit to markets  
• Youth vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups |
| **Opportunity for perpetration** | **Is there a particular trigger for atrocities coming up? Are there moments in the political process that could breakdown and result in atrocities?** | **Are there any other early indicators of risks, such as increasing hate speech, movement of armed groups, changes in laws affecting some groups more than others or broader legal reforms restricting human rights, or increasing evidence of human rights abuses?** | **• Hate speech**  
• Recent clashes between Barado and Lunga rebels  
• Clashes following creation of new Barado political party  
• Failure of police to provide protection from renewed attacks  
• Lack of accountability for atrocity crimes perpetrated during the civil war** |
| **Early indicators of risks** | **Are there any other early indicators of risks, such as increasing hate speech, movement of armed groups, changes in laws affecting some groups more than others or broader legal reforms restricting human rights, or increasing evidence of human rights abuses?** | **• Hate speech**  
• Recent clashes between Barado and Lunga rebels  
• Clashes following creation of new Barado political party  
• Failure of police to provide protection from renewed attacks  
• Lack of accountability for atrocity crimes perpetrated during the civil war** | **• Targeting of women, children and the elderly in previous attacks**  
• Pattern of sexual violence  
• Women targeted in transit to markets  
• Youth vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups** |
| **Unique vulnerabilities of populations based upon:** ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, age, gender, other communal differences within your surroundings. | **Potential motives** | **Opportunity for perpetration** | **Early indicators of risks** |

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Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Module 3: Conducting Threat Assessments through the Atrocity Prevention Lens

Conclusion

Slide 19

Module 3 Learning Outcomes - Review

By the end of Module 3, learners will:

- Understand the ways in which information on risks can be collected and communicated
- Identify the actors, motives and means that may be present when assessing the threat of mass atrocity crimes
- Explain how the Atrocity Prevention Lens enhances the ability to assess the potential risks faced by populations
- Define warning signs and risk factors for mass atrocity crimes

Note to Facilitators: As a conclusion to Module 3, review the learning outcomes with participants, taking time to address any remaining questions.
**Objective:**

Module 4 will help peacekeepers identify tactical and strategic responses to prevent and halt mass atrocity crimes, based on threat assessments and risk analyses.

**Learning Outcomes:**

By the end of Module 4, learners will be able to:

- Articulate where R2P and the Atrocity Prevention Lens apply within the day-to-day work of UN peacekeepers
- Identify, prioritize and formulate a tactical and strategic plan to mitigate risks of atrocity crimes

**Methods:**

- Brief review of Module 3
- Group discussions
- Lecture
- Activity: Atrocity Risk Assessment and Response Plan

**Resources:**

- Slides
- Risk Analysis Worksheet
- Risk Response Worksheet
Module 4: R2P in Practice – Responding to the Threat of Mass Atrocity Crimes

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**Lesson Map**

Module 4 should take approximately four hours.

Estimated timing:

- 1 hour of lecture and discussion
- 3 hours of group activities

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Module 4: R2P in Practice – Responding to the Threat of Mass Atrocity Crimes

Introduction: Review of Module 3: Threat Assessment through the Atrocity Prevention Lens

Now that participants have been introduced to mass atrocity risks, this Module will discuss how to manage risks, including by prioritizing risks and developing an appropriate response.

As discussed in Module 1, R2P has not been codified in peacekeeping mandates in the same way that POC has. Peacekeepers are not prescribed a set of discrete actions they must undertake in fulfilling their responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes.

Nevertheless, existing practices within POC do provide an overview of the types of tactics peacekeepers can employ to prevent atrocity crimes. Indeed, many of the tasks and qualities of a response to mass atrocity risks will resemble those found in a response to the imminent threat of physical violence to civilians. The complex context of a mass atrocity situation, and the fact that most atrocity crimes require planning and preparation, means that the timing and order of activities undertaken by missions, as well as the menu of response options available to them, may vary from “normal” POC activities.

Module 4 goes beyond the identification of variables introduced in Module 3 to discuss how to analyze a growing (or decreasing) risk – and how to respond to this analysis.
Lesson One: Risk Analysis

In Module 4, participants will be learning how to use various risk management tools in order to prioritize and respond to threats identified in their threat assessments.

In addition to conducting regular threat assessments, as discussed in Modules 2 and 3, risk management provides a number of tools that can be used to prioritize and respond to risks or existing threats. Risk analysis should be forward looking and sensitive to the specific needs of different groups, including women and men, girls and boys; the elderly; children; youth; and persons living with disabilities.

Module 3 addressed how to conduct threat assessments - particularly in terms of identifying the various factors that may contribute to a risk of mass atrocity crimes. The Module introduced the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes – which lists risk factors for atrocity crimes – and then used the cases of South Sudan and Girano to list indicators within society that could contribute to a risk of mass atrocities. The next step in the Risk Management process is analyzing when these variables and observations may result in atrocity crimes and deciding how to treat (or respond to) those risks.

In other words, this lesson will address two questions:

1. How can the indicators identified during threat assessments inform your understanding of when the likelihood of atrocities is increasing?

2. When identified threats are increasing, how should peacekeepers respond?
The first part of Phase 2 involves analyzing threats. This analysis can start by formulating identified risks from your threat assessments in the format of an if/then statement.

A simple example from daily life may be: **IF** it is raining outside, **THEN** I will get wet.

Examples from a conflict setting could include:

- **IF** hate speech continues in South Sudan, **THEN** targeted killings may increase
- **IF** security forces are not trained in respect for human rights, **THEN** they may use unnecessary force against civilians and perpetrate arbitrary arrests

Some examples using variables identified in Module 3 could include:
Module 4: R2P in Practice – Responding to the Threat of Mass Atrocity Crimes

- **IF** small arms and light weapons continue to proliferate, **THEN** community violence may increase
- **IF** authorities repress peaceful protests, **THEN** riots may break out
- **IF** there are few economic opportunities for youth, **THEN** they may be easily recruited into armed groups
- **IF** populations do not agree with election results, **THEN** they may contest them through protests

As discussed with the Framework of Analysis, sometimes multiple risk factors may be present that could increase the likelihood of an atrocity occurring. In the if/then format this could look like:

- **IF** land for farming and grazing is scarce, the rainy season has just ended, and agricultural and herder communities have a history of inter-communal violence, **THEN** fighting may break out

For the purpose of the risk analysis in this course, if/then statements should also specifically highlight atrocity risks. This can either be done through looking at specific variables that relate to acts that may constitute atrocity crimes - such as the increase in targeted killings in the South Sudan hate speech example – or through thinking about the next extension of the if/then statement.

In other words, once you have determined that:

- **IF** land for farming and grazing is scarce, the rainy season has just ended, and agricultural and herder communities have a history of inter-communal violence, **THEN** fighting may break out

The next step is to formulate an atrocity-related if/then:

- **IF** fighting breaks out, **THEN** civilians may be targeted based upon their religious identity
- **IF** fighting breaks out, **THEN** children may be abducted
- **IF** fighting breaks out, **THEN** villages and property may be intentionally destroyed
- **IF** fighting breaks out, **THEN** a particular group may be massacred in retaliatory attacks
Once these if/then statements have been formulated, the next step is of analysis is considering the **likelihood** of these risks occurring. Determining the likelihood is another way of saying “What is the probability of this happening?”

One way of simplifying thinking around this is through using a scale. Risk likelihood is scored on a scale from 1 to 5, from remote to near certainty. Where a risk falls on this scale is dependent upon your perception of the probability that the event or threat will take place. “Near certainty” means that there is little doubt that the threat is real and will occur. “Remote,” by contrast means that the chances are very slim and nothing is likely to happen. Between these two extremes we have Likely, Possible, and Fairly Unlikely. “Likely” means that it is not guaranteed but there is a high probability that the risks could be realized. “Fairly Unlikely” means that the risk is present, but the likelihood of the threat taking place is very low.

You will need to utilize a number of variables from your threat assessments to assist you in determining how likely a certain threat is to occur.

Using some of the earlier examples:

- **IF** there are few economic opportunities for youth, **THEN** they may be easily recruited into armed groups

What is the likelihood that the youth will be recruited into armed groups? With no other information you may determine “Possible” – it is not out of the realm of possibility, but it is not 100 percent certain to occur or 100 percent remote.

But if you add more information from the threat assessment – what if there are no armed groups? Then the likelihood of being recruited into one goes down. By contrast, if there are armed groups in the area and they have a history of recruiting youths, then the likelihood may increase.
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- IF populations do not agree with election results, THEN they may contest them through protests

Determining likelihood on this example you may look at the history of the country. Is there a history of protests after contested elections?

When you assess the atrocity risks associated with this – the next question may be “what is the likelihood that these protests will be violent?”

Slide 4

When thinking about the likelihood of atrocities, the information from the threat assessments becomes all the more relevant.

- IF fighting breaks out, THEN civilians may be targeted based upon their religious identity
- IF fighting breaks out, THEN children may be abducted
- IF fighting breaks out, THEN villages and property may be intentionally destroyed
- IF fighting breaks out, THEN a particular group may be massacred in retaliatory attacks

When analyzing the likelihood of each of these risks – think about observations from the worksheets such as a history of fighting over land taking on a religious or ethnic dimension; whether armed groups in the area have shown a pattern of abducting children; and the capacity to commit retaliatory violence on a large scale.

If the groups have no history of abducting children – or if children have already fled the area – then the likelihood may be “possible.” If the groups have a history of kidnapping or of recruiting children into armed conflict, you may rank the likelihood “near certainty.”
Alongside the calculation of likelihood is risk impact. Once you have understood whether or not events or patterns of behavior are likely to occur – in order to prioritize your response you must also understand the potential impact on the population.

Risk impact works on a scale similar to risk likelihood ranging from “bearable” impact to “severe unbearable” impact. Impact can be perceived and measured in several ways – including the severity of the damage (death versus a light injury) or the scale of the impact (one person injured versus thousands). “Severe unbearable impact” means that the impact reaches a level of some unthinkable harm or suffering. “High impact” means that there are significant consequences caused by the risk. “Medium impact” is something that causes a measurable difference in the situation – but the consequences are not so severe that they are unbearable or difficult to overcome. “Moderate impact” means that some consequences are felt as a result of the risk, but the scale and severity is relatively low. “Bearable impact” may mean consequences that are not felt at all. The threat may have resulting in some consequences, but they have little to impact on those who were threatened.

Impact is judged here independently of likelihood. In other words – the impact of a genocide is “Severe and unbearable” regardless of whether it is likely to occur.

Utilizing the examples from the previous slide:

- **IF** fighting breaks out, **THEN** civilians may be targeted based upon their religious identity
- **IF** fighting breaks out, **THEN** children may be abducted
- **IF** fighting breaks out, **THEN** villages and property may be intentionally destroyed
- **IF** fighting breaks out, **THEN** a particular group may be massacred in retaliatory attacks
Impact is based upon how severe the outcome would be if the “then” part of this sentence happened.

What would the impact on the population be if massacre occurred?

What would the impact on the population be if villages are intentionally destroyed?

By contrast to these examples, what would the impact be IF it were raining today and I THEN got wet? Considerably more bearable.

Slide 6

The final part of Phase 2 involves calculating the **risk score**. This entails multiplying the risk impact by the risk likelihood. The resulting number is the **risk score**.

The example on the slide shows that IF hate speech continues in South Sudan, THEN targeted killings may increase. – The likelihood of hate speech resulting in targeted killings is rated as possible and the impact is rated as high, resulting in a risk score of 12.

Utilizing the examples from the previous slides:

- **IF** security forces are not trained in respect for human rights, **THEN** they may use unnecessary force against civilians and perpetrate extrajudicial executions or arbitrary arrests.
  - **Risk Likelihood**: *Possible* – it is not completely remote because security forces have not been trained in how to appropriately respond to the population – but it is also not absolutely certain because poor training does not guarantee that security forces will perpetrate crimes.
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- **Risk Impact – High Impact** – if they use unnecessary force civilians may be killed or seriously injured, the scale of which may amount to crimes against humanity (as seen in the Guinea case in Module 1). And the response may trigger further violence.

- Risk Likelihood: 3 x Risk Impact: 4 = Risk Score: 12

**IF** land for farming and grazing is scarce, the rainy season has just ended, and agricultural and herder communities have a history of inter-communal violence, **THEN** fighting may break out.

- **Risk Likelihood: Likely** – based upon their history (or pattern of violence) – there is a good chance that fighting may occur in this period. If you remove the observation of “the rainy season has just ended” however – the likelihood may shift down to “Fairly Unlikely” due to lack of mobility of groups and lack of opportunity for fighting.

- **Risk Impact: High Impact** because of civilian casualties, potential for spillover into a larger more protracted conflict, and likelihood of contributing to other risks – such as ethnic and religious targeting, recruitment of children into armed groups for fighting, attacks on women, potential displacement, etc.

- Risk Likelihood: 4 x Risk Impact: High Impact: 4 = Risk Score: 16

Utilizing an example of genocide risks will demonstrate how “likelihood” may affect your assessment even when impact remains the same:

In a country where risk likelihood is low the score may be a 5: Likelihood 1 x Impact 5 = Risk Score 5

In a country where risk likelihood is near certainty, the score will be a 25: Likelihood 5 x Impact 5 = Risk Score 25

**Note to Facilitators**: Emphasize to participants that there is no strict right or wrong answer for likelihood and impact – these scores are subjective and also highly dependent upon context. Something that has a severe unbearable impact in daily life, may appear completely bearable in the context of an armed conflict.
As noted earlier, an important benefit of risk management is that it allows individuals to prioritize responses. This is very important for peacekeeping missions with limited resources. In the graph shown on the slide, the identified risks have been charted according to their overall risk scores. Looking at the risk scores in relation to one another allows peacekeeping personnel and other actors to quickly see which risks may need to be addressed most urgently.

R1 and R2 on this chart correspond to the risks just discussed, where the likelihood of risk occurring is scored a 3 or 4 and potential impact is high.

R3 and R4 correspond to the two different genocide scenarios described – one in which likelihood is low but impact is unbearable (R4) and one in which the likelihood is high and impact is unbearable (R3).

R5 corresponds to the rain example. The likelihood of getting wet when it is raining is very high, but the impact is bearable.

An important thing to understand when considering atrocity risks is that mass atrocity crimes are almost always high impact – this is why you will observe on this chart that all risks except the rain example are clustered to the right side.

But it is important to remember that the risks that are most urgent are not necessarily the ones that will be prioritized first. Other factors, such as resources, capacities, and mandate will be a part of the prioritization calculation. Sometimes it will make more sense to address lower impact risks because they are easiest to address and/or may act as a means of preventing threats in the future.
Activity 4.1a: Risk Assessment (Slide 8)

Materials:  
- Girano case scenarios  
- Threat assessments worksheets from Module 3 (on Girano)  
- Risk Analysis worksheet  
- Poster size risk score chart  
- Different color post-it notes (one color for each group)

Time Estimate: 1.5 hours

Activity Introduction:

For this activity, participants will be conducting a risk assessment based on the threats identified in their threat assessment worksheets from Module 3. This activity will be divided into two parts. Part one will consist of the first two phases of the risk assessment cycle: risk identification and risk analysis.

Instructions:

1. Divide the room into the same groups used for the threat assessment activity in Module 3.
2. Instruct participants to take out their scenarios and threat assessments from Module 3.
3. Based on their threat assessments, participants will identify a list of risks of mass atrocities. If possible, risks should be formulated into an if/then statement. (For example, “if hate speech continues, then targeted killings may increase”). However, participants may list the risks in another format if it is easier.
4. Participants should list their risks on the risk assessment worksheet. Encourage participants to consider various vulnerable groups, including women, children, the elderly, the sick and persons living with disabilities. There may not be risks present to each of these groups, but it is important to consider them during this analysis.
5. Participants will then score each risk on the worksheet, by identifying the risk impact and the risk likelihood and multiplying the two numbers.
6. Each group will receive a different color of post it notes. Instruct the group to write their top 5-7 risks on post it notes, then come and place them on the risk score chart.
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chart at the front of the room. By doing this, the entire group should be able to see how the various groups have scored the risks they identified.

7. Bring the participants back into large group. The facilitator should now go over the results as shown on the risk score chart, looking for similarities and differences in the risks identified and how they were scored.

Optional Discussion Prompts:

1. How do the risks identified varied? Are there many commonalities among the groups?

2. How did the various groups score the risks? What are the similarities and differences among the groups?

3. What different vulnerable groups were identified (women, children, the elderly, etc.)?

4. How does using the risk score chart help prioritize risk responses?
## Activity 4.1 Risk Assessment Worksheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Analysis</th>
<th>Impact (1-5)</th>
<th>Likelihood (1-5)</th>
<th>Risk Score (1-25)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IF/THEN statement:</td>
<td>5 = Severe/unbearable</td>
<td>5 = Near certainty</td>
<td>(Risk impact x Risk likelihood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 = High</td>
<td>4 = Likely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = Medium</td>
<td>3 = Possible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = Moderate</td>
<td>2 = Fairly unlikely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = Bearable</td>
<td>1 = Remote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Example: If hate speech continues, then targeted killings may occur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF/THEN:</th>
<th>Impact Score =</th>
<th>Likelihood Score =</th>
<th>Total Score =</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<th>IF/THEN:</th>
<th>Impact Score =</th>
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<tr>
<th>IF/THEN:</th>
<th>Impact Score =</th>
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</table>
There are three main options when considering how to treat a risk:

1. **Transfer (to another actor or entity)**
   
a. Transfer occurs when another actor has a better capacity to address the threat. This could mean that a risk is identified and another actor who may be better equipped or prepared to address the risk is also identified and the responsibility to respond is “transferred” to them. In peacekeeping this can mean transferring to an actor with a different mandate that is specifically relevant to this risk.

2. **Mitigate: consider potential options for mitigation including the resources needed and the key actors involved**
   
a. Mitigate means that an actor is choosing to address the risk themselves.

   b. Utilizing the South Sudan hate speech example from the Risk Score slide, mitigation may include increasing community engagement, encouraging community leaders to use peace messaging, and/or increasing monitoring
of incitement to violence and preparing to provide protection to a targeted group.

3. Accept (either out of necessity or because the risk/impact are at an acceptably low level)

   a. Necessity: Some risks are related to variables or events in society which peacekeepers cannot control. For example, elections. Peacekeepers may identify the risks surrounding elections, but they cannot control when elections will occur in a country. So they accept the risk of elections and tensions rising as a result of the campaigning and voting process. They still have the ability to treat aspects of that risk – by addressing some direct threats to populations while elections are taking place.

Sometimes Treating risks can involve a combination of these options.

For example, if schools for girls are under attack in a particular region of the country, peacekeepers may treat by **mitigating** risks through patrols around schools when students are present; they may also **transfer** some responsibilities to Child Protection Officers or the UN Children’s Agency and others who are prepared to provide psychosocial support to victims of attacks; and while doing this may also **accept** the risk that you can prevent further attacks but not completely defeat the group perpetrating them.

**Slide 11**

There are a number of actors to choose from for “transferring” the treatment. Some of these actors are situated within the mission, while others involve a transfer to an external actor.

UN field missions have a range of protection actors distributed amongst the components. Besides the military and police components, civilian components, such as
civil affairs, human rights, political affairs and others, have specific mandates regarding POC.

UN peacekeepers under POC mandates are authorized by the UNSC to support or supplement the protection efforts of host-state institutions in cases where international peace and security is deemed to be at risk.

The military component retains the monopoly of the use of force in the peacekeeping missions and its units are the tools to protect civilians from physical harm. However, no military or police unit can sustain protection without the assistance of other mission and non-mission actors.

Child Protection Officers, for example, can absorb responsibilities related to an identified threat to children. DDR units may be tasked with assisting in demobilizing members of armed groups that have surrendered.

Slide 12

Outside the mission the protection actors include the host government, UN Security Council, neighboring states, non-state actors, and other organizations or UN agencies.

The host government always has the primary responsibility for protecting civilians within its borders.

Other UN agencies/organizations that have been mandated by the international community to provide supplementary protection in support of host government protection responsibilities:

- UN Refugee Agency: may attempt to promote and provide legal and physical protection, and minimize the threat of violence to displaced people. They also seek to provide at least a minimum of shelter, food, water, and medical care in the immediate aftermath of any refugee exodus.
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- UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: is engaged in monitoring human rights situations on the ground and implementing projects, such as technical trainings and support in the areas of administration of justice, legislative reform, human rights treaty ratification and human rights education.

- International Committee for the Red Cross: protects and defends international humanitarian law.

- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: mobilizes and coordinates humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies, advocate for the rights of people in need, promote preparedness and prevention, and facilitate sustainable solutions.


Many non-state actors (NGOs, CSOs) are also involved in the provision of protection related services (humanitarian assistance) the monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses (human rights monitors and advocacy organizations) and the rehabilitation and reform of judicial institutions.

Slide 13

For the purposes of this lesson, participants will be focusing mostly on the first three phases of the risk management cycle. However, it is important to note that continuous monitoring is an important part of risk management. Observations during monitoring feed into the identification of new risks, changes in previous risks and/or adjustments to risk scores and treatment options.
Monitoring is important in order to take changing circumstances into account as well as to measure the effectiveness of risk treatment activities.

Utilizing the herder/farmer example from earlier— if the likelihood of violence is high during dry season – but likelihood drops to “remote” during the rainy season, monitoring allows the analysis to acknowledge this fluctuation in risk score with the changing seasons.
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Activity 4.1b: Developing Responses to Risks (Slide 14)

Activity Introduction:
This activity will focus on risk treatment, or response. Based on the risk scores determined by the groups in Activity 4.1a, they will be instructed to develop a response plan. Response plans should focus primarily on the tactical or field level, although some discussion of strategic or political responses is also acceptable.

Instructions:

1. Have participants divide into their small groups (the same groups as in Activity 4.1a).

2. Participants will now determine which of the three treatment options to assign to each risk: transfer, mitigate or accept. (If participants have identified many risks, they may choose to focus on their top 5-7 risks, based on high score).
   
   a. If participants choose to transfer a risk, they need to identify to whom it will be transferred.
   
   b. For risks that will be mitigated, participants should identify how the risk will be mitigated, as well as what resources will be needed and who the key actors will be. Participants should also be reminded to bear in mind what tasks may be in their mandate.
   
   c. For risks that will be accepted, participants should articulate why accepting the risk is either necessary or desirable.

3. Participants should use their worksheets to do this portion of the activity.

4. Once participants have finished, bring them back into large group and have each group present their results. In addition to stating how they would treat risks, participants should be encouraged to say which risk they would respond to first and why.
### Activity 4.1 Part 2 Risk Response Worksheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk:</th>
<th>Risk Score (1-25)</th>
<th>Treatment option (Transfer, mitigate, accept)</th>
<th>Details (If transferring, to whom? If mitigating, how will you mitigate, what resources are needed and who are the key actors involved? If accepting, why?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tbody>
</table>
Lesson Two: Tools in the Toolbox

Note to Facilitators: The following lesson discusses a range of tasks and tactics that can be used in response to the threat of mass atrocity crimes. The information should be used to supplement the discussion from the previous activity.

Slide 15

Options for Tactical Response

- Patrols
- Conduct joint operations that include military/UNPOL personnel as well as national police/host military forces
- Evacuation of civilians under threat
- Conduct cordon and search operations
- Mobilize quick/rapid reaction forces
- Neutralize/defeat forces that threaten civilians
- Support relief for displaced populations
- Support the provision of humanitarian assistance
- Civilian asset protection

Core Protection and Response Tasks

Within POC the following tasks are used as a means to create a safe and secure environment for populations in their area of operation. These methods have been singled out because they are also an effective means for protecting populations from mass atrocity crimes. As emphasized in Module 3, upholding R2P in practice does not necessitate adding new tasks to the work of peacekeepers, but rather is a way to reframe thinking and the speed of response and/or possibly the combination of tools that are utilized. In that sense, most of the physical responses by peacekeepers in mass atrocity situations will not vary significantly from responses in other POC scenarios.

Patrolling: as with many mission activities, patrolling serves the dual purpose of being a means of obtaining information, as well as providing physical protection to civilians. Patrolling aids in restoring and maintaining a safe and secure environment, establishing freedom of movement, and can act as a deterrent to armed groups/actors.

- In order to protect populations through physical presence, peacekeeping personnel can engage in long-range patrols, protective patrols, escort patrols, night patrols, etc.

- When atrocity risks have been identified, patrols should take place at times of day when populations face the greatest risk of attack from armed groups. Those scheduling patrols should be cognizant of when populations are most vulnerable, planning such things as escort patrols around the day-to-day activities of
vulnerable populations, such as patrols scheduled around firewood and water collection, market patrolling, etc.

**Conduct joint operations that include military personnel/UNPOL as well as national police/host military forces:** by conducting joint operations with national forces, peacekeeping missions increase their capacity through strength in numbers and working with local forces that already know the local language, local context and geography. When operating in countries where military and police have the trust of the population, such operations also increase the credibility of the mission. Such operations also give the mission an opportunity to improve the professionalization of national forces.

- During joint operations it is important to distribute presence to areas where attacks are occurring/likely to occur and where many of the targeted civilians have congregated. Mission personnel should utilize the expertise of local forces to learn about inter-communal dynamics and leverage this information when planning operations.

**Evacuation of civilians under threat:** at times, civilians under the threat of mass atrocity crimes may have to be evacuated to safety under the overall coordination and arrangements of the host state and supported by the UN mission, UN entities and other international actors. Such evacuations must be carried out on a voluntary basis.

**Conducting cordon and search operations:** cordon and search operations involving isolating specific areas in order to search for concealed “adversaries” or weapons caches. Peacekeeping police personnel can utilize such operations to limit the capacity of perpetrators to commit crimes by removing individual perpetrators and/or destroying their means of perpetration by confiscating weapons or other tools for causing civilian harm. Such operations have also been used within IDP camps and POC sites to ensure that would-be perpetrators do not have access to commit crimes within protected areas.

- **Example from the field:** in South Sudan, tens of thousands of civilians have taken shelter in UN POC sites since the outbreak of the civil war in December 2013. In order to maintain the security and neutrality of these sites, UN Police conduct cordon and search operations to ensure that no weapons are trafficked through the sites and that weapons and combatants are not being hidden in secure areas. In order to bolster the trust between mission staff and civilians within the sites during these operations, UNMISS has started programs to educate people on the value of the operations to their security and has also deployed teams of female police officers to perform cordon and search activities since many women within the site feel more comfortable inviting female officers into their homes.

**Mobilizing quick/rapid reaction forces:** some missions are equipped to mobilize quick reaction forces to be deployed to areas of heightened threat. Such forces are often specially trained to robustly uphold a POC mandate and have the resources to rapidly deploy to areas where civilians are at imminent threat or where they are under attack.

- **Example from the field:** after months of relative stability following the formal end of the 2013-2015 conflict in CAR, violence reignited in November 2016 in Bambari as armed groups affiliated with the Séléka rebel alliance engaged in a series of
attacks on civilians as well as on UN peacekeepers from the MINUSCA mission. The mission deployed a Quick Reaction Force made up of Portuguese troops to the area in order to have a long-term presence with civilian protection capacity. In March 2017, the contingent engaged in “direct combat” with the Séléka allies and reportedly inflicted “heavy casualties” amongst the combatants while protecting civilians from attacks. The force also participates in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities to minimize the risk of future attacks.

Neutralizing/defeating forces that threaten civilians: in some situations when civilians are under attack or face imminent attack, robust peacekeeping measures are necessary, including offensive combat operations against perpetrators. Offensive operations may include combat patrols, raids or deliberate attacks and planned military operations against armed groups with the aim of protecting the civilian population.

Example from the field: In 2013, the UN authorized the creation of a “Force Intervention Brigade” in the DRC within MONUSCO. While all MONUSCO troops had a mandate that allowed for the use of military force to protect civilians, the Force Intervention Brigade was conceived as a contingent that would specifically engage in offensive operations against armed groups in the DRC’s restive east. In other words, this was the first effort of the Security Council to transition from peacekeeping or peacemaking to “peace enforcement” through lethal force and active combat. Alongside the national army (FARDC), the Force Intervention Brigade has carried out “targeted offensive operations” against armed groups with the aim of neutralizing them. Utilizing heavy arms, including combat helicopters, the brigade has engaged in fighting in North Kivu against such groups as the M23 Movement (which was subsequently “defeated”) and the Allied Defense Forces (ADF), which has perpetrated atrocities and killed more than 750 civilians since October 2014.

Support relief for displaced persons: in most cases displaced persons are cared for by humanitarian organizations, but in some cases peacekeeping personnel are needed to provide additional protection to those fleeing atrocity violence. In many instances peacekeeping personnel are the only force available to provide physical protection to civilians in certain areas and must help secure those who are fleeing to a new area. Displaced persons remain vulnerable to attack while fleeing violence – including ambushes by armed groups, CRSV, abductions, etc. – as well as potential violence within POC sites themselves.

Support the provision of humanitarian assistance: atrocity situations often trigger wider humanitarian disasters. In some instances, parties to the conflict may block humanitarian aid from reaching populations in need or attack aid convoys. Peacekeeping personnel can assist by providing a secure environment within which humanitarian actors can operate. If humanitarian aid is interrupted not only are civilians at greater risk of death from starvation and disease, but also a lack of resources may exacerbate tensions and lead to further conflict.
Civilian asset protection: this includes activities aimed at protecting civilian infrastructure and sites that are important to the community. When identifying that certain groups are being targeted – particularly religious groups – it is important to provide adequate protection to relevant religious sites such as churches or mosques, particularly on days of worship when targeted populations may be gathered in crowds. Civilian asset protection is also an important tactic for protecting women and children when schools and markets serve as potential targets for perpetrators.

Slide 16

Addressing the Specific Vulnerabilities of Women and Children: Specific Protection and Response Tasks

- Tailor patrols to women and children’s mobility patterns. (Firewood collection, water collection and market patrols for women, for example; patrols during hours when children are traveling to or from school).
- Ensure that women have access to information and services provided by the mission.
- Support the protection of children, including through securing schools, training juvenile specialists in police/military units who are capable of working with children after attacks, training peacekeeping personnel on standard procedures for working with children associated with armed forces and groups.
- Support the elimination of CRSV, including being attentive to indicators of CRSV such as women hiding in groups or witness testimony of sexual violence; intervene to stop sexual violence from happening when you have early warning information and detain perpetrators whenever possible.
- Establish safe areas for women and children within IDP camps/POC sites.
- Involve women peacekeeping personnel in cordon and search activities within communities and protection sites.

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- Establish safe areas for women and children within IDP camps/POC sites.
- Involve women peacekeeping personnel in cordon and search activities within communities and protection sites.
Module 4: R2P in Practice – Responding to the Threat of Mass Atrocity Crimes

- Some mission staff (including Child Protection Advisers) are mandated to negotiate action plans on children with armed groups in order to facilitate the return of children and/or deter groups from further recruitment.

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Consolidation Activities/Preventing Recurrence

Tasks undertaken to prevent mass atrocities at the consolidation phase often require a specific mandate from the UN Security Council, but can include:

**DDR:** Disarmament programs are often essential to prevent a recurrence of armed violence against civilians as they assist in removing the means of perpetrating atrocity crimes and, at times, remove the motives for joining groups of perpetrators. Such programs may involve collecting arms from combatants, demobilizing groups and beginning a process of bringing combatants back into a society through extensive reconciliation and sometimes provision of jobs. It is important to note that such programs should not include those with command responsibility for the perpetration of atrocity crimes, who will often be addressed through a separate criminal process. Some missions are also authorized to conduct repatriation and resettlement for combatants who have crossed borders (MONUSCO, for example).

During DDR processes, peacekeeping personnel should liaise with WPAs to ensure that they are equipped to address the unique protection needs of female ex-combatants.

**SSR:** Security Sector Reform (SSR) involves a range of activities that strengthen the rule of law in a country. These actions help prevent further atrocities by ensuring security forces are trained on violations of human rights in a way that prevents them from being perpetrators and also help in reinforcing accountability for any crimes that have already been committed. SSR activities include training national police and military personnel, as well as strengthening the courts and capacity for the judiciary to perform at the highest level following violent conflict.
Module 4: R2P in Practice – Responding to the Threat of Mass Atrocity Crimes

When the government is a perpetrator in atrocity crimes or when insufficient rule of law contributed to an environment that enabled atrocities, SSR is an essential element of the consolidation process.

National security forces need to be trained on human rights and international humanitarian law, and also need to be encouraged to refrain from recruiting past perpetrators into the military or enabling them to have leadership positions within the military. Courts need to be afforded the protection necessary to perform their jobs. In some cases, peacekeeping personnel also facilitate the creation of mobile courts in remote areas that previously lacked a sufficient judicial presence.

**Inter-communal dialogue and education programs:** A critical part of consolidation is stabilizing local communities and creating resilience to atrocity crimes. This sometimes requires reestablishing trust and relationships within different parts of communities and educating the population on their similarities and differences as well as on human rights. Peacekeeping personnel are often called upon to assist in establishing such mechanisms and/or facilitating local dialogue.

**Facilitating the peace process, including support to the creation of reconciliation programs and transitional justice mechanisms, as well as participation in ceasefire monitoring:** Mission leadership will sometimes be called upon to participate in peace negotiations in their capacity as mediators or good-offices roles. Peacekeeping personnel may also be mandated to provide physical and logistical support to reconciliation processes.

When states lack the capacity or reach of state authority, missions can often fill gaps in establishing local conflict mediation efforts for disputes within communities. Peacekeepers work to prevent and mitigate local-level disputes by supporting communities and actors at the sub-national level with community dialogue, facilitating mediation efforts and supporting localized peace agreements and reconciliation processes.

Within this context it is important for peacekeeping personnel to bear in mind the important role that women can play during the peace consolidation and peacebuilding process. Women should be included in all phases of the process in mediation and leadership roles.

In some areas missions have facilitated the creation of “Local Protection Committees” which increase community resilience and empower them to participate in their own protection processes. In the DRC, MONUSCO has played a role in encouraging women’s civil society groups to become deeply involved in the organization and implementation of such committees.

**Quick Impact Projects (QIPs):** These small-scale, rapidly implemented projects provide the mission the opportunity to build credibility within communities while also creating a common good for the community. “These projects must meet priority needs of the population and have both a quick and long lasting effect while building confidence towards the peace process, the mission and its mandate.”
While some QIPs are aimed at restoring public infrastructure – such as repairing wells – others can be focused on activities that may restore relationships within communities or provide a form of security. For example, QIPs may include awareness raising activities and educational programs. In South Sudan, UNMISS has facilitated QIPs that train local police on respect for human rights and awareness of risks for women and children. UNMISS has also used QIPs to assist in ceasefire monitoring and to provide women with resources that help in minimizing the frequency of dangerous trips to retrieve water and firewood.

**Support the restoration and protection of cultural heritage:** while this is only explicitly stated in the mandate of MINUSMA at the current time, the UN has committed to deepening the relationship between DPKO and UNESCO with regards to the role peacekeepers can play in the protection and restoration of cultural heritage. This includes protecting artifacts from trafficking, protecting historic sites from destruction, and restoring sites that have been damaged during fighting. In the case of MINUSMA, the mission has undertaken a number of tasks to restore sites within Timbuktu, including restoring nine mausoleums over the past three years. MINUSMA has also utilized QIPs as a mechanism for restoring cultural heritage sites.
Conclusion

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**Module 4 Learning Outcomes - Review**

By the end of Module 4, learners will:

- Articulate where R2P and the Atrocity Prevention Lens apply within the day-to-day work of UN peacekeepers
- Identify, prioritize and formulate a tactical and strategic plan to mitigate risks of atrocity crimes

**Note to Facilitators:** As a conclusion to Module 4, review the learning outcomes with participants, taking time to address any remaining questions.
Optional Activity: Action Plan

As an optional concluding activity, have participants complete an “Action Plan,” in which they will articulate how they plan to put the course materials to use in their roles as peacekeepers. This activity may be more appropriate for individuals who have previous experience in a mission setting.

The purpose of this activity is to provide participants with an opportunity to set personal objectives for the implementation of course material, as well as to identify potential barriers and enablers for implementation.

Materials:  
- Action Plan worksheets (see below; also in separate file on USB for ease of printing)

Time Estimate: 30 minutes

Instructions:
1. Provide each participant with a copy of the Action Plan worksheet.
2. Participants should work individually to fill out the their own goals for implementation of course material.
3. Have participants share out to the large group.
4. Depending on time, draw on participants’ ideas to discuss potential strategies for implementation as well as how to leverage enablers and mitigate barriers.
**R2P TRAINING ACTION PLAN**

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<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Date:</th>
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Based on the information you have learned from this training, what specific objectives do you have for implementation?

How will you know when you have accomplished these objectives?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What barriers and enablers do you anticipate facing in implementation?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barriers</strong></td>
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What resources can you utilize to help achieve these objectives and/or mitigate barriers?
What additional tools, resources or planning would you need for implementation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Next steps for implementation:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In the next 3 months I will:</strong></td>
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Other comments/feedback:
Optional Activity: Action Plan
GLOBAL CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies
CUNY Graduate Center
365 5th Ave., Suite 5203
New York, NY 10016 USA
www.globalr2p.org

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